Togo

Adam Valavanis is a former intern with the Africa Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. He received a master’s degree in conflict studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science.  On February 22, Togolese will head to the ballot box to vote in a presidential election. It will be the year's first national election in Africa. The incumbent, President Faure Gnassingbe, is seeking to extend his stay in office despite having already served three terms as president.  Gnassingbe will face six other candidates, including longtime rival Jean Pierre Fabre. Fabre, a human rights activist, was nominated as the leader of Togo's main opposition party, National Alliance for Change, late last year. He has come in second place in the previous two elections and now faces the herculean task of uniting the opposition. Thanks in part to the fragmented opposition, Gnassingbe is favored to win. Faure Gnassingbe came to power in 2005 following the death of his father Gnassingbe Eyadema, who had ruled the country since 1967. He subsequently won reelection in 2010 and 2015. Together, the Gnassingbe family has led the country for more than fifty years. The family's long reign has in recent years become a point of contention. In 2017 and 2018, protestors took to the streets demanding that Gnassingbe step down. Unfortunately, these protests have fizzled out, with the opposition, nicknamed the C14, unable to capitalize on them ahead of the election.  Now Gnassingbe finds himself with more power than ever before. His grip on the country has been bolstered by the reinstatement of presidential term limits last year by parliament. Under the new law, presidents can serve up to two five-year terms. Term limits had been scrapped during Gnassingbe Eyadema's near forty-year rule. However, this new law reset Gnassingbe's term limits, permitting him to stay in office until 2030. The opposition had boycotted the 2018 legislative elections, resulting in a near unanimous decision. Such anti-democratic moves are surprising in West Africa, home to some of the continent's most vibrant democracies. Despite its otherwise strong record of defending democracy in the region, ECOWAS has been unable to exert its influence in Togo. In early 2018, the regional body hosted mediation talks between the government and the opposition. Unfortunately, in spite of these efforts, little has changed on the ground and ECOWAS seems unable to reign in Gnassingbe's authoritarian tendencies. In response to the protests in 2017 and 2018, Gnassingbe unleashed security forces on peaceful protestors resulting in arrests, injuries, and deaths. In the run-up to Sunday's contest, opposition towns across the country have been on lockdown. Additionally, the country's national election commission issued a statement earlier this week, stripping the main independent election observer, the National Consultation of Civil Society of Togo, of its accreditation. This follows the commission's refusal to allow the Catholic Church to monitor polling places. Such moves have many worried that the vote will be neither free nor fair and another step away from democracy.

Adam Valavanis is a former intern with the Africa Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. He received a master’s degree in conflict studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science. West Africa is facing a growing threat from Islamist extremist groups. Many of these groups originated in Mali but have since spilled over its borders, with jihadis establishing themselves in the north and east of Burkina Faso. The country has become a desirable haven for many groups because of the security vacuum that has defined the country following the deposition of longtime strongman Blaise Compaore. The presence of these groups, including Ansaroul Islam, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen, has precipitated a rise in interethnic and interreligious tensions in a country that has for years been characterized by peaceful coexistence.  Burkina Faso's inability to clamp down on many of the extremist groups operating inside its borders has allowed such groups to use the country as a launch pad for attacks in coastal West African countries, most notably Benin. Burkina Faso borders Pendjari National Park in Benin's northwest. This forest has become the site of several incursions by jihadis, who have attacked communities and tourists in the area. The situation has become so dire in the north that both France and the United States have issued travel warnings for Pendjari and the surrounding areas. Such incursions by Islamist groups come at a time of political fragility in Benin, following its controversial legislative elections in April. The protests and general sense of insecurity that have gripped the country in the last few months could provide fertile ground to extremist groups looking to gain a foothold in the country. Officials fear that jihadis have also infiltrated Togo and Ghana.  Currently, the most comprehensive effort to combat Islamist terrorism and intercommunal violence in the region is the G5 Sahel Joint Force, a security partnership between five states in the Sahel and supported by France. Unfortunately, the G5 has faced funding shortfalls, preventing it from quickly and effectively responding to threats as they arise.  For most of the past decade, coastal West Africa has been spared the Islamist violence that has dominated the Sahel. It hosts some of the continent's most stable democracies, including Senegal, Ghana, and Benin. The region has also become a hotspot of foreign investment, attracting interest from the West as well as China and Turkey. The presence of Islamist groups, along with ongoing issues such as corruption and drug trafficking, threatens to upend all of this.  

The past few months have not been comforting for advocates of dynastic succession in Africa. In Togo and Gabon, favorite sons have become focal points for popular frustration. Togo’s Gnassingbé Eyadema led the country from 1967 until his death in 2005. His son, Faure Gnassingbé, was promptly installed as president, and was since been victorious in three deeply flawed elections. Togolese citizens have been vociferously demanding democratic reforms and insisting on term limits that would apply retroactively, effectively ending Faure’s tenure in 2020. They have been met with sometimes violent repression that has alarmed the region.  Togo’s December parliamentary elections did little to improve the country’s prospects. The opposition largely boycotted the exercise, insisting on key reforms to the electoral commission and process before participating. The resulting predictable victory for the ruling party is unlikely to be understood as a definitive decision about the country’s future, and unlikely to quell popular demands for change. Gabon’s future is equally uncertain, though for different reasons. Omar Bongo led Gabon for over 40 years. When he died in 2009, his son Ali was declared the winner in disputed presidential elections, and re-elected in another flawed election in 2016.  Last October Ali Bongo suffered a suspected stroke while in Saudi Arabia, and while his government insists that he is recovering in Morocco, he has not yet returned to the country he purportedly leads. Widespread confusion about who is really making decisions, uncertainty about when the newly elected National Assembly and a new cabinet will begin work, and political maneuvers that appear designed to evade the constitutional requirement that an incapacitated President be replaced through a special election do not inspire confidence domestically or abroad. A tight inner circle of Bongo loyalists (unsurprisingly featuring some family members) appear to hold the real levers of power for now, but as the failed coup attempt on January 7 illustrates, it will be difficult to maintain stability with provisional and ad hoc measures indefinitely.   As measures these long-ruling families have taken to cling to power become increasingly extreme, they invite resentment and resistance from citizens whose everyday concerns predispose them to reject the air of entitlement that surrounds their leaders. On a continent where calls for generational change have real political potency, installing junior in office is rarely a satisfying response.