Niger

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 22 to May 28, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 22: Two police officers and "several" (estimated at ten) bandits were killed in a shootout in Gusau, Zamfara. May 22: Bandits killed eight in Maradun Local Government Area (LGA), nine in Zurmi LGA, and ten in Kaura-Namode LGA in Zamfara. May 22: Sectarian violence led to one hundred deaths in Katsina-Ala, Benue. May 23: One police officer and one attacker were killed during an attack on a police station in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. May 23: Police killed four attackers during an assault on an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) office in Awka, Anambra. May 23: Gunmen killed eight in Jos South LGA, eight in Riyom LGA, and six in Wase LGA in Plateau. May 23: Herdsmen killed five in Takum, Taraba. May 23: Bandits killed twenty-one vigilantes in Rabah, Sokoto. May 24: Bandits killed ten while police officers repelled the attack, killing ten bandits in Bungudu, Zamfara. May 24: Bandits kidnapped fifteen in Tafa, Niger State. May 25: Gunmen killed five police officers during an attack on a police station in Ezeagu, Enugu. May 25: Police killed two bandits in Ohaji/Egbema, Imo. May 25: Bandits killed one and kidnapped one in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. May 26: Gunmen killed one police officer in Oshimili North, Delta. May 26: Boko Haram kidnapped "some" (estimated at ten) in Kaga, Borno. May 26: Police officers killed five bandits in Batsari, Katsina. May 26: Land grabbers killed two in Ado-Odo/Ota, Ogun. May 27: Herdsmen killed thirty-six in Katsina-Ala LGA and seven in Gwer West LGA in Benue. May 27: Herdsmen killed twelve in Gassol LGA and two in Bali LGA in Taraba. May 27: Security operatives killed seven Eastern Security Network (ESN) members in Eleme, Rivers. May 27: Bandits killed three while two bandits were also killed in Giwa LGA, bandits killed four in Igabi LGA, and bandits killed one in Chikun LGA in Kaduna. May 28: Bandits killed twenty across the Wushishi and Lavun LGAs in Niger State. May 28: Three police officers and two attackers were killed during an assault on a police station in Ukwuani, Delta. May 28: Nigerian troops killed ten Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. May 28: Gunmen killed five soldiers in Ihiala, Anambra. May 28: A Boko Haram attack in Diffa, Niger resulted in the deaths of three militants, four Nigerien soldiers, and four civilians. May 28: Kidnappers abducted "many" (estimated at ten) around Kachia LGA, Kaduna.

Asch Harwood, a former research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations' Africa program, is the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker and the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  The Nigerian state security apparatus has a long history of human rights violations. Most recently, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a notorious Nigerian police unit, made international headlines for its brutality and a wave of massive protests calling for its disbandment—which were then quashed by security services in a horrifying massacre of peaceful protestors. In many instances, the military’s response to Boko Haram has been similarly heavy-handed and indiscriminate. Abuses have been well-documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and even the State Department. A former colleague of mine gained access in 2017 to a prison holding suspected Boko Haram operatives, where he confirmed the abhorrent conditions and presence of significant numbers of women and children. Nevertheless, members of the military and police have also been victims of Boko Haram in their own right. The impact of the Boko Haram conflict on security services has been far-reaching, but in this analysis, the focus is on the geographic heart of the conflict—Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states in Nigeria, the Lac region in Chad, Diffa in Niger, and Extreme-Nord in Cameroon.     Since 2012, the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) has documented roughly 3,384 state security service deaths in the Boko Haram conflict. The epicenter of the violence is Borno State, which accounts for nearly 70 percent of all security personnel deaths in the NST dataset. Though the militaries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria cooperate under the guise of the African Union-authorized Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the NST does not distinguish the nationality of security personnel victims, only the approximate geographic location.   The deadliest years for security services overall have been 2018, 2019, and 2020, with 2019 the deadliest at an estimated 719 security personnel killed. This represents a shift from the height of the conflict in 2014-2015, when security personnel deaths were relatively low compared to the astronomical number of Boko Haram and civilian deaths, as can be seen in the chart below.   Since 2014, at least, Boko Haram has split into factions which sometimes cooperate. New factions are especially hostile to the police and the security services. In response to high casualty rates, the military and security services have withdrawn into highly fortified encampments. Their death rates have declined, but the jihadi factions are able to move about the countryside almost at will.   In 2019 and 2020, security personnel deaths jumped in Chad’s Lac region. In one incident in Bohoma in 2020, over ninety Chadian troops were killed. But Nigeria, and Borno State in particular, still remain the geographic center of the conflict. The borders in northeastern Nigeria, and particularly around Lake Chad, are porous, facilitating both Boko Haram and MNJTF’s regular movement across them. While these numbers appear to bring a sense of precision to the conflict, important to remember is that the NST relies on open-source reporting of casualties, which is subject to a number of biases in the context of the Boko Haram conflict. For one, many incidents take place in remote areas. As a result, estimates come from the military or Boko Haram themselves, both of which have incentives to downplay the number of deaths on their respective sides while overstating enemy casualties. Nevertheless, they provide a sense of the shape and trajectory of the conflict. The data shows that Boko Haram is far from defeated, and that the decline in military and security-service casualties are likely the result of their withdrawal from much of the countryside.

On March 17, around one hundred assailants, traveling on motorcycles and pickup trucks, killed thirty-three soldiers and wounded an additional fourteen in an attack near Tessit in central Mali. Peacekeepers operating under the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) assisted the evacuation of the dead and wounded; the French-led counterinsurgency force stationed in West Africa, Operation Barkhane, helped the Malian military secure the area after the attack. About four days later, perpetrators killed 137 in coordinated attacks in the Tahoua region of southwest Niger. The attacks took place near the border with Mali and also not far from Tillabéri, another Nigerien border region, where at least fifty-eight people were killed recently by gunmen on motorcycles. The Islamic State’s “West Africa affiliate” has apparently claimed responsibility for the Tessit attack. This likely refers primarily to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is known to operate in the tri-border region where the frontiers of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso meet; reporting on the attacks at Tillabéri and Tahoua suggests ISGS involvement. If so, there are additional reports that militants from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA)—a splinter group of Boko Haram—provided reinforcements to ISGS in the Tahoua attack. That would indicate a new expansion of ISWA’s geographic scope: the hotbed of ISGS activity is located well over one thousand kilometers from Boko Haram and ISWA’s main area of operations in northeastern Nigeria. Much closer to the tri-border area, however, is northwestern Nigeria, where criminal and jihadi activities are converging as the Nigerian region becomes more insecure. Banditry, particularly kidnapping for ransom, is prevalent; Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau claimed responsibility for a mass kidnapping in Nigeria’s Katsina State in December last year, though his claim is unverified. With regard to the latest atrocities in Mali and Niger, it remains possible that some level of coordination took place between jihadi groups and groups regarded as primarily criminal in nature. But, if so, why? Victims were killed, not kidnapped, and looting does not seem to have been the goal. However, outside observers lack the granular knowledge of the region to divine the motivation for the attacks. Revenge or rivalry over control of smuggling routes are plausible explanations, as is jihadi militancy. Or, perhaps, elements of all three are present.  With regard to the counterinsurgency effort against the jihadis, Barkhane is considered the most effective fighting force in West Africa. But the French deployment is not popular in France; public opinion perhaps fears Barkhane could become bogged down in West Africa like the United States in Afghanistan. Looking to the 2022 presidential elections, President Emmanuel Marcon raised the possibility of a whole or partial military withdrawal, but he has of late backed away from his earlier comments. MINUSMA was established in 2013 after the French Operation Serval and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) failed to stabilize Mali in the face of Islamist rebellion. The deployment under MINUSMA is large, with more than 16,000 total personnel as of January 2021. So, too, have been its fatalities: some 235 since it was established. Its mandate is “stabilization,” not peacekeeping per se, as there is no peace to keep. The recent string of violent episodes, along with rumored cooperation between jihadi cells, shows that stability and security in the Sahel are far from achieved, and that a significant French withdrawal or a winding down of MINUSMA could lead to jihadi and criminal forces severely threatening the survival of Mali's military-led government.

Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou, set to step down after two terms in office, was last week awarded the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. The chair of the Mo Ibrahim Prize Committee, Festus Mogae, a former president of Botswana and himself a recipient of the prize, said that Issoufou had "led his people on a path of progress." The committee noted that Issoufou had faced "severe political and economic issues." Niger in the best of times is one of the poorest countries in the world, facing recurrent, severe drought. It has been buffeted by jihadi terrorism, a host of economic issues, and COVID-19. Unlike many other African presidents, Issoufou did not try to remain in office beyond his constitutionally mandated two terms by amending the constitution or pursuing other extralegal means. The prize committee, in addition to Chairman Mogae, is luminous. The committee’s members are Graca Machel, former first lady of both Mozambique and South Africa; Aïcha Bah Diallo, human-and-women's rights activist from Guinea; Mohamed ElBaradei, Egyptian diplomat and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency; Horst Köhler, former president of Germany; and Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland. Former members include Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, now the head of the World Trade Organization, and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Mo Ibrahim, an Anglo-Sudanese billionaire, established the Ibrahim Prize in 2006 to promote good governance. Considered the world’s largest cash prize, award recipients are given $5 million over ten years, followed by $200,000 a year for life. Recipients can also apply for an additional $200,000 per year for their own philanthropy. Hence, the prize frees recipients from the pecuniary concerns that might otherwise encourage them to remain in office after their terms expire. Since its establishment, the prize has been awarded only six times. The five recipients preceding this year's were Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique) in 2007; Festus Mogae (Botswana) in 2008; Pedro Pires (Cape Verde) in 2011; Hifikepunye Pohamba (Namibia) in 2014; and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia) in 2017. Nelson Mandela was awarded an "honorary" prize, as he was not eligible for it, having left office before the prize was established. The fact that most years the selection committee cannot identify a departing head of state that qualifies for the prize is often taken as an indictment of the quality of African leadership at the highest levels. Ibrahim prize recipients have been notable for operating within a broad political culture of respect for human rights and the rule of law. Notably, all of the heads of state that have received it have left office when their constitutional terms of office were up. The prize, however, is awarded for "good governance," not for the promotion of democracy as defined in the developed world. This publication is part of the Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 16 to January 22, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   January 16: Bandits killed one in Igabi LGA, three in Chikun LGA, and one in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. January 16: Soldiers killed five civilians, and one soldier was killed in retaliation in Maiduguri, Borno. January 16: Communal violence led to two deaths in Anambra East, Anambra. January 16: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Shiroro, Niger State. January 17: Bandits killed ten, including one soldier, and five bandits were killed in Maradun, Zamfara. January 17: Gunmen killed two police officers and two others in Port Harcourt, Rivers. January 17: Nigerian troops killed thirty bandits and lost one soldier in Bungudu, Zamfara. January 17: Bandits killed one in Igabi LGA, killed one and kidnapped one in Zaria LGA, and killed two in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. January 18: Police officers killed two kidnappers in Mangu, Plateau. January 18: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Kagarko, Kaduna. January 18: A roadside bomb planted by Boko Haram killed four Nigerien soldiers in Diffa, Niger. January 18: Sectarian violence led to seven deaths in Mbo, Akwa Ibom. January 18: Nine soldiers and five Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Nasarawa, Nassarawa. January 18: Bandits killed thirty-five in Maru, Zamfara. January 18: Bandits killed seven vigilantes in Mashegu, Niger State. January 20: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno. January 20: Bandits killed two in Chikun LGA, one in Giwa LGA, and one in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. January 21: Bandits killed thirteen and kidnapped eleven in Bungudu, Zamfara. January 21: Yansakai, an outlawed vigilante group, killed two herdsmen in Maradun, Zamfara. January 22: Soldiers killed four kidnappers in Owo, Ondo. January 22: Bandits killed four in Chikun LGA and two in Giwa LGA in Kaduna.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 26, 2020, to January 1, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   December 26: Police officers killed a traditional ruler in Nkanu East, Enugu. December 26: Boko Haram killed four security personnel and six civilians in Hawul, Borno. December 26: Bandits killed one and kidnapped three in Bosso, Niger. December 26: Gunmen killed two and kidnapped fifty in Batsari, Katsina. December 27: Gunmen kidnapped seventeen in Munya, Niger State. December 27: Bandits kidnapped two in Bosso, Niger. December 27: A gang clash resulted in ten deaths in Kajuru, Kaduna. December 27: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped six in Sabuwa, Katsina. December 27: A cult clash resulted in five deaths in Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa. December 28: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. December 28: Boko Haram landmines killed four soldiers in Konduga, Borno. December 28: Nigerian troops killed eight bandits in Kaduna, Kaduna. December 28: Boko Haram kidnapped four in Madagali, Adamawa. December 29: One vigilante and one bandit were killed in Kaduna, Kaduna. December 29: Boko Haram landmines killed seven hunters in Ngala, Borno. December 29: Six bandits and two others were killed in Kurfi, Katsina. December 29: Nigerian troops killed three Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) militants in Konduga, Borno. December 30: Cultists killed four in Oredo, Edo. December 30: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Mobbar, Borno. December 30: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. December 31: Nigerian troops killed one bandit in Batsari, Katsina. December 31: Bandits killed seven in Mashegu, Niger State. January 1: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 12 to December 18, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   December 12: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. December 12: Twenty Boko Haram militants and one soldier were killed during a clash in Askira/Uba, Borno. December 12: Kidnappers abducted one and killed one soldier and one other in Ibadan, Oyo. December 12: Boko Haram killed thirty refugees in Diffa, Niger. December 13: Three escaped prisoners were killed after a prison break in Calabar, Cross River. December 13–December 14: Kidnappers abducted twenty-two in Rafi, Niger State. December 15: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Oshimili South, Delta. December 15: Suspected Fulani herdsmen killed three in Makurdi, Benue. December 15: Following a police killing of a commercial motorcyclist on December 15, protestors burnt down a number of police stations in Aguata, Anambra; during the violence, one police officer and one civilian were killed. December 16: Nigerian troops killed five Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. December 16: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. December 17: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno. December 17: Bandits killed seven in Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna. December 17: Amotekun officers killed two civilians in Ibadan, Oyo. December 17: Kidnappers abducted five in Kaura-Namode, Zamfara. December 18: Gunmen killed eight during an attack on the Zamfara Emir's convoy in Funtua, Katsina. December 18: Boko Haram killed five and abducted thirty-five travelers during a highway attack in Konduga, Borno. December 18: A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and three others in Konduga, Borno.

Alexander Noyes (@alexhnoyes) is a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Ashley Bybee is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Paul Clarke is an adjunct research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. In August, jihadists in Niger killed six French aid workers and two Nigeriens just outside of the capital, Niamey. Terrorist attacks have increased by 250 percent over the last two years in Africa's Sahel region, according to the State Department. To help counter the threat of terrorism and build the capacity of African militaries, the U.S. government spends over $1.5 billion a year on security assistance to the African continent. Does this support work?  Reliable security cooperation and assistance data are scarce. But the existing evidence suggests that the current U.S. focus on training and equipping African partners, without due attention to governance and institutional-level reforms, has been insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst.  Focusing solely on increasing the operational capabilities of security forces in Africa runs the risk of strengthening unaccountable, corrupt, and predatory security sectors, throwing away U.S. taxpayer dollars on equipment that will not be sustained, and undermining U.S. governance and human rights priorities.  The deficiencies of the traditional train and equip approach in Africa are well documented, including anecdotes of U.S.-supplied equipment rusting on runways due to neglect, investments swallowed by corruption, and U.S.-supported militaries being used for government repression or launching coups.  A 2018 RAND study found that prior to 1990, U.S. security assistance to Africa in fact did more harm than good and was associated with an increase in civil wars. The impact of more recent efforts has also been paltry, as U.S. security assistance since 1990 in Africa "appears to have had little or no net effect on political violence."  The study found, however, that a more holistic focus on governance and institution building showed more promise. Such assistance can be a more effective way to achieve both U.S. and partner country objectives, leading to "durable improvements" in the security environment. Our research in Niger – where we served as subject matter experts for U.S. defense-institution building initiatives – supports this finding. Niger is a key partner of the U.S. in West Africa. The United States provides a range of assistance to Niger, but the country stands out because strategic-level reforms have been taken seriously by both the United States and the partner country.  Niger continues to suffer from corruption, serious allegations of abuse, and often tumultuous civil-military relations. Yet our research found that the country has made strides over the past five years toward building better defense institutions and improving its defense management practices. Niger's political leadership – at the highest levels – appears to be genuinely interested in reforms aimed at improving the professionalism and performance of their defense and internal security forces.  Our experience in Niger points to four main lessons for how to build better military institutions in low-capacity countries facing a host of threats in Africa (and beyond).  Generate high-level political will. Local buy-in and senior level political will are crucial to all security sector reform efforts, but are particularly important for institution building. Identifying and cultivating change agents to take the lead in devising and implementing potentially disruptive reforms is key to ensuring gains are made and progress is sustained. In Niger, a full-time senior-level coordinator, with excellent high-level access and working relationships with senior leaders, was critical.  Codify shared commitments. Where U.S. and partner interests align, successful reforms are more likely. In Niger, an official Joint Country Action Plan – essentially a memorandum of understanding between senior leaders on both sides – helped establish and codify shared priorities and goals, and lay out tangible ways to achieve them.  Focus on the institutional as well as the operational. Niger conducts myriad military operations and hosts U.S. defense-institution building teams concurrently. Identifying opportunities to apply defense-institution building principles to current operations is a sweet spot where partners' operational effectiveness can be enhanced while simultaneously building more effective and accountable defense institutions.  Engage holistically – support military and police reforms equally. In many African countries, police forces are just as important to security – and in need of reform – as the military. With Nigeriens in the lead, U.S. teams helped create a unified interministerial structure that allowed the military and police to work more effectively and streamline joint reforms. Institution building and reform processes are long-term endeavors where progress should be measured in decades, not years. Even where clear progress is made, defense institution building is surely no panacea for fledgling democracies struggling with recent coup legacies and allegations of abuse.  While Niger still has a long way to go, the country's recent experience suggests useful ways to help build more effective, affordable, and accountable defense sectors in other low-capacity countries facing similar challenges and threats.

Jacob Zenn is author of “Unmasking Boko Haram: Exploring Global Jihad in Nigeria,” which was published in April 2020 by Lynne Rienner in association with the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews. The Sahel and Nigeria were previously distinct areas of operations for jihadist groups. However, the lines between these areas of operations are now blurring. It may, therefore, become harder in the future to determine which of Islamic State West Africa (ISWA)’s branches carried out an attack when such an attack occurs between Niamey, Niger and northwestern Nigeria. On August 9, the Islamic State’s ‘province’ in the Sahel, known as Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), was suspected of killing six French NGO workers, their Nigerien guide, and one other Nigerien citizen. The victims were on safari near Niamey, Niger in a village where many expats take day trips to see the Sahel’s only remaining wild giraffes. Not only did these victims lose their lives, but any hopes for Niger’s tourism industry to revive after COVID-19 were also dashed. Al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), immediately disclaimed the attack. JNIM has generally avoided targeting Westerners since its 2017 formation and seeks an eventual negotiation with Mali’s government for a French and UN military withdrawal from Mali and some form of power-sharing deal involving sharia law. This would follow the negotiation model of the Taliban, to which JNIM is loyal. It would not have been in JNIM’s interest or consistent with its modus operandi to conduct this attack. Islamic State acknowledged the attack in the “news” section of its weekly magazine, al-Naba. It did not explicitly claim the attack, however. This was perhaps because Islamic State avoids claiming brutal killings of women–and one of the French NGO workers was a woman. ISWA, which is historically based in Nigeria’s Borno State and operates around Lake Chad, including in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, has executed Nigerian female NGO workers. However, ISWA never officially claimed such executions through Islamic State media channels. Islamic State also never formally claimed the beheadings of European female tourists in Morocco, despite Islamic State supporters conducting those attacks. Adding to confusion surrounding the attack in Niger is that there are at least two factions of Boko Haram. One is headed by Abubakar Shekau and has no practical as opposed to theoretical affiliation with Islamic State, and the other, ISWA, is headed by a shura (consultative council), presents no individual leader, and claims affiliation with Islamic State. The relationship between Shekau’s faction and ISWA is mostly hostile but is also obscure, much like ambiguity surrounding ISWA’s precise relationship with the Islamic State. Confusion for outsiders is deepened by the fact that no faction will call itself “Boko Haram.” Shekau’s faction tends to focus on Borno, Nigeria and its neighbors, especially Chad. ISWA’s narratives take on a more regional and global perspective, However, as Shekau’s faction has undertaken operations beyond its traditional area of focus and near where ISWA operates in Borno and its borderlands, it sometimes becomes difficult to attribute specific incidents to one faction or the other. Before Islamic State announced that ISWA incorporated not only the Borno, Nigeria-based group, but also ISGS into one ‘province’ in March 2019, the latter entity had existed from 2015 informally as an Islamic State ‘brigade.’ This includes when it conducted the 2017 ambush that killed four U.S. special forces members and four Nigerien soldiers in Tongo Tongo, Niger. As late as March 2019, therefore, ISWA comprised two separate entities: one Borno branch and another Sahel branch in the Niger-Burkina Faso-Mali border axis. Both are distinct from the Shekau faction. The attack on the French NGO workers, which would be the ISWA Sahel branch’s southernmost attack, occurred 150 miles from northwestern Nigeria’s Sokoto State. It was also in Sokoto that ISWA’s Borno branch claimed an attack that was organized from across the border in Niger in 2019. Such attacks near the Sokoto, Nigeria-Niger border represent the expansion of both ISWA branches' traditional areas of operations and indicate the two branches are converging. In recent months there have been other signs of the Shekau faction establishing bases in northwestern Nigeria, particularly Niger State. Meanwhile, the smaller and lone al-Qaeda-loyal faction in Nigeria, Ansaru, has claimed several attacks since January in Kaduna State, which is located roughly between Niger State and Sokoto State. These trend lines suggest the area between Niamey, Niger and Niger State, Nigeria will not be spared from jihadist groups’ attacks any longer and ISWA’s two branches, Shekau’s faction, and Ansaru will all be competing for recruits in the same areas.

International Crisis Group, a well-regarded NGO, has issued a thoughtful evaluation of the effort by Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and Niger to coordinate their military efforts against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. The coordinating instrument is the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), authorized by the African Union in 2015 and with a civilian oversight board. Participating states collectively pledged 8,000 troops to the MNJTF. (The Republic of Benin is a member of the MNJTF but contributes no troops.)  Crisis Group notes successes by the MNJTF: instances of troops engaging with Boko Haram across national borders and improved morale among soldiers. However, Crisis Group also notes that Boko Haram factions often quickly regroup after MNJTF operations because such operations are rarely sustained. In fact, Boko Haram appears to be strengthening, especially in northeast Nigeria. According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, the last two years have been deadlier than any other period for Nigerian soldiers since the Boko Haram insurgency began in 2011.   Further, the report finds that participating countries are reluctant to cede command over their own troops to the MNJTF, planning is poorly coordinated, and there is a shortage of funding. Participating countries often have different political goals. For example, Crisis Group suggests that the Nigerian government sees the MNJTF as a fig leaf to cover the Chadian military's operations within Nigerian territory. Further, civilian oversight is weak and poorly funded. To that end, Crisis Group recommends enhanced intelligence coordination, establishing clearer lines of authority, and improving the human rights posture. Those participating in the MNJTF should approach the AU and the EU for increased funding.  The economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic and the fall in oil prices has weakened the already struggling economies of the MNJTF, and so the prospect of asking the force to do more must be seen in the context of the cash-strapped current climate. But some of the report’s recommendations may not require much in the way of funding, such as trust building among MNJTF participants and better coordination and communication. Beyond its clear-eyed evaluation of the MNJTF, Crisis Group notes the need of participating governments to win the trust of the local populations in the Lake Chad Basin. This implies a political process that is largely absent, though the report makes the important observation that a well-functioning MNJTF could promote trust. That dimension could prove to be more significant than its military operations against Boko Haram.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 16 to 22, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1590503351929'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 16: Gunmen kidnapped three people from Ado and Makurdi LGAs in Benue. May 17: Boko Haram killed twenty in Nganzai, Borno.   May 17: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  May 17: Gunmen abducted a naval officer and two others in Akoko South-East, Ondo.  May 17: Bandits killed five in Shiroro, Niger state.  May 18: Twelve Nigerien soldiers and seven Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack in Diffa, Niger.  May 18: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Bursari, Yobe.  May 18: Bandits killed eight in Wukari, Taraba.  May 18: Two Nigerian soldiers and three Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Gujba, Yobe.  May 19: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Biase, Cross River.  May 19: Bandits killed ten in Tsafe, Zamfara.  May 20: Communal violence led to twp deaths in Ishielu, Ebonyi.  May 21: Police officers killed eight kidnappers in Bali, Taraba.   May 22: Police killed two bandits in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. May 22: Gunmen killed twenty in Kajuru, Katsina.  May 20–22: Nigerian troops killed 135 bandits in Jiba and Dan Musa LGAs in Katsina and Birnin Magaji and Zurmi LGAs in Zamfara. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 9 to 15, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589832552098'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 9: Gunmen killed two police officers and one civilian in Okpe, Delta.  May 9: Herdsmen killed two in Guma, Benue.  May 9: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  May 10: Communal violence led to eight deaths in Bali, Taraba.  May 11: Nigerian and Nigerien troops killed twenty-five Boko Haram militants in Diffa, Niger.  May 11: Nigerian and Nigerien troops killed fifty Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  May 12: Gunmen killed seventeen in Kajuru, Kaduna.  May 12: Herdsmen killed two civilians while the Nigerian army killed four of the herdsmen in Guma, Benue.  May 12: Herdsmen killed two in Numan, Adamawa.  May 12: Kidnappers abducted an Army captain and three others in Akoko North-East, Ondo.  May 12: Herdsmen killed four in Guma, Benue.  May 12: A communal clash resulted in three deaths in Biase, Cross River.  May 13: Herdsmen killed eight in Kajuru, Kaduna.  May 13: Nine Boko Haram militants and five Nigerian soldiers were killed during a clash in Kaga, Borno.  May 13: Gunmen killed eleven in Safana LGA, one in Batsari LGA, two in Dutsinma LGA, and three in Faskari LGA in Katsina.  May 14: Nigerian troops killed twenty-seven bandits along the Katsina/Zamfara border (Birnin-Magaji LGA in Zamfara, estimated).  May 14: Gunmen killed three in Dekina, Kogi.  May 15: Communal violence led to forty-eight deaths in Lamurde, Adamawa.  May 15: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. 

Asch Harwood is a research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations and the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker. Previously at UNICEF and Reboot, he is the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  April is now one of the deadliest months in the Boko Haram conflict, according to data from the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST), which now features geographic data from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589298856898'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='590px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='590px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The NST has documented 1,491 deaths linked to the Boko Haram conflict in April. Casualties have only been higher in two previous months—March 2014 and February 2015—since the NST began in May 2011. These previously higher death tolls were reported during the height of the Boko Haram conflict.  So what accounts for such a dramatic spike in violence? The escalation culminating on April 8 is the result of a roughly two-week assault by Chadian forces on alleged Boko Haram operating around Lake Chad.  var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589293529471'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   Chad’s military claimed it killed one thousand “jihadists,” and lost fifty-two soldiers. It launched the assault, called Operation Bohoma Anger, in response to an attack on Chadian troops by Boko Haram near Lake Chad that left nearly one hundred dead over March 23 and 24. Chad’s military reportedly attacked positions all around Lake Chad, including in Nigeria and Niger. Borders in the region are largely nonexistent. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1589293735896'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 800 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else if ( divElement.offsetWidth > 500 ) { vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='587px';} else { vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height='727px';} var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   Despite these claims of “victory,” there remain unanswered questions. Jacob Zenn, a frequent contributor here, has pointed out that the effort was probably more of a public relations campaign than a military victory. He points to the presence of Chadian President Idriss Deby and his son in the region during the offensive. He also argues that the Chadian military is likely exaggerating how many alleged Boko Haram were killed while downplaying the number of military casualties. Zenn also notes that the operation largely targeted the ISWA sect of Boko Haram, even though it was its rival, Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), that attacked the Chadian military over March 23 and 24. Then there are questions regarding human rights violations. For example, there have been credible allegations that suspected Boko Haram captured during Bohoma Anger were poisoned after being denied food and water while in prison.  The International Crisis Group points out in a recent report on the conflict, “Jihadist groups pose a very serious danger to civilians and soldiers in the four countries bordering Lake Chad.” Daniel Eizenga, writing for the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, goes a step further, arguing, “Boko Haram’s ability to accomplish such a devastating attack, along with the preceding increase in militant Islamist group activity in Chad’s Lac Province, however, raises the prospect that Boko Haram and ISWA have gained momentum and now pose a greater threat to Chad and stability in the wider region.” Still, for the moment, the spike in violence does not necessarily reflect a return to 2014–2015.  

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 4 to 10, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1586786037403'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   April 5: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and ten others in Amchide, Cameroon.  April 6: Nigerian troops killed nineteen Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 6: Nigerian police killed six in a clash over the lockdown in Kaduna South, Kaduna.   April 7: Suspected herdsmen killed one in Oshimili North, Delta.  April 7: Nigerian troops killed two Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  April 7: Gunmen killed four in Bassa, Plateau.  April 7: Nigerien and Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  April 7: A military officer and three kidnappers were killed during a shootout in Okene, Kogi.  April 7: Boko Haram killed three in Askira/Uba, Borno.  April 8: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Ukum, Benue.  April 8: Bandits killed one and kidnapped sixteen in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  April 8: Gunmen abducted nine in Chikun, Kaduna.   April 8: The Chadian army said that military operations over the past month had resulted in the deaths of one thousand Boko Haram militants and fifty-two Chadian soldiers in the Lake Chad area.  April 10: Suspected herdsmen killed a pastor in Oshimili North, Delta. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 7 to 13, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1584367334062'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   March 7: Boko Haram killed seven in Diffa, Niger.  March 8: Gunmen kidnapped three in Aniocha South, Delta.  March 8: Bandits killed eight in Bungudu, Zamfara.  March 8: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 9: Kidnappers abducted six and killed one in Shagari, Sokoto. March 9: Kidnappers abducted four students in Funtua, Katsina. March 10: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped four in Kaduna North, Kaduna.  March 10: Sectarian violence led to nine deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi.  March 10: Customs officers killed nine in Ibadan, Oyo.  March 11: Nigerian police killed six kidnappers in Faskari, Katsina.  March 11: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Agatu, Benue.  March 12: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  March 12: Bandits killed four in Gusau, Zamfara. March 12: Nigerian and Chadian soldiers killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram commanders in Kukawa, Borno.  March 13: Herdsmen killed seven in Guma, Benue.