Africa in Transition

On December 21 the results were announced of the election of the African National Congress’s National Executive Committee (NEC). Between national conferences, it is the highest decision-making body in the party. For example, it was the NEC that determined that responsibility for the party’s reverses in the local elections of 2016 was collective, not Jacob Zuma’s, though he was the party leader. The NEC has eighty members, half of whom must be female. The outcome of the December 21 NEC elections appears to be an even split between the Ramaphosa and the Zuma/Dlamini-Zuma factions. At this stage, the party leadership as a whole appears to be split down the middle, with the Top Six (the six most senior party officials) also equally divided between the two factions. Should that persist, the party would be paralyzed. The balance however, might change. Within the Top Six, there is a serious challenge in the courts to the election of pro-Zuma Ace Magashule (premier of the Free State). He defeated the pro-Ramaphosa former premier of KwaZulu/Natal Senzo Mchunu for party secretary general by only twenty-four votes. Already some among the pro-Ramaphosa faction are predicting that the balance among the Top Six will shift in favor of Ramaphosa by four to two. In addition, there are signs that Deputy President and Mpumalanga premier David Mabuza may be shifting from Zuma to Ramaphosa. If that were to happen, only Jesse Duarte, the party deputy secretary general, would be left as pro-Zuma among the Top Six. The ANC loves a winner—and Cyril Ramaphosa won the presidency. The possibility of defections to the new president should not be discounted. The next major issue for the party may well be forcing Jacob Zuma to resign as state president. Already the veterans’ caucus in the party is calling for it. The NEC may take up the issue at its January 5 meeting. A South African journalist saw a list circulating at the electoral convention of potential Ramaphosa cabinet appointments, possible only if Zuma is out. While any such list must be hypothetical and tentative, it illustrates the talent available to Ramaphosa. Names on the list include Zweli Mkhize to finance, Pravin Gordhan to public enterprises, Blade Nzimande to higher education, and Lindiwe Sisulu to international affairs. Mkhize made his reputation as the party’s treasurer, Gordhan as internationally-respected minister of finance (until he was fired by Zuma). Nzimade, with a PhD, has been deeply concerned about education reform and has previously served as minister of education. Lindiwe Sisulu, daughter of liberation icons Walter and Albertina Sisulu, has also held a number of cabinet portfolios. As a group, they have distinguished backgrounds:  Mkhize is a medical doctor, Sisulu holds a DPhil from the University of York (UK), and Gordhan was the chair of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), which hammered out the transition from apartheid to non-racial democracy. Ramaphosa played a leading role in CODESA as paramount ANC negotiator. Gordhan’s subsequent ministerial career in finance earned the confidence of international investors. Nzimande’s PhD is in sociology from the University of Natal, a distinguished university. 

Kenyan opposition leader Raila Odinga's decision on December 10 to postpone his inauguration as the president of an alternative “People’s assembly” for Kenya has, at least for the time being, lowered the political temperature in the country. Odinga had announced that he would be sworn in as president in Mombasa on December 12, based on his claim to have won the original August 8 elections. Those elections, in which the election commission had certified Uhuru Kenyatta as the winner, were thrown out by the Supreme Court as not having followed all the constitutionally-mandated procedures. Odinga and opposition voters subsequently boycotted the election rerun in October and they do not recognize the legitimacy of Kenyatta’s victory. Following that election, Kenyatta was sworn in as president and has organized his administration. However, up to half of all Kenyans question or deny the legitimacy of his election and inauguration, according to polling. Spokesmen for the Kenyatta administration said that if Odinga proceeded with parallel inauguration, he would be committing treason, raising the possibility that Kenyatta might attempt to arrest him. In a bitterly divided Kenya, this could provoke widespread ethnic violence, even civil war. (Kenyatta is a Kikuyu, Odinga a Luo; both big ethnic groups are allied with smaller ones). Odinga is still saying that he will proceed with his inauguration, perhaps even before the end of he year.  Why did Odinga back down? Will he continue to do so? The Kenyan press is reporting that some of Odinga’s coalition partners, the National Super Alliance (NASA), Odinga’s family (especially his wife), and foreign diplomats led by the U.S. ambassador, urged him to pull back from the brink. On Twitter, U.S. Ambassador Robert Godec said, “NASA’s decision yesterday (December 10) is a positive step. We again call for a sustained, open, and transparent national conversation involving all Kenyans to build national unity and address long-standing issues.” Ambassador Godec and Acting Assistant Secretary for Africa Don Yamomoto are continuing to call for dialogue between Odinga and Kenyatta. However, the Kenyan press is also reporting anger at the postponement among Odinga’s grass-roots supporters. What happens next? Odinga‘s spokespeople say that he and NASA want dialogue on security reform, strengthening the judiciary, and greater government devolution. Kenyatta, too, is calling for dialogue, but he has ruled out further talks about election reform, a recurrent Odinga theme. So, if Kenya is back from the brink, the political stalemate continues. Christmas is coming, and much of Kenya shuts down for the holidays. Come January, however, politics will resume. In the meantime Kenya is divided and uncertainty about almost everything is the watchword.