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Rumors of a Political Capture
Accusations of influence peddling in the heart of its presidency raise the ugly scepter of state capture in Nigeria. Read More
Nigeria Faces a Crippling Population Boom
At a population conference in New York, Chairman of the National Population Commission (NPC) Eze Duruiheoma estimated that the current population of Nigeria is 198 million, and that the population living in urban areas has been growing 6.5 percent annually over the past fifty years. He cites that World Population Prospects prediction that by 2050, Nigeria will displace the United States as the third most populous country in the world after China and India. He also noted the 2014 World Urbanization Prospects prediction that by 2050, 77 percent of Nigeria’s population will be urban. The NPC chairman also looked at the number of internally displaced Nigerians. With respect to the Boko Haram insurrection in the northeast, Duruiheoma estimated that the number of internally displaced is 1.76 million, which is lower than other estimates, some of which can be as high as 2.5 million.
Nigerians know they are by far the most populous country in Africa, and they are proud of it. Estimates of the size of the country’s population range from the World Bank’s 186 million to 205 million by UN agencies. An accurate census is difficult in Nigeria in part because of infrastructure shortcomings. In the past, too, census results have also fueled ethnic and religious conflicts exploited by political figures. Nevertheless, in 2017 the director general of the NPC raised the possibility of a census in 2018. Given the practical and political difficulties and with the prospect of national elections in 2019, that timeframe seems overly optimistic. In the meantime, it is necessary to fall back on careful estimates.
Duruiheoma pointed out in New York that Nigeria’s urban population growth has not been accompanied by a “commensurate increase in social amenities and infrastructure.” More generally, economic growth has not kept up with population growth. Hence, the enormous slums outside city centers. In effect, Nigeria has no population policy that would limit births, and Nigerians have traditionally valued large families. Yet the country’s rapid population growth, especially in urban areas, poses difficult economic, social, and public health challenges. A huge, rapidly growing population is not necessarily a source of national strength.
Unemployment and Begging Across Nigeria
Despite this controversial tweet to the contrary, the unemployment rate is Nigeria is not actually that high on average. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the unemployment rate is 5.5 percent (the official unemployment rate for the last quarter is 19 percent). For comparison, Ethiopia’s was 5.4 percent, South Africa’s was 27.3 percent, and the U.S. unemployment rate stands at 4.9 percent. In his book Poor Numbers (2013), Morten Jerven has taught us to be skeptical about African statistics, with the exception of those from South Africa. Nevertheless, the World Bank figures are probably the best to be had, and they try to take into account the informal economy. The reality appears to be that Nigeria has an unemployment rate similar to that of other African states, while South Africa is the outlier.
However, despite a relatively low unemployment rate, most Nigerians are very poor—more than half of the population lives on two U.S. dollars per day or less. Unemployment is certainly an important driver of poverty in South Africa, but poor and unemployed South Africans benefit from a government safety net, and still have a higher standard of living than many employed Nigerians.
Within countries, there can be big regional differences in unemployment. As anybody who has been to Lagos knows, the city is a hive of activity, with literally everybody working at something. The shear energy released in Lagos is striking to outsiders. George Packer’s brilliant 2006 New Yorker profile of Lagos comments on the huge range of services offered. Lagosians are never idle. Their civil culture appears to be unsympathetic to beggars, with the important exception of those with visible physical infirmities for whom spontaneous charity of biblical proportions is common. In general, however, the only able-bodied beggars to be found in Lagos, with an estimated population of up to 22 million, are from other parts of Nigeria or West Africa.
Begging and unemployment are more common in the sharia states of the north. The giving of alms is seen as an important religious duty. Beggars are ubiquitous and have long been a part of the social and religious fabric of communities. Children enrolled in Islamic schools, known as madrassas, often split their day between begging and religious studies. The region is poor and generally getting poorer, the result of exploding population growth, climate change, and under-investment in almost everything. Those economic and social realities, coupled with local custom that is sympathetic to it (unlike in southern Nigeria), drive begging. Even before the Boko Haram insurrection, Bornu’s state capital, Maiduguri, was notorious all over West Africa as “the beggar maker.” The treatment of begging distinguishes sharia states from the rest of Nigeria. With respect to unemployment and begging, as with much else, regional differences in Nigeria are important.
Traditional Rulers Hold Real Power in Nigeria
London’s Financial Times and the Washington’s Washington Post ran long articles on Muhammad Sanusi II, the emir of Kano. The emir is generally regarded as second only to the Sultan of Sokoto among Muslim traditional rulers in Nigeria. His office, and much of the ceremony that accompanies it, is more than a thousand years old.
The emir and his court is nothing if not picturesque, featuring an ancient Rolls Royce in impeccable condition dating from the colonial or early independence period and ranks of brilliantly robed retainers than recall the British raj in their Indian empire. The British followed a strategy of indirect rule in India and northern Nigeria, in both places largely preserving traditional, feudal government with all of its picturesque ceremonial.
Emir Muhammed Sanusi is more than a traditional religious leader and he enjoys much greater influence than do Indian maharajas today. He was the director of the Nigerian central bank following a distinguished business and banking career. He was fired from that position by President Goodluck Jonathan after showing that large sums of oil revenue had not been transferred from the Nigeria National Petroleum Company to the national treasury, and was therefore, in effect, missing. The governor of Kano selects emirs among a narrow pool of candidates, all of whom are members of the royal family. The then governor of Kaduna, no friend of President Jonathan, was apparently happy to make Sanusi the emir.
In addition to his business success, Sanusi is also an accomplished Islamic scholar. Boko Haram, the Islamist terrorist group present in northeastern Nigeria, has tried to assassinate him on occasion. From Boko Harma’s perspective, Sanusi is a Muslim apostate because he does not subscribe to the theological system of Boko Haram.
Furthermore, Sanusi is also a threat to Boko Haram because many people in Kano (Nigeria’s second largest city) accord him greater respect than they do secular institutions of government. As with other traditional rulers, many Nigerians prefer to use the emir for dispute resolution rather than the civil courts. Sanusi’s authority over his co-religionists is much greater than secular law provides for. He is truly a bridge between traditional Nigeria and the post-independence state. It well behooves diplomats and others to maintain close contact with the emir and Nigeria’s other traditional rulers.
South Africa’s DA Struggles to Broaden Support Amid Zuma's Departure
The Democratic Alliance (DA) is the official opposition to the governing African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa’s parliament. It is the second largest party in the country in terms of electoral support, and it is the only party to have increased its share of the vote in every election since 1999. It holds 89 of 400 seats in parliament. It controls outright the provincial government of the Western Cape and governs in coalition Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Port Elizabeth. Of South Africa’s largest cities, only Durban is still governed by the once-dominant ANC. With strong links to civil society, the DA played a crucial role in driving from power former president Jacob Zuma and for keeping alive the criminal proceedings against him. The DA regularly presents itself as the party of good governance, the rule of law, and support for the constitution. Its new party leader, Mmusi Maimane, is young, articulate, charismatic, and black. He made an excellent impression during a recent visit to Washington DC.
Yet the party faces a troubled future. Electoral politics in South African continue to be very largely a racial census. About 9 percent of the population is white, 9 percent “coloured,” and perhaps 2 percent of South Asian origin. The overwhelming majority of the population—some 80 percent—is black African. The DA’s electoral support mostly comes from racial minorities that tend to be much wealthier than the black majority. The DA is seeking to broaden its appeal to the black majority, especially among the “born frees,” those that came of age after the end of apartheid, and among the black urban middle class. However, among the former, voter participation is low, as it is among that age group in most electoral democracies. The black middle class is smaller than the amount of media attention it receives would indicate, and so far, the DA has had limited success in attracting its votes.
The DA is certainly trying to attract black support, but control of the party largely remains in white hands, despite Mmusi Maimane’s leadership. On the burning issues of the day, such as service delivery in the townships, land redistribution to poor blacks, or meaningful reform of education in rural areas, the DA’s policies appear to be underdeveloped and largely unappealing. Among many black South Africans, the DA remains a “white” party; some in the townships even think, incredibly, that it aims to restore apartheid.
While he was president, Jacob Zuma was “the gift that kept on giving” for the DA. With his ties to corruption, his reputation for sexual predation, his multiple wives, and his efforts to undermine institutions of government, he provided a focus for DA opposition and a rallying cry for electoral support. Now he is gone, replaced as president and ANC party leader by the urbane and skillful Cyril Ramaphosa, an architect of the post-apartheid constitutional settlement. His moves against corruption risk stealing the clothes of the DA and have engendered confidence among financial institutions. Further, the DA’s reputation for good governance has been marred by the water crisis in Cape Town, fights with coalition partners in Port Elizabeth, and a generally disappointing performance in Johannesburg.
The DA is also burdened by the ineptness of some of its leaders. Former mayor of Cape Town, current premier of the Western Cape, and former DA party leader Helen Zille is notorious for her insensitive tweets. For example, she ignited a firestorm in 2017 when she said that the legacy of colonialism was not all bad. Faced with the possible discipline by the party, she apologized. Even if what she said objectively is true—she cited South Africa’s superior infrastructure—such comments only set back DA efforts to attract black voters in racially wounded South Africa. Other racially insensitive comments by whites associated with the DA also attract wide attention. If it is to break out of its white and “coloured” electoral ghetto, the DA will need leaders, political style, and policies that speak to the concerns of the poor, black majority. Thus far, its progress has been disappointing, despite Mmusi Maimane.
Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: April 7 - April 13
Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 7 to April 13, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.
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April 7: Suspected herdsmen killed four in Bali, Taraba.
April 7: Nigerian troops rescued 149 and killed 3 Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.
April 7: Nigerian troops killed two would-be suicide bombers in Konduga, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected.
April 7: Tiv farmers killed eleven herdsmen in Guma, Benue.
April 8: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed himself but not others at the University of Maiduguri in Maiduguri, Borno.
April 8: Herdsmen killed seven in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.
April 8: Herdsmen killed five in Obi, Nasarawa.
April 8: Herdsmen killed four in Keana, Nasarawa.
April 8: A cult clash resulted in six deaths in Ijebu North, Ogun.
April 10: Suspected herdsmen killed eight in Ukum, Benue.
April 10: Suspected herdsmen killed seven in Logo, Benue.
April 11: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.
April 11: Suspected herdsmen killed forty-eight and lost three of their own in Wukari, Taraba.
April 11: Suspected herdsmen killed three in Logo, Benue.
April 11: Bandits killed "scores" (est. at forty) in Anka, Zamfara.
April 12: Bandits killed two policemen and kidnapped twenty-one others in Birnin Gwari, Kaduna.
