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Africa in Transition

Michelle Gavin, Ebenezer Obadare, and other experts track political and security developments across sub-Saharan Africa.

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Nigerian President Bola Tinubu speaks at the National Collation Centre in Abuja, Nigeria on March 1, 2023.
Nigerian President Bola Tinubu speaks at the National Collation Centre in Abuja, Nigeria on March 1, 2023. REUTERS/Esa Alexander

Rumors of a Political Capture

Accusations of influence peddling in the heart of its presidency raise the ugly scepter of state capture in Nigeria. Read More

South Africa
The State of President Ramaphosa’s Nation
Dr. Cedric L. Suzman was the founding executive vice president and program director of the World Affairs Council of Atlanta. He retired in 2015. The ascendancy of Cyril Ramaphosa to the presidency of South Africa has been greeted with a mix of enthusiasm, relief, and skepticism. It comes as South Africa prepares to celebrate the centenary of Nelson Mandela’s birth and it is worth remembering that Ramaphosa was Mandela’s first choice as his deputy, even though he was persuaded by the party to accept Thabo Mbeki. The country faces daunting challenges and Ramaphosa has only a slim majority of support in the National Executive Council of the African National Congress (ANC).  In his State of the Nation Address, corruption, jobs, and education stood out as the issues in need of immediate attention. President Ramaphosa addressed all three in some detail, but in trying to strike an optimistic note, he understandably glossed over many difficulties. He gave prominence to rooting out corruption, which all agree is his most urgent task. It has corroded the effectiveness of government at all levels, from the cabinet down to the lowest ranking municipal or city official. “State Capture” involving Zuma and the Gupta family is only the most visible issue. Being a loyal ANC cadre became the sole criterion for selection to any official position, without regard to competence. Any service or contract inevitably resulted in kickbacks to those involved, artificially inflating prices. The result has been a deterioration in productivity and government effectiveness, and a steady decline in the overall growth of the economy since 2011. Per capita GDP growth was negative between 2012 and 2016, placing South Africa in the bottom twentieth percentile for the continent, just above Zimbabwe. Given this depressing picture, Ramaphosa needs to not only address corruption at the top of government and state enterprises, but throughout the ranks of the ANC down to the provincial and local government levels.   President Ramaphosa also focused on the need to provide jobs by restoring economic growth and development. Unemployment is over 36 percent and youth unemployment is even higher. About a third of the population is now receiving monthly social grants to keep them from poverty. Optimism and business confidence in Cyril Ramaphosa’s considerable abilities will only go so far. Renewed foreign direct investment will help to drive growth in the relatively sophisticated industrial sector, but will not do much for the large numbers of unskilled and poorly educated job seekers. Large-scale capital investment projects have up to now not been successful and real gross fixed capital formation is just above 18 percent, well below the government target of 30 percent. Large increases in government expenditures are constrained by the growing budget deficit, which now exceeds the apartheid-era high. Mr. Ramaphosa recognized this constraint in the budget just announced by finance minister, Malusi Gigaba, raising the VAT tax from 14 to 15 percent, the first increase since 1993, as well as increasing the income tax. Export-led growth will also be difficult to achieve with an unproductive, low-skilled, but relatively well-paid unionized workforce.  The government will need to develop creative new programs to address the problem of unemployment. President Ramaphosa outlined a number of suggestions in his address, including a Jobs Summit to explore practical solutions, infrastructure projects such as the installation of solar water heaters and the war on water leaks, the Employment Tax Incentive, and the Youth Employment Service Initiative, which will place unemployed youth in paid internships in companies across the economy. Other examples not mentioned include investment in labor intensive projects in low skilled sectors and a major emphasis on technical schools.  The third challenge is addressing the failure of primary and secondary education. South Africa is particularly weak in math and science, even when compared to other developing countries. The poor educational system is not a result of a lack of funding, but largely due to systemic problems. It starts with a lack of accountability at the administrator level, inadequate teacher training, and teacher unions that make holding teachers accountable for their performance (and even presence) in the classroom more difficult. As with corruption and job creation, addressing the education problems will take new initiatives and time for the results to work their way through to the next generation of work seekers. Most importantly, literacy and basic education programs are urgently needed for those currently unemployed who left school early and still lack a basic education. Unfortunately, Ramaphosa's speech focused on the modest improvement in high school graduation rates and the politically charged issue of free university, not on primary education. All these initiatives will require time and strong leadership to implement—resources that are in very short supply. Of more immediate concern for the ANC are the 2019 national elections. Ramaphosa will have to prove that the party is serious about addressing corruption, joblessness, and education if they hope to capture over 50 percent of the vote. While there is good reason for optimism and faith in the resiliency of the country and its institutions, skeptics would be forgiven if they still have their doubts.   
Nigeria
Latest Boko Haram Kidnapping Recalls Chibok in 2014
The latest Boko Haram kidnapping of female students sheds some light on the terrorist group’s current operational capacity and highlights President Muhammadu Buhari’s direct involvement in the matter. While Boko Haram’s kidnapping operation is similar to its infamous kidnapping in 2014 of female students from Chibok, the government's response has so far been quite different. What this episode also highlights, however, is the ongoing lack of transparency with respect to Boko Haram activities on the part of Nigerian officials. On February 20, Boko Haram attacked the Government Girls Science and Technical School, a girls’ boarding school roughly equivalent to a high school in the United States, in Dapchi, less than fifty miles south of the Niger border in Yobe state. Witnesses told U.S. media that the Boko Haram convoy consisted of nine vehicles, including two with machine guns on the roof. The uniformed Boko Haram fighters opened fire as they entered the village and proceeded directly to the school. There are contradictory reports about the number of girls they kidnapped and how many were subsequently rescued by the Nigerian army. Witnesses credibly say that more than ninety were kidnapped, more than seventy were rescued, and that two girls were killed. This Boko Haram operation certainly recalls the 2014 kidnapping of almost three hundred school girls at Chibok. Unlike at Chibok, however, the army responded quickly at Dapchi. President Goodluck Jonathan was silent about Chibok for many days and spoke out only in response to international and domestic criticism. By contrast, President Muhammadu Buhari issued a statement soon after the incident and directed the military and police to find the missing girls. He also said he was sending the defense minister to Yobe on Thursday to “ascertain the situation.” Nevertheless, his critics complain that it took two days for him to issue a statement.  There continues to be too little transparency about the incident: some police spokesmen and the school’s principal said no girls were kidnapped at all, and the principal said that Boko Haram only stole food until they were chased away by the police. On the other hand, a school roll call accounted for only 815 of 926 students. (The roll call seems to have occurred before the army’s rescue operation.) Several witnesses indicated to media representatives that Nigerian security personnel told them not to talk about the episode. More disturbing is Boko Haram’s use of armored vehicles, its access to uniforms, and its ability to carry out mass kidnappings. The operation appears more sophisticated than the suicide bombings that continue to be a feature of the group. Dapchi is yet another sign that Boko Haram is far from defeated. As for the three hundred Chibok school girls, about one hundred still remain in captivity.
South Africa
Renewing U.S.-South Africa Relations Under President Ramaphosa
This is a guest blog post by Anthony Carroll. Anthony is founding director of Acorus Capital, a private equity fund investing in Africa, and a vice president of Manchester Trade Limited, an international business advisory firm. He has over forty years of experience working with Africa and is an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Last Friday’s State of the Nation Address by newly-elected South African President Cyril Ramaphosa outlined many of the challenges that confront his country nearly a quarter of a century after the end of apartheid. These include economic inequality, unemployment, decaying social conditions, and corruption. His forthright remarks represent a paradigm shift in that country’s governance and governing principles and provides an opportunity for the United States to reengage with a strategic ally after nearly two decades of eroding relations. It is only fitting that Mr. Ramaphosa usher in this new era. Once the favored protégé of Nelson Mandela, Ramaphosa was the chief negotiator for the ANC during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) process that effectively dismantled the odious system of apartheid. The institutions established at that time, including a much admired constitution, have flexed their muscles in the past few months exorcizing the corrupt and incoherent eight-year reign of Mr. Ramaphosa’s predecessor, Jacob Zuma. The coming months will reveal the depths of corruption that marked the Zuma era and, as the Truth and Reconciliation process salved the wounds of apartheid, provide South Africa an opportunity to set a new course. The United States should extend its hand to Mr. Ramaphosa and contribute when requested and where it can, not only for some ideal but for its own strategic self-interest. This process will not be easy. After the bloom of the post-apartheid process faded and Nelson Mandela relinquished power, U.S.-South Africa relations began a downward arc. Among the irritants included dismay over President Thabo Mbeki’s policies on HIV/AIDS, differing positions on Israel, Palestine, Iraq, and Libya, South Africa’s preferred embrace of fellow BRICS countries (most concernedly Russia) and myriad disagreement on trade relations starting with a scrapped regional free trade agreement and more recently, disputes on U.S. chicken exports. While this trend occurred in both Republican and Democratic administrations, it has been especially fractured during the later years of the Zuma administration. The symptoms included a compulsive attention to protocol over substance, limited access to government decision makers in Pretoria, thinly veiled opprobrium by U.S. diplomats, and an eroded civil discourse that included allegations by high level ANC officials that the United States was intent on fomenting regime change. Well, regime change did occur, and the United States had nothing to do with it. Rather, it was South Africa’s independent media, civil society, parliament, and judiciary that waltzed Zuma and his cronies out the door.  So where to begin? We can start by maintaining our current programs of assistance in South Africa. While we have ongoing military and counterterrorism collaboration with South Africa, laudable U.S. initiatives in health programming like PEPFAR have benefited millions of South Africans. A second area of strength is in trade. South Africa has been the largest beneficiary of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) by trading 141 items without duty, including automobiles and fine wines. Lastly, over 600 U.S. firms have offices in South Africa and provide a strategic and secure platform to grow U.S. commercial interests on the African continent. Using these as a base, here below are a few recommendations where the United States could advance Mr. Ramaphosa’s and its own interests. First, South Africa is a leader in medical research and life sciences in both the government and private sector. The United States could foster partnerships between U.S. educational institutions and bioscience organizations such as the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) that could address Africa’s vast unmet health needs. Second, South Africa is the logical platform for U.S. businesses to exploit the Africa continent. Indeed, South Africa’s fastest growing trade relations are with its African neighbors. American technical assistance and political capital can be leveraged to support the emergence of African regional integration, a process logically led by South Africa, the continents largest and most sophisticated economy. Additionally, South African financial institutions, including the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (the world’s fourth oldest exchange) can be a conduit for U.S. creative capital going into Africa. Last, with three consulates and Africa’s largest embassy in Pretoria, the U.S. government has the platform in which to respond to advise and technical assistance requests by the South African government, private sector, and civil society. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: February 10 - February 16
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 10 to February 16, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1519134489960'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, February 9: Soldiers killed "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Gubio, Yobe) February 10: Herdsmen killed at least two policemen (two are still missing) in Logo, Benue. February 10: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Bassa, Plateau. February 11: Suspected herdsmen killed four in Jema'a, Kaduna. February 12: Suspected herdsmen killed two civil defense officers in Guma, Benue. February 13: Kidnappers abducted a People's Democratic Party (PDP) chieftain in Ikara, Kaduna. February 14: Bandits killed forty-one in Zumi, Zamfara. February 15-16: A cult clash resulted in five deaths in Ikwerre, Rivers. February 16: Three suicide bombers killed themselves and nineteen others in Konduga, Borno. Boko Haram was suspected.  
  • Liberia
    Liberia’s Johnson-Sirleaf Awarded the Mo Ibrahim Prize for African Leadership
    The Mo Ibrahim Foundation awarded its prize for African leadership to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the former president of Liberia. The foundation’s prize committee stated that Sirleaf had shown exceptional leadership, and noted that Liberia was the only African country out of fifty-four to improve in every category of its Index of African Governance. While it did acknowledge that Sirleaf has been criticized for tolerating corruption, it noted that her leadership had nevertheless been exceptional under difficult circumstances following a generation of civil war. Mo Ibrahim, a British-Sudanese telecom billionaire, established the prize in 2006 to recognize African leadership. Eligibility is restricted to African democratically elected heads of state or government who served the constitutionally mandated term of office in the past three years and demonstrated outstanding leadership. It is probably the richest international prize in the world. It awards laureates $5 million over ten years, then $200,000 per year for life. In addition, laureates may apply for an additional $200,000 per year for their own philanthropy. The prize appears to have been designed to recognize and encourage African leadership of the highest quality and also to free former heads of state from post-presidential financial burdens.  The selection committee numbers eight and is of outstanding quality: it includes former president of Ireland Mary Robinson, former first lady of both Mozambique and South Africa Graca Machel, and former president of Botswana (and laureate) Festus Mogae. The prize may be awarded annually, but it has been awarded only five times in the ten years since it was established, including this year. The other recipients are Joaquim Chissano (former president of Mozambique), Festus Mogae (former president of Botswana), Pedro Verona Pires (former president of Cape Verde), and Hifikepunye Pohamba (former president of Namibia). Johnson Sirleaf was by no means without controversy during her long career in Liberian politics. She appears to have been much more popular outside of Liberia than at home. Her chosen candidate to succeed her in the most recent elections was defeated, and her political party recently expelled her from membership for reasons that appear to be both local and obscure. That she was the first woman to be elected as a chief of state in Africa and was therefore also probably more important outside of Liberia than at home. Her record is undoubtedly mixed, but her success in guiding the country out of a generation of civil war should not be taken for granted.