Africa in Transition

Faced with losing a scheduled parliamentary no-confidence vote on February 15, Jacob Zuma resigned from the presidency of South Africa in a broadcast to the nation in the evening on February 14. The governing African National Congress (ANC) and its large parliamentary majority moved quickly to elect deputy president and current party leader Cyril Ramaphosa to state presidency. As Zuma said in his less-than-dignified address to the nation, he resigned only because the ANC turned against him and insisted on it. The party concluded that Zuma had become too great a political liability as it looked toward upcoming elections in 2019. Zuma’s administration had become a byword for corruption, cronyism, and bad administration. Despite his populist rhetoric designed to appeal to the poor, virtually nothing was done to ameliorate their lot. His nativist style as well as his bad governance increasingly repelled South Africa’s growing urban black middle class. South Africa’s international reputation went into free-fall under him. Investment dried up, and the value of the national currency fell. In a major wakeup call, the ANC lost control of all of South Africa’s major cities except Durban in the 2016 local elections. Without change, the party feared that it might lose its parliamentary majority in the elections of 2019. In the December 2017 party convention, the ANC therefore chose Cyril Ramaphosa as party leader, rather than Zuma’s preferred candidate, his former wife Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma. (ANC party rules apparently precluded Zuma from running again.) Thereafter, Zuma’s departure from the state presidency became highly likely: the tradition is that the party leader and the state president are the same person. To preserve ANC party unity, Ramaphosa sought to ease Zuma out in a dignified way. Zuma refused to cooperate and fought resignation until it became clear that he had lost parliament’s, and more importantly, the ANC’s, confidence. In that way only, Zuma’s departure resembled that of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, who also refused to resign following a coup by his own party until the Zimbabwe parliament was about to impeach him.   As leader of the ANC and state president, Zuma governed through the creation of patronage/clientage networks greased by corruption. If South Africa’s constitutional institutions appeared to get in the way, he tried to circumvent them. However, he regularly failed. Such was the strength of South Africa’s constitutional institutions, its independent judiciary, the vigilance of the parliamentary opposition, and the activism of civil society, Zuma, in so many ways a disaster for South Africa, was a challenge, but never an existential threat, to the country’s democracy and rule of law. However, Zuma was a threat to the ideals of the ANC. His leadership through patronage/clientage networks, his cronyism, his self-centeredness, and his appeal to an atavistic Zulu tribalism seriously undermined the party’s founding principles of non-racial, non-sexist democracy. Hence, especially in urban areas, the ANC’s core constituency increasingly stayed home on election-day or drifted over to one of the opposition parties. Cyril Ramaphosa and other “reformers” within the ANC have a big job to restore national confidence in the ANC as a democratic movement devoted to the rule of law. Ramaphosa’s next step will be to deliver the state of the nation address, which resembles the U.S. state of the union address. Soon thereafter he will unveil his proposed budget. Because Zuma resigned office rather than being forced out by parliament, Ramaphosa inherits his cabinet but is free to make changes. South Africans anticipate that a Ramaphosa government will be technically far more competent than its predecessor, and organized around promoting economic growth. Ramaphosa is also expected to move quickly against the notorious nests of corruption. He nevertheless faces serious challenges. If South Africa’s democratic institutions have successfully weathered Zuma, gross economic inequality, largely parallel to racial divisions, remains. Most South Africans are poor, by some measures poorer than they were the decade that apartheid ended, though the small white minority is probably richer than it was when Mandela came to office. Ramaphosa seems to recognize the central importance of higher rates of economic growth as the way to address poverty. He also seems to understand that state redistribution of wealth, such as happened in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, would destroy Africa’s most sophisticated economy and condemn most South Africans to deeper poverty. The question remains whether he can persuade South Africans to be patient; up to now, they have been. That could be a source of encouragement.   

Zuma is not out yet, but he will be by February 15. Today, Speaker of Parliament Baleka Mbete moved the motion of no confidence originally scheduled for February 22 to Thursday, February 15. The vote will not be by secret ballot, so the public will know if any MP votes for Zuma. Most, if not all, of the opposition parties will also vote for the motion, which is likely to be carried by a huge majority. Once passed, Zuma and all the members of his cabinet will be required to resign. The speaker will assume the presidency until the national assembly elects a new president. The African National Congress (ANC) has said that immediately after the no-confidence vote, it will elect Cyril Ramaphosa to the presidency of South Africa. (Under the South African constitution, parliament elects the president, and the ANC still has an overwhelming majority of MPs.) Ramaphosa will then proceed to appoint his cabinet. In another clear sign that the Zuma era is finished, the South African police raided the Johannesburg residence of the Gupta family, closely associates of Zuma, business partners of his son, and widely linked with corruption, known as “state capture.” The motion of no-confidence that parliament will vote on is originally the product of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), who proposed the motion on February 2. It was then tabled for a vote on February 22 by Speaker Mbete (a member of the ANC). Today, the speaker agreed to move their motion forward to February 15 and to incorporate ANC amendments that outline the governing party's reasons for Zuma’s removal. This jockeying for ownership of the motion represents the broader struggle between opposition parties and the ANC to be able to take credit for Zuma’s departure.  Pending a successful vote of no-confidence, Zuma will face the humiliation of being utterly rejected by the party to which he claims to have devoted his life. Of course, right up to when the vote is taken, Zuma could resign. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe only resigned when parliament was about to vote on his impeachment. Whether Zuma is toppled by a no-confidence vote or he resigns, he will keep his pension and the other emoluments of a former president. Nobody ever accused Jacob Zuma of being gracious. Many party leaders had hoped that the transfer of presidential power would be dignified and graceful, with Zuma voluntarily resigning the presidency after Ramaphosa defeated his preferred candidate (his former wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) in the race for party leadership. ANC tradition is that the party leader is the state president; when Thabo Mbeki was defeated as party leader in 2008, he resigned the presidency following his recall by the party. Zuma’s dignified resignation would have helped the ANC move past the divisions apparent at the party conference in December, but Zuma prides himself on being a “fighter,” and has placed his personal interest ahead of his country and his party. He may believe that the patronage networks he has constructed may yet save him. Mbeki, Zuma’s predecessor, has had a distinguished post-presidential career as an African elder statesman; it is difficult to foresee Zuma in such a role. Instead of announcing his resignation in a February 14 radio broadcast (when many expected him to do so), Zuma whined that he had done nothing wrong and that the party leadership had never told him why he was being told to resign. The answer is quite clear to everybody else; something of a consensus has emerged in South Africa, including within the ANC, that Zuma is corrupt and that he was seeking to undermine the country’s democracy and its adherence to the rule of law. The ANC’s leadership concluded that unless it gets Zuma out quickly, there will be a popular anti-ANC backlash in the national elections of 2019. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the ANC leadership, long intimidated by Zuma, has ever spoken to him in such plain terms.  

The impending departure of Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa was expected following the defeat of his preferred candidate in the African National Congress’s (ANC) elections for party leader. A Council Expert’s Brief provides an analysis of Zuma’s departure from office and the way forward for the ANC. In the meantime, readers may find helpful an updated chronology and primer as the drama continues to unfold. Note that the ANC’s highest decision-making body is the National Executive Committee (NEC), which numbers 107. It strives to make decisions by consensus rather than by majority votes. When the NEC is not sitting, party affairs are in the hands of the National Working Committee (NWC). The Top Six, the senior-most party leaders including the party’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, is part of the NEC and the NWC. It normally handles day-to-day party business. The State of the Nation Address (SONA) is, like a U.S. president’s state of the union address, a major South African parliamentary calendar event. It precedes the president’s presentation of the budget, which is scheduled for February 21. The timeline indicates that the ANC “recalled” Zuma (directed him to resign the presidency) on February 13, and that he has refused. Now he faces a vote of no-confidence in parliament or possible impeachment. Resignation is a more dignified exit from the presidency than recall or losing a no-confidence vote. Impeachment would imply criminal behavior and strip Zuma of his pension rights. It has become clear that, while Zuma may have agreed to resign in principal as early as February 6, he requested to remain in office for another three to six months. This was refused, resulting in the present stand-off. Thursday, February 1 Speaker of the House Baleka Mbete insists that SONA will go ahead as planned on February 7, in response to speculation that the speech would be postponed to allow President Zuma to resign the presidency.   Friday, February 2 At the request of Julius Malema, head of the left-wing opposition Economic Freedom Fighters party, Speaker Baleka Mbete agrees to schedule debate for a motion of no-confidence vote in the Zuma administration on February 22. The opposition parties make a united call that “anyone but Zuma” should deliver the SONA. Sunday, February 4 The Top Six meets with Zuma to pressure him to resign. He refuses. Monday, February 5 The NWC meets at ANC party headquarters, Luthuli house, in Johannesburg. The press speculates that the NWC was preparing for a NEC meeting which would recall Zuma from the presidency. Tuesday, February 6 Speaker of Parliament Baleka Mbete postpones the SONA, contrary to what she said on February 1, citing numerous, unspecified  “threats to the event.” EFF leader Malema tweets, “[Zuma] will resign anytime from now.” Democratic Alliance (center-right opposition) leader Mmusi Maimane demands that Zuma be impeached. Jacob Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa, and party secretary general Ace Magashule meet at Genadendal, the president’s official Cape Town residence. According to the media, Zuma agrees to resign as soon as a list of unspecified preconditions have been finalized. Further, the two agree to postpone the NEC meeting scheduled for the next day until February 17. Wednesday, February 7 Ramaphosa and Zuma attend “routine Cabinet Committees [sic] meetings in Cape Town.” Ramaphosa tweets confirmation that they discussed Zuma’s eventual departure. Ramaphosa said that Zuma’s fate will be announced “in the coming days.” Opposition parties (DA, EFF, Congress of the People, African Christian Democratic Party, and Freedom Front Plus) meet to discuss a way forward, particularly the EFF’s proposed motion of a parliamentary vote of no confidence and the election of a new president should it succeed. In a joint statement, opposition parties complain that the country “cannot grind to a halt to allow for a compromised ANC to fight their internal battles.” Ramaphosa and Zuma hold another round of talks. Thursday, February 8 According to anonymous reports from MPs who attended a February 8 ANC caucus meeting, Ramaphosa promised that he was not negotiating a deal that would protect Zuma from prosecution. Ramaphosa also reportedly said that it was a “matter of days” before the transition talks would be concluded. According to the same MP, Ramaphosa said specifically that it was a matter of days before Zuma “goes.” Friday, February 9 Ramaphosa, followed later by members of the Top Six, pulls out of a scheduled public event scheduled for the day to focus on “pressing matters.” The Top Six is scheduled to meet on Saturday, February 10. Monday, February 12 The NEC holds a meeting regarding the fate of Zuma. It is reported that he agreed to step down, but the details are unclear. It later emerges that Zuma had agreed to go unconditionally after three or six months Opposition leaders hold a joint press conference, renewing calls to hold the motion of no confidence. They also called for the dissolution of parliament and national elections, which are currently scheduled for 2019, to be held early. After a nine hour meeting of the NEC, Ramaphosa and Magashule drive to Zuma’s office around midnight and reportedly deliver an ultimatum: resign in forty-eight hours or face a recall. The pair then returns to the NEC meeting. The meeting eventually adjourned at 3:00 a.m. February 13. It later emerges that Ramaphosa and Magashule tried to convince Zuma to reduce the time frame he provided, but that the attempt failed. Tuesday, February 13 ANC secretary general Ace Magashule and his deputy Jessie Duarte personally deliver the recall letter to Zuma at his official residence in Pretoria. In a press conference, the Magashule announces that the ANC’s NEC has formally asked Zuma to resign, but does not give a deadline, instead saying that they gave him “time and space” to make his decision. During the press conference, Magashule says, “We did not take these decisions because Comrade Jacob Zuma has done anything wrong.” He added, “It is obvious that we want Comrade Ramaphosa to come in as the president of South Africa. We respect him.” He also added, “There is no need to…humiliate [Zuma].” The ANC releases a statement on the recall, detailing Zuma’s proposal to resign in three to six months and the ANC’s efforts to shorten the timeframe, which Zuma refused. Zuma reportedly refuses the ANC’s recall. The drama’s next act will be a parliamentary no-confidence vote, unless Zuma changes his mind and resigns in the meantime. (Last updated 2:30pm ET, February 13)