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Rumors of a Political Capture
Accusations of influence peddling in the heart of its presidency raise the ugly scepter of state capture in Nigeria. Read More
Podcast: "State Capture" in South Africa
Crispian Olver, a former senior South African government official, long-time ANC activist, and author of the new book How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay, joins me to discuss the pervasive corruption in South Africa known as "state capture" and the state of the African National Congress. Ahead of the 2016 local elections, Crispian Olver was tasked by the ANC and the central government to clean up the municipal administration in Port Elizabeth. What he uncovered was in many ways an illustration of what has been happening elsewhere in South Africa. The intervention he orchestrated, as well as the local election campaign in which he was deeply involved, offer insights on corruption and politics in South Africa.
You can listen to the podcast here.
Kenyatta Government Declares Odinga's NRM "Criminal"
Following the January 30 “inauguration” of Raila Odinga as an alternative president of Kenya, the Interior Ministry declared that his National Resistance Movement (NRM) is an “organized criminal group” under the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act. Thus far, however, no arrests have been reported. The NRM is an offshoot of Odinga’s broader political coalition, the National Super Alliance (NASA). NASA created the NRM as its resistance wing, according to Kenyan media.
The Kenyatta administration had sought to prevent Raila Odinga’s “inauguration,” and when it ultimately took place, to minimize media coverage of it, including a live television blackout. President Kenyatta’s office earlier had said that any “actions” (a reference to Odinga’s) would be subject to the law. In December, the attorney general said that if Odinga declared himself president, he would be committing high treason, punishable by death. In an interview with the Voice of America in early January, Odinga raised the possibility that he would establish an alternative government, either in Kenya or abroad.
The current political crisis is the outcome of two disputed elections and associated judicial processes. The crisis resulted in a second term for Uhuru Kenyatta as president of Kenya. NASA refuses to accept this outcome and maintains that Odinga was the genuine winner of the original presidential elections, and therefore the Kenyatta presidency is illegitimate.
Personal rivalry between the Kenyatta and Odinga families dates back to Kenya’s independence. It both feeds on and promotes ethnic and class conflict. Kenyatta is Kikuyu, probably the country’s largest and most powerful ethnic group, and the face of big business; Odinga is a Luo, a traditional Kikuyu rival ethnic group, and the voice of the marginalized, especially in the Nairobi slums.
A concern is that the 2007 scenario may repeat itself, during which a disputed presidential election morphed into an ethnic conflict that left over one thousand dead and up to half a million internally displaced. A power sharing settlement was cobbled together by the UN secretary general that led to a new constitution designed, among other things, to decentralize governance and mitigate Kenya’s winner-take-all political culture. The new constitution appeared to be working. Hence, in part, the disappointment among friends of Kenya over the current crisis.
At this stage, the current crisis could be dissipated by an agreement between Kenyatta and Odinga. Both are “big men,” rich, and beneficiaries of the status quo. Over the years they have been in social as well as political contact. However, mismanagement of the crisis could have dire consequences. Negative scenarios might include mob violence by Odinga’s supporters or government arrests of Odinga’s associates, or even perhaps of the man himself, as the attorney general has threatened. These actions would inflame Odinga’s followers, with likely deleterious consequences.
Raila Odinga Sworn in as Kenya’s “People’s President”
As he has long said he would do, Raila Odinga had himself sworn in as the “people’s president” at noon on January 30 in the presence of thousands of supporters in Uhuru Park in downtown Nairobi. With only limited success, the Kenyatta government tried to block media coverage rather than using the police to prevent the event. The attorney general and other lawyers of the Uhuru Kenyatta government said the inauguration amounted to treason. Odinga’s oath, according to western media, was “I, Raila Omolo Odinga, do swear that I will protect the nation as people’s president, so help me God.” Media described the crowd as numbering perhaps two thousand and ecstatic. Odinga and his umbrella political movement, the National Super Alliance (NASA) has never accepted the legitimacy of the August and October elections, nor the subsequent court decisions that resulted in the second term presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta.
Ethnic divisions in Kenya have long played a major role in shaping politics. Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta, who was the leader of the liberation struggle against the British, is seen as the face of the wealthy, big businesses, and the Kikuyu tribe. As with the effort to blackout the January 30 “inauguration,” Kenyatta’s critics see him as increasingly resorting to authoritarian means to consolidate his power. Odinga, nearly as wealthy as Kenyatta, appeals chiefly to the poor in the Nairobi slums, the Luo ethnic group, and others who regard themselves as marginalized. The disputed elections mark a point at which Kenya is more divided than at any time since the disastrous elections of 2007 in which disputed elections morphed into ethnic conflict that left thousands dead. In December, reflecting the fragility of the country, the U.S. acting assistant secretary of state for Africa asked Odinga not to proceed with his “inauguration,” and called on him and Kenyatta to enter into negotiations. Thus far, this has not happened and responsibility for the impasse appears to be shared by both leaders.
The Odinga “inauguration” has certainly led to further polarization, as has the Kenyatta government’s attempt at a media blackout. The concern must be that miscalculation by either leader could ignite what is likely a powder keg. Kenyatta must do all he can to ensure restraint by the police force. For his part, Odinga must implore his supporters to avoid violence.
Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: January 20 - January 26
Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 20 to January 26, 2018. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.
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January 20: Kidnappers abducted three in Munya, Niger.
January 21: Sectarian violence led to six deaths in Numan, Adamawa.
January 21: Four were killed in a cult clash in Oron, Akwa Ibom.
January 21: Herdsmen killed two in Aniocha North, Delta.
January 22: Gunmen killed six and abducted two children in Maradun, Zamfara.
January 22: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Bassa, Plateau.
January 23: Pirates killed two police officers in Ogbia, Bayelsa.
January 23: Gunmen killed nine and abducted seven children in Ardo Kola, Adamawa.
January 24: Boko Haram killed one in Bama, Borno.
January 24: Gunmen killed four vigilantes in Kaiama, Kwara.
January 24: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Bokkos, Plateau.
January 25: Herdsmen killed eight in Bassa, Plateau.
January 25: Nigerian gunmen attacked a border post in Ekok, Cameroon. There were no casualties.
January 26: Herdsmen killed three in Bassa, Plateau
January 26: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.
An Opportunity to Improve Health in Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe
Ewodaghe Harrell is a Franklin Williams intern for global health, economics, and development at the Council on Foreign Relations. She received her master's in public health from Brown University in 2017.
In November 2017, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe resigned after thirty-seven years in power. He leaves behind a legacy of disastrous government campaigns and policies which rolled back social, economic, and cultural progress for Zimbabweans. Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s successor and former vice president, has indicated that genuine change is coming, pledging to rebuild the country and “protect and promote the rights and people of Zimbabwe.” However, based on his recent cabinet appointments, some skeptics worry that Mnangagwa's government will be a continuation of Mugabe’s. Further, Mnangagwa is associated with many of the harmful reforms committed under Mugabe’s rule that led to the collapse of the healthcare system. To make good on his lofty, post-Mugabe promises, Mnangagwa must promote economic reform in order to to have a shot at transforming the healthcare system.
Mnangagwa must address the key challenges in public health. Currently the majority of Zimbabwe’s health sector is understaffed and overburdened. Since 2000, an estimated three million people, including many health workers, have left the country in search of economic opportunity and better working conditions abroad. According to the WHO, there is an overall density of only 1.23 health workers per 1,000 people, which is half of the estimated minimum density of health workers needed across sub-Saharan Africa. In 2008, for instance, the health workforce was so small that a fast-spreading cholera outbreak contributed to over four thousand deaths and an estimated ninety thousand infections within months. Zimbabweans continue to experience challenges in combating communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, diarrheal diseases, and HIV/AIDS. The HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to be a significant public health problem in Zimbabwe, placing a tremendous strain on the health sector. In 2016, approximately 14 percent of the adults in Zimbabwe were living with HIV/AIDS, the sixth highest HIV/AIDS prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa. Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health and Child Care estimates that 45 percent of women who died of pregnancy-related complications were HIV positive. Although maternal mortality has declined from 960 deaths per 100,000 live births to 614 deaths per 100,000 live births in recent years, the ratio is still unacceptably high.
The high disease burden from preventable diseases is characteristic of most low- and middle-income countries, and is particularly a result of inadequate health financing. With billions of dollars of domestic debt and millions more in stolen public funds, Zimbabwe has in recent years relied on funding agencies to support public services. In fact, USAID has invested nearly $100 million annually in Zimbabwe to support health programs that provide treatment for and prevention of diseases and help make health care services more accessible to families.
To address these challenges, the government will need to first establish economic stability. Second, Mnangagwa must ensure the government prioritizes financing the public healthcare system and developing a comprehensive health strategy that targets the greatest health problems. Such investment in improving health services will require international support. Zimbabwe is facing considerable challenges, but if Mnangagwa takes reengagement seriously and if global partners continue to work with the health sector, the country will have the tools to make remarkable progress.
