Africa in Transition

Recently-appointed Minister of Public Enterprises Pravin Gordhan is moving quickly in South Africa. He is seeking to rationalize the financial commitments of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and promising large personnel changes: “Virtually every entity that we are supervising, or are responsible for, is going to have changes as far as the board is concerned.” Ramaphosa has also suspended the commissioner of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) because “its leadership had lost all credibility.” He replaced him, at least temporarily, with Mark Kingon, who has had more than thirty years of experience at SARS. Critics of former President Jacob Zuma’s administration saw SOEs, ranging from the national power company to the flag carrier South African Airways, as nests of corruption. Complaints that the Gupta brothers, notorious Zuma cronies, had “captured” the state often focused on the mismanagement of SOEs and the suspicion that the brothers were benefiting from corrupt contracts. Soon after becoming leader of the Africa National Congress and president of South Africa, Ramaphosa promised to clean up SOEs. From that perspective, his appointment of Gordhan as minister of public enterprises is encouraging. Gordhan has held many high offices in government and served twice as finance minister. His international reputation for competency was on display when Zuma replaced him with a less competent crony and the Rand’s value fell dramatically in response. The hallmark, at least thus far, of Ramaphosa’s appointments has been a focus on competence, a clear departure from those in his predecessor’s later years. The international financial rating agencies may start to react positively as soon as March 23, when Moody’s will issue its next credit rating, which is currently one notch above junk status.   

At the time Boko Haram kidnapped almost three hundred girls from a school in Chibok in 2014, reports surfaced that the Nigerian security forces had advance intelligence, but that they failed to take the necessary preventive action. In February 2018, Boko Haram kidnapped 110 girls from the Government Girls Science and Technical College at Dapchi in Yobe state. Amnesty International released a report of the February kidnapping, concluding that the Nigerian security forces again ignored advanced warnings of an impending Boko Haram kidnapping operation up to four hours before the attack. The nearest government forces, Amnesty says, were an hour away. Amnesty is calling on the Nigerian government to investigate “the inexcusable security lapses” and “as an even greater priority, the government must use all lawful means at its disposal to ensure that these girls are rescued.” To that end, Boko Haram released most of the kidnap victims on March 21. Though the numbers vary between reports, it appears that at least 101 were returned and five died while the lone Christian remains in captivity. The girls were presumably returned for a quid pro quo from the Nigerian government that is not publicly known, though there are allegations of a payment and prisoner swap of up to five million euros and five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram is embedded in northeast Nigeria. It is therefore likely that local Boko Haram members or supporters alerted the kidnappers to the absence of security forces in Dapchi. The episode also illustrates an uncomfortable reality: Boko Haram is able to operate largely at will in northeast Nigeria, even if it no longer controls territory. Under those circumstances, the Nigerian security services do appear to be strapped for the resources necessary to protect Nigerian citizens. Dapchi is further evidence that Boko Haram is far from defeated, even if it appears unable or uninterested in carrying out operations outside of the Lake Chad basin.  Throughout the nine-year Boko Haram insurrection, government spokesmen lied about or greatly exaggerated their success. In a familiar pattern, the military is aggressively attacking the Amnesty report. A military spokesman has accused Amnesty of being “economical with the truth” and undermining “our military and our institutions.” Another spokesman has said, “Most of [Amnesty’s] narratives are outright falsehoods and a calculated attempt to whip up sentiments and mislead unsuspecting Nigerians.”  The Nigerian military fails to recognize that Amnesty International has immense credibility. Attacks on the organization, far from damaging Amnesty, undercut the credibility of military spokesmen. Indeed, a lack of candor and transparency on the part of government spokesmen is common across Africa and erodes trust between citizens and their governments. The Wall Street Journal has identified the kidnappers as members of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. I see the ISWAP, despite its name, as more a faction of Boko Haram than an extension of the Islamic State. The relationship between these factions, the other ostensibly led by Abubakar Shekau, is obscure, as are their connections with outside groups. There is certainly evidence of ties between al-Barnawi and the Islamic State, but it is by no means clear how important they are, and it is unlikely that the Islamic State is dictating the strategy or tactics of al-Barnawi.   

The Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) is one of several groups seeking to revive republic of Biafra, a predominately Igbo state that sought to secede from Nigeria in 1967. Secession led to a civil war that left around one million dead, most civilians and mostly from disease and starvation, before the territory was re-incorporated into Nigeria in 1970. Nigeria’s military government, led by General Yakubu Gowon, pursued a post-war policy of “no victors, no vanquished,” and former supporters of Biafra quickly resumed prominent positions in national life. Nevertheless, pro-Biafra sentiment has never gone away, especially among the Igbo, and it is supported by some elements of the Nigerian diaspora. Many Igbos firmly believe that they are marginalized, but it is unclear just how much support Biafra has among the Igbo. In times of political uncertainly like now with the 2019 national elections on the horizon, discussions of Biafra tend to reenter the political and media mainstream. The civil war was a defining episode in Nigeria’s post-independence history, and for a generation of Nigeria’s leaders, including President Muhammadu Buhari, national unity is sacrosanct. The titular leader of IPOB is Nnandi Kanu and he holds both a British and a Nigerian passport. He argues that Biafra should be recast in terms of self-determination, that it is a legitimate political movement that reflects the aspirations of ‘Biafrans.’ The Nigerian government, on the other hand, sees his secessionist efforts as treasonous. The government arrested Kanu in 2017, jailed him, and then released him on bail pending his trial. He has since disappeared and the security services regularly say they do not know where he is. Biafra supporters have claimed that the security services murdered him, while others suggest that he fled to the United Kingdom. The British authorities, however, say they do not know where he is, but note that as a British subject, Kanu would be free to enter the United Kingdom at any time. Meanwhile, Kanu’s collaborators who were arrested at the same time he was but were not granted bail face a new three-count charge of treasonable felony. These charges effectively separate their trial from Kanu’s, when and if it takes place. The government has announced that their trial will start soon. In response, the IPOB has announced that if the defendants are not granted bail or released unconditionally, it will begin a campaign of civil disobedience. Should it take place, there is a real danger that the campaign could morph into sabotage of Nigeria’s oil production facilities. Oil provides more than 70 percent of the government’s revenue, and more than 90 percent of its foreign exchange. Hence, unrest in the oil patch poses a serious challenge to the Nigerian government. Charges of treason in the context of secessionist movements can be a blunt instrument, as the British government learned in Ireland in 1916. Conviction and execution can convert a marginal movement into a popular insurrection. Hence, it is to be hoped that the Nigerian government will proceed with caution and sensitivity.