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Africa in Transition
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Rumors of a Political Capture
Accusations of influence peddling in the heart of its presidency raise the ugly scepter of state capture in Nigeria. Read More
Kenyatta and Odinga Call for Reconciliation in Kenya
In a joint press conference on March 9, President Uhuru Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga promised to begin the process of reconciliation following their bitter standoff around the 2017 elections that raised the specter of ethnic violence. Up to now, both had refused to participate in talks. In their appearance together, Kenyatta said, “We will begin a process of discussing what ails us and what creates division among us.” Odinga said it was "time to resolve our differences.”
If sincere, friends of Kenya will welcome Kenyatta and Odinga moving their country back from the brink.
It is not quite clear how to account for the reconciliation now. Odinga had himself inaugurated as the “people’s president” in opposition to Kenyatta’s formal inauguration as president, and he has denied the legitimacy of Kenyatta’s presidency. On the other hand, Kenyatta spokesmen have accused Odinga of treasonous behavior. While the ethnic differences the two personify have not gone away, it is possible that the two have agreed to a deal that would be personally advantageous to both of them, whether financially or politically.
The move has received mixed reactions, to say the least. Some have praised the two for their “show of statesmanship,” while Dr. Miguna Miguna, a leader in Odinga’s National Resistance Movement who was allegedly sent to Canada against his will, accused the opposition leader of “betrayal.”
The BBC raises the possibility that the reconciliation move is a public relations stunt related, somehow, to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's visit to Kenya. Perhaps—he arrived shortly thereafter—though that seems far-fetched.
In any event, Kenya’s friends will be watching over the next several days to see if the political temperature cools.
An $80 Million Yacht, a $50 Million Apartment, and Nigeria’s Former Oil Minister
Laundering money by purchasing real estate in foreign countries is an old song. The wealthiest parts of London and New York are filled with expensive houses and apartments, respectively, that are apparently unoccupied by their foreign owners most of the time. Mayfair and Belgravia in London and midtown Manhattan are especially popular. In Manhattan, One57, located at 157 West 57th Street, is one of the most notorious of the supertalls, apartment houses more than one thousand feet high. It includes the most expensive apartment ever sold in New York, at a price of $100.5 million in 2014. New York law makes it easy for purchasers of expensive real estate to be anonymous, making properties in the city attractive to foreigners living in unstable countries who wish to protect or launder their assets.
Kolawole Akanni Aluko, a former executive director of Atlantic Energy, was the owner of a 6,240-square foot apartment on the 79th floor of One57 that he reportedly purchased for just over $50 million. The formal owner, apparently, was a shell company that he controlled. As collateral for a mortgage, Aluko used his $80 million yacht, which he reportedly rented to rapper Jay-Z and singer Beyoncé at a rate of $900,000 per week. Subsequently, he defaulted on a mortgage of $35.3 million to a Luxembourg bank. In foreclosure, the apartment was sold at auction in 2017 for $36 million, a decline of 29 percent in the purchase price.
Aluko and others are under investigation in Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States for, among other things, bribing the Nigerian oil minister at the time, Diezani Alison-Madueke, for lucrative government contracts. Alison-Madueke is also under investigation. Aluko has reportedly disappeared on his yacht and is thought to be somewhere in the Caribbean. For its part, the U.S. Department of Justice has filed a civil complaint seeking the forfeiture and recovery of $144 million in assets related to the alleged bribery of Alison-Madueke by Aluko and others.
Oil and gas are the property of the Nigerian state. They are exploited through joint ventures and agreements between the state and oil companies. Oil production is normally about two million barrels per day. Yet more than half of Nigeria’s population lives in poverty. Popular resentment at corruption of the magnitude alleged with respect to Aluko was an important factor in the presidential victory of Muhammadu Buhari in 2015, and drives his anti-corruption campaign.
For more insight into One57, see this article by the New York Times that chronicles a reporter’s over-night stay.
Trump's Africa Policy Taking Shape With Tillerson's Trip
The secretary of state is by far the most senior member of the Trump administration to visit Africa, naturally raising the possibility of a reset in the administration’s approach to the continent.
Low Expectations for Secretary Tillerson’s Trip to Africa
Rex Tillerson will make his first trip to Africa as Secretary of State between March 6 and March 13. He will visit five of Africa’s fifty-four countries—Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria. The trip hardly appears to be a “reset” by the Trump administration in its approach to Africa. The State Department spokesperson, Heather Nauert, when announcing the trip, said that its purpose was “to further our partnerships with the governments and people of Africa.” She also said that the Secretary would be discussing how the United States “can work with our partners to counter terrorism, advance peace and security, promote good governance, and spur mutually beneficial trade and investment.” This rhetoric implies little change in the U.S. agenda in Africa since the end of the cold war and may reflect apparent White House disengagement and disinterest in the world’s second largest continent.
The selection of countries the secretary will visit indicates a strong emphasis on security issues. Djibouti is the site of the only U.S. base in Africa. Nigeria and Chad are deeply involved in the struggle against the Islamist, anti-western Boko Haram, which involves limited U.S. military training and equipment sales. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti are also involved in the struggle against al-Shabaab, the terrorist organization centered in Somalia, where the U.S. military also has assumed a limited support role.
Chad, Djibouti, and Ethiopia are backsliding with respect to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Kenya faces unresolved issues related to its recent contested presidential elections. Ethiopia’s strong-man prime minister abruptly resigned in February, resulting in a care-taker government that is set to elect a new prime minister soon. Nigeria, the giant of Africa, has established itself as a credible democracy, but goes into a 2019 election cycle that could be violent. Secretary Tillerson’s itinerary does not include what is in many ways the most successful African state, South Africa. It has the continent’s largest economy and is a functioning “non-racial” democracy. Its new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, provides the possibility of a reset in the bilateral relationship, which at present is no more than “cordial” and “correct.”
The secretary’s trip is unlikely to advance the United States relationship with sub-Saharan Africa in any meaningful way. The focus is on security, not economic development, trade and investment, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Further, the Trump administration has yet to articulate a distinctive policy toward Africa. U.S. engagement, limited though it is, appears to be more military than diplomatic, reflecting the Trump administrations security preoccupations. There is still no assistant secretary of state for Africa, no U.S. ambassador to South Africa, and numerous other Africa-related positions remain unfilled. Certain authoritarian African leaders, like Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, have made positive statements about President Trump. Democratic leaders on the other hand, notably Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari and South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, were deeply critical of the president’s public denigration of Africa and Haiti.
With the U.S. recessional from Africa, save for security issues, African states are turning to other partners, notably China, France, and the EU. In a thoughtful article, John Stremlau, an American visiting professor at Johannesburg’s prestigious University of the Witswatersrand, suggests that, for the time being, growing the United States relationship with sub-Saharan Africa may rest more with the legislative branch than with the executive branch and the secretary of state. He points out that since the 1990s Congress has consistently supported closer economic and political partnerships with Africa, reflecting the big American business, philanthropy, and civil society constituency for Africa.
Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: February 24 - March 2
Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 24 to March 2, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.
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February 25: An IED killed a Nigerian Army Captain in Kaga, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected.
February 26: Sectarian violence led to twelve deaths in Kajuru, Kaduna.
February 26: Boko Haram killed two Nigerian soldiers, and six others are missing in Damboa, Borno.
February 26: Nigerian and Cameroonian troops killed thirty-five Boko Haram militants; two Nigerian soldiers were also killed during the fight in Bama, Borno.
February 27: Herdsmen killed twenty, and Nigerian soldiers killed ten of the attackers in Demsa, Adamawa.
February 28: Kidnappers abducted a journalist's wife and child, and killed an FRSC officer in Igabi, Kaduna.
February 28: 5 Boko Haram militants and two Nigerian soldiers were killed during a battle in Gwoza, Borno.
March 1: Boko Haram killed four policemen, four soldiers, and four aid workers, also abducting one aid worker in Kala/Balge, Borno.
March 1: Sectarian violence led to ffiteen deaths in Sardauna, Taraba.
March 1: Boko Haram abducted three and lost one militant in Madagali, Adamawa.
March 2: A suicide bomber killed herself but no others in Gubja, Yobe. Boko Haram was suspected.
