Africa in Transition

Shaun Abrahams, the national director of public prosecutions at the National Prosecuting Authority, announced on March 16 that Zuma will face sixteen charges of corruption and money laundering. The governing African National Congress (ANC), which Zuma dominated during his years as party president and state president of South Africa, has restricted itself to affirming its confidence in the South African judicial system in its official statements. The Rand, South Africa’s currency, remained steady following the announcement. Prosecution follows nine years of legal efforts by Zuma, at the taxpayers’ expense, to get the charges set aside. They date from an arms deals in the 1990s, and the prosecuting authority set them aside in 2009 shortly before Zuma was elected state president. In 2016, the High Court reinstated the charges and Zuma lost his legal battle to overturn that ruling. Now, Abrahams says that prosecution will proceed, and that “there are reasonable prospects of a successful prosecution.” Abrahams has widely been seen as a political ally of Zuma, with critics claiming that Zuma irregularly appointed him director of public prosecutions to forestall his own prosecution. In the end, the courts sided with the critics and required current President Ramaphosa to appoint a new director within sixty days of its ruling. That time period has not yet lapsed, so Abraham remains in office. His replacement will be responsible for the prosecution of Zuma, but it is not yet clear who Ramaphosa will appoint.  That Abrahams is proceeding with prosecution shows just how far Zuma has fallen and how few allies he apparently still has within the ANC. Critics will likely question whether Abraham has made some sort of deal with the new Ramaphosa administration. Prosecution of Zuma is a double-edged sword. South African civil society widely believes that Zuma is corrupt and that he should therefore be tried. Time after time, South Africans have reaffirmed their support for the rule of law and an independent judiciary. For his part, Ramaphosa, one of the architects of South Africa’s constitution, has always been a staunch supporter of the law. Not to try Zuma would be viewed by many as evidence that the Ramaphosa administration had “sold out,” that corruption has no consequences, and that he is willing to compromise on the rule of law for political ends. On the other hand, Zuma remains popular in his native KwaZulu and among the Zulus, South Africa’s largest ethnic group. Ramaphosa has therefore sought to treat Zuma with dignity, but also cannot be seen as favoring Zuma in the impending prosecution. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether Zuma’s trial will expose the corrupt behavior of other ANC politicians still in office and how this affects party unity. For the time being, however, most South Africans across the political spectrum are likely to support the decision to prosecute.

Annually, Forbes Africa identifies the continent’s billionaires. It includes the Mediterranean littoral as well as sub-Saharan Africa. Its list is restricted to billionaires who live in Africa or have their primary businesses there. (These criteria excludes Mo Ibrahim and Mohammed al-Fayed who live in London and do not have their primary businesses in Africa; it does include Zimbabwean citizen and London resident Strive Masiyiwa, whose telecom business is based in Africa.) The list does not include “dispersed” fortunes held by multiple family members. Forbes lays out its methodology, noting that the number of billionaires rises and falls depending on market conditions.  Forbes identifies twenty-three billionaires in Africa. Nine are from North Africa, specifically six from Egypt, two from Morocco, and one from Algeria, while fourteen are based in sub-Saharan Africa. Keeping with the practices of U.S. Department of State and the Council on Foreign Relations, which normally includes the Mediterranean littoral in the Middle East for cultural, political, and economic reasons, I discuss only sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa dominates the list, with eight billionaires, seven of whom appear to be white: Nicky Oppenheimer, Johann Rupert, Koos Bekker, Michiel le Roux, Stephen Saad, Christoffel Wiese, and Desmond Sacco. Though the country is nearly eighty percent black, there is only one black billionaire on the Forbes list, Patrice Motsepe; he is the bother-in-law of the current president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, whose net worth was estimated to be $450 million in 2015. Of the eight billionaires, Forbes ties the wealth of three to mining: Nicky Oppenheimer, Patrice Motsepe, and Desmond Sacco. The others reflect South Africa’s relatively diversified economy with international links: Johann Rupert, luxury goods, including Cartier and Montblanc; Koos Beekker, media and investments; Michel le Roux, banking; Stephen Saad, pharmaceuticals; and Christoffel Wiese, retail. There are no women among the South Africans.  Nigeria contributes three billionaires. Forbes identifies Aliko Dangote as “Africa’s richest man,” with his wealth based on cement, sugar, and flour. Mike Adenuga’s wealth is based on oil, telecoms, and real estate. Folorunsho Alakija’s wealth is based on oil. She is one of two women on the Forbes Africa list.  The remaining three billionaires come from three different countries. Isabel dos Santos is the daughter of the long-time ruler of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos; Forbes ascribes her wealth to investments. Strive Masiyiwa is from Zimbabwe; Forbes attributes his wealth to telecommunications. And Mohammed Dewj is Tanzanian. His wealth is based on a conglomerate founded by his father that is involved with, among other things, flour, textiles, and beverages.  Forbes identifies a total of 2,208 billionaires world-wide. The most are from the United States with 585. “Greater China” (China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) is second with 476. Russia, famous for its oligarchs, has 96 and is fifth on the Forbes list. Forbes identifies fourteen billionaires in Norway and the Philippines, the same number as in all of sub-Saharan Africa. The small number of billionaires is another indicator of the small size of sub-Saharan Africa’s economies.   

The March 9 meeting about reconciliation between President Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga has, for the time being, pulled Kenya back from the brink. On news of the meeting, the Kenyan shilling rose against the U.S. dollar. Odinga has called off his defiance campaign against the Kenyatta government, while Kenyatta apparently is allowing Odinga to continue to use the title “people’s president." The official document released detailing the pact refers to both as “his excellency,” a title normally reserved for the chief of state. However, the two will not be part of a power-sharing arrangement. Spokesmen for Odinga are saying that he agreed to meet with Kenyatta to avoid possible future bloodshed along ethnic lines. Details are scarce, but the two leaders were said to be covering a “vast agenda,” including free and fair elections in 2022, and will be traveling around the country together on a “unity” tour. Kenyatta apparently did not consult with his vice president and likely (until now) successor, William Ruto. Odinga, for his part, did not consult in advance with his coalition partners, though he has since met with them and Kalonzo Musyoka, one of NASA's four leaders, has proposed a meeting with Kenyatta. Still, some are accusing Odinga of “betraying millions of Kenyans.”  Kenyan media reports that diplomatic, religious, and business pressure all played a role in the decision by Kenyatta and Odinga to reconcile. Kenyan media is suggesting that U.S. Ambassador Robert Godec played a leading role in this effort. Then there was the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who arrived in Nairobi the same morning as the meeting. Though Kenya is divided by ethnic rivalries easily exploited by politicians, the crisis that seems to have ended was shaped by the personal rivalry of Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga and their families dating back to independence. Both are leaders of large tribes, Kenyatta of the Kikuyu, Odinga of the Luo, and both are rich, though Kenyatta is richer. Nevertheless, because the rivalry was personal, the resolution of the crisis could also be personal. It is significant that Kenyatta has agreed to allow Odinga to retain some of the trappings of a chief of state. Kenyatta may be borrowing from the logic of King Henri IV of France in 1593 when he allegedly said, “Paris vaut bein une messe,” or “Paris is well worth a Mass.” For Henri, becoming king of France was worth a conversion from Protestantism to Catholicism. For Kenyatta, sharing some of the trappings of the presidency is well worth retaining all of the presidency’s power. Presuming the deal sticks (it will be debated and voted on in parliament soon), reconciliation could upend Kenyan ethnic politics. With the Kikuyu and the Luo, the third politically-ambitious ethnic group in Kenya is the Kalenjin. Their political leader is William Ruto. He has well-known personal ambitions for the presidency and will almost certainly run in 2022, but the new pact between Odinga and Kenyatta could upset his plan to lead the Jubilee Party. With which other ethnic group will the Kalenjin ally? Kenyan media seems to like the idea that the Kenyatta-Odinga reconciliation was midwifed by foreign diplomats, and there is no doubt they played a role. Kenyatta’s and Odinga’s own personal interests, however, were likely more important.