Africa in Transition

Ned Dalby is a senior research analyst with International Crisis Group and lead contributor to the new report, Double-Edged Sword: Vigilantes in African Counterinsurgencies. He joins me to discuss the origin, operation, and demobilization of these groups, their role in counterinsurgency, and ultimately, what makes the reliance on vigilante groups by the government successful in some cases and not in others. Vigilante groups usually arise in weak states with deteriorating security situations in which locals feel compelled to take their security into their own hands. The state will often try to co-opt these militias, who are afforded a level of legitimacy in their communities that the military is not, at least initially, and thus have a distinct advantage in counterinsurgency operations. The reliance on vigilantes presents interesting questions for a state's sovereignty and their legitimate monopoly on the use of force. How the military and the state treat these groups will help determine both the success of the counterinsurgency and the prospects for the eventual demobilization of the vigilantes. You can listen to my conversation with Ned here.

The administration of President Uhuru Kenyatta has responded to rival Raila Odinga’s “inauguration” as a self-declared people’s president last week in a way more characteristic of an authoritarian regime than of a new democracy. It has transformed an act in Odinga’s political theater into a challenge to the legitimacy of the Kenyatta administration. Kenyatta’s attorney general has called the inauguration treasonous, and one of Odinga’s newly formed ancillary groups “criminal.” More seriously, the administration had temporarily blacked out the transmission of Kenya’s four major television stations, and it initially ignored a court order to allow the stations to resume broadcasting. The administration arrested several Odinga-allied politicians, some of whom were promptly freed by the courts. Despite rumors to the contrary, Odinga himself has not been arrested, though one of his key supporters has reportedly been deported.    Kenya is generally counted as a middle-income county, a label that reflects the country’s comparative wealth but obscures the huge differences in levels of development between rural and urban areas. Within the latter, there are those in the modern economy living in certain glittering Nairobi precincts and involved with the celebrated game parks catering to international tourism on the one hand, and those trapped in the slums on the other. To generalize broadly, Kenyatta is the face of the wealthy, Odinga of the poor; of at least parallel importance, however, are Kenyatta’s Kikuyu and Odinga’s Luo tribal identities. The two ethnic groups, like Kenyatta and Odinga, have long been rivals. Though Kenya’s postcolonial history has seen bloody ethnic conflict, flawed elections, and authoritarian government, a new constitution in 2010 distributed political power away from the center, created a more independent judiciary, and guaranteed basic human rights, including freedom of the media. A hope had been that the new constitution would guide Kenya away from its winner-take-all political culture, lowering the stakes for any one office and ultimately lowering the likelihood of violence. Yet it is not an overstatement to say that between Odinga’s “inauguration” and the government’s undemocratic response, Kenya faces a serious political crisis that threatens to unravel its recent economic and political progress. It now appears that Kenya’s economic progress and celebrated new constitution merely papered over both deep ethnic rivalries and those among Kenya’s “big men,” who show little regard for the interests of those outside their particular constituency, be it ethnic or political. As I have written previously, the precipitating cause of the current crisis is a disputed presidential election (followed by a disputed redo) between Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga. (It should be noted that the elections for other offices went well, with inevitable disputes being satisfactorily adjudicated in the courts.) Following the two elections and numerous court cases, Kenyatta was declared the winner and has been duly inaugurated as president. However, Odinga and his supporters—approaching half of the electorate—do not accept as legitimate the Kenyatta presidency. Hence, Odinga staged his own “inauguration” and claims that he, not Kenyatta, is the legitimate president of Kenya. Many Kenyans now fear that they are on a downward trajectory toward an ethnically-based civil war, as occurred following disputed elections in 2007. It is to be hoped that memories of this violence will help prevent a repeat.

David Kieghe is a development and management consultant and activist based in the United Kingdom. He received his MBA from Liverpool University and is the author of the book “National Ambition: Reconstructing Nigeria.” The president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, signed into law the establishment of the North East Development Commission (NEDC) in October 2017. The NEDC’s mission is to lead the reconstruction and development of Nigeria’s northeast. It is likely to consolidate and replace other initiatives such as the Victims Support Fund (VSF), Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE), and Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI). The funding of the Commission will come from various sources including the Federal Government of Nigeria, international bilateral donors, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the UN, the European Union, USAID, UKAID/DFID, as well as local donors.  There are also hundreds of local and international NGOs currently responding to the humanitarian crisis in the region. A major challenge is coordinating these diverse actors, each with different missions, to avoid duplicating projects and programs. The other challenge is how to ensure that the activities and solutions that various actors bring are culturally appropriate.  Coordinating the activities of NGOs should therefore be of paramount concern for the NEDC and should be done in close consultation and partnership with states and local governments in the area. It should also coordinate with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is also operating in the region.  To promote community unity and stabilization, the NEDC should regularly consult with the ordinary people in the region (for whom it was created) in determining and prioritizing their needs. It should ensure that solutions take into account the culture and customs of those it seeks to help, and its economic initiatives should empower ordinary people.  Over time, the NEDC will need to invest in data systems, education, health care, housing, skills training, and agriculture. If successfully implemented, the NEDC has the opportunity to make a real difference in the lives of Nigerians in the northeast.