Africa in Transition

The predominance of white ownership of land [PDF] is taken by many—perhaps most—South Africans as emblematic of the persistence of apartheid injustice. Hence, there have long been calls for the expropriation of white-owned agricultural land without compensation. That was a central tenant of the Pan-African Congress, a liberation-movement rival of the now-governing African National Congress, and of the Economic Freedom Fighters, at present the third largest party in parliament. (It has 25 seats compared to 89 for the Democratic Alliance and 249 for the ANC.) At its December 2017 party convention, the ANC also supported expropriation without compensation and on February 27, 2018, parliament overwhelmingly voted to begin a process that would amend the constitution to allow for expropriation of without compensation. The persistent poverty of much of its black majority is the greatest challenge to South Africa’s democratic government. Inequality of wealth largely follows racial lines. In 2015, more than 55 percent of South Africans were poor. According to Statistics South Africa, less than 1 percent of the total white population was poor, while 63 percent of black people, 37 percent of coloured people, and 7 percent of Indian/Asian people were poor. The nine percent of South Africa’s population that is white holds the lion’s share of the country’s wealth. Most blacks see their poverty as the direct consequence of apartheid. While it is true that since the transition to non-racial democracy the small black middle class has grown and a few oligarchs have emerged, wealth inequality among blacks is now much greater than that between whites and blacks. Many may be asking whether South Africa is going down the road of Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe seized white-owned agricultural land and helped destroy the economy. The short answer is no. For a start, South Africa is a constitutional democracy, not a parliamentary democracy, which means that the constitution limits what parliament can do. More to the point, it specifically guarantees the right to private property, meaning that expropriation without compensation would be immediately challenged in the courts. Therefore, the constitution must be amended. This vote has begun that process, but it is difficult and time-consuming.  Cyril Ramaphosa, state president and leader of the governing ANC, publicly supports expropriation without compensation, but also stresses that commercial agriculture and the country’s food security must be protected. A businessman and an oligarch, he is also committed to growing the economy to address poverty; that requires the confidence of foreign and domestic investors that their property rights will be respected. Therefore, white-owned farms, which dominate commercial agriculture, will likely be protected in the interest of the economy. South Africa is now about 60 percent urban, and urbanization is proceeding rapidly. Further complicating forced expropriation is the fact that African small-scale farming is not popular. Of those South Africans compensated for apartheid-era expropriation of their land, nearly all of them chose financial compensation rather than the return of their land. Of the land that has already been redistributed by the state, a credible estimate is that 70 percent of it is no longer in production. Nevertheless, land reform is an emotional and symbolic issue, especially in rural areas, and it is easily exploited as an issue by populist politicians. Where the practical need for land reform is most pressing is in urban and suburban areas, where there is substantial pressure from people leaving rural areas to look for work. Hence the emergence or expansion of informal settlements, mostly on government-owned land. State-owned land and tribal trust lands provide a possible venue for land redistribution without an impact on investor confidence or agricultural production. By and large, however, tribal chiefs would not like that approach because their control of tribal lands is basic to their local power. These chiefs were an important political constituency of former president Jacob Zuma, whom Ramaphosa has driven from office. This could spell an end to vetoes on land redistribution by tribal chiefs.

The Nigerian political class is deeply engaged in one of its favorite party games: speculating about whether President Muhammadu Buhari will seek reelection in 2019. Given the advantages of incumbency, the smart money says that he will seek reelection and win. Under Nigeria’s custom of power rotation between the predominately Christian south and predominately Muslin north, it is still the north’s “turn.” This means that the opposition People’s Democratic Party will likely field a northern and Muslim candidate, but it will be difficult to find such a candidate that could mount a successful challenge to Buhari, a northern Muslim himself. Within the political establishment, however, many hope Buhari will not run. Former president Olusegun Obasanjo has urged Buhari to step down after his term expires and accused his government of incompetency and nepotism. Obasanjo has also called for the reconstruction of state institutions from the ground up. Former military chief of state Ibrahim Babangida has also urged Buhari not to run. The three are of the same generation and have dominated Nigerian politics since the aftermath of the 1967-1970 civil war. Babangida was born in 1941, Buhari in 1942, and Obasanjo in 1937. All three grew up during the colonial period and advanced through a Nigerian army that in those days was trained by the British. All three have served as military chiefs of state and Obasanjo and Buhari subsequently embraced civilian democracy and served as elected presidents. None represents a significant break with the past, though Buhari campaigned heavily on an anti-corruption platform. Discontent with politicians that have “aged in place” is widespread in Nigeria. There are many calls for a Sovereign National Conference to review the country’s institutions and perhaps recast its politics, but it is hard to see how such talk will result in concrete action at this stage. Meanwhile, a Buhari candidacy remains hostage to his health. While he appears healthy at present, during his presidential term he has spent long periods in the United Kingdom undergoing treatment for a disease that has never been disclosed to the public.  

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s new cabinet is a significant improvement over his predecessor's and will reassure domestic and international investors. Restoring confidence in South Africa’s government and economy is a crucial first step to achieving the higher rates of economic growth needed to reduce poverty among the black majority.  Notably, Nhlahna Nene, the erstwhile finance minister under Zuma has been reappointed to the post by Ramaphosa. Widely respected by the financial community, he was inexplicably fired by former president Jacob Zuma. Pravin Gordhan, another respected former finance minister and casualty of Zuma’s administration, has been appointed minister of public enterprises. He will be responsible for state-owned enterprises like South African Airways and the national electric company. Under Zuma, public enterprises were nests of corruption and inefficiency. Gordhan is seen as having the energy and ability to clean up the mess, and oversaw an ANC-led effort to combat corruption in Port Elizabeth. As the new minister for energy, Jeff Radebe is expected to end the Zuma administration’s ill-considered nuclear energy program. Gwede Mantashe will be in charge of mineral resources and therefore oversee the country’s mining sector, which remains a central part of South Africa’s economy. He comes out of the labor movement and served as general secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers and has a reputation as a tough but trusted negotiator. The new minister of education, Naledi Pandor, is a close ally of Ramaphosa and will have to deal with an education system whose failures are partly to blame for the high levels of black unemployment. There are holdovers in the cabinet from the Zuma administration. Most notably, Zuma’s ex-wife and his candidate to succeed him as party leader, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. She is a former foreign minister, former minister of health, and former chairwoman of the African commission, but her new appointment as minister for planning and evaluation is far inferior in power and prestige. Among reformers, however, the greatest concern must be the appointment as deputy president of David Mabuza, governor of Mpumalanga. His shift of support from Dlamini-Zuma to Ramaphosa was crucial to the latter’s victory in the race for party leader. While he has a reputation for thuggery and corruption, Ramaphosa can fence Mabuza off from power and authority if he wishes to do so. The new foreign minister is Lindiwe Sisulu. Born in 1954, she is the daughter of liberation icons Walter and Albertina Sisulu. She has a PhD from York University in England and has been in the cabinet continuously since 1994. Her focus has been on domestic issues, with her byword being “poor first.” Broadly speaking, her political approach appears similar to that of the left wing of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom. It remains to be seen whether she has any interest in improving the official bilateral relationship with the United States, which is now no more than “correct” and “cordial.”