Africa in Transition

South Africa President Jacob Zuma faces more than seven hundred charges of corruption in connection to an arms deal that occurred in the late 1990s, long before he became president. Those charges had been set aside by a lower court while he was president. However, in October the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the decision of a lower court that the charges could be reinstated now. The decision whether to prosecute rests with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), an independent, non-political body. However, after the October ruling, Zuma appointed Shaun Abrahams as chief prosecutor, who is seen as a Zuma ally. The High Court has now ruled that Zuma’s appointment is invalid: Judge Mlambo said, ‘”in our view, President Zuma would be clearly conflicted in having to appoint a national director of public prosecutions, given the background…and particularly the ever present spectre of the many criminal charges against him that have not gone away.” The court ordered the deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa, to appoint a new chief prosecutor. The Zuma administration will probably appeal the high court ruling to the Constitutional Court. However, according to British media, the African National Congress (ANC) is saying that the parties involved should “reflect” on the opinion before deciding whether to appeal.  Next week, the ruling ANC will hold its national convention where it will choose a new person to succeed Zuma as party leader. The leading candidates are Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, Jacob Zuma’s choice candidate and his former wife, and Cyril Ramaphosa, Mr. Zuma’s current vice president. The race is close, and the court’s ruling will probably give Ramaphosa a boost. The way the court ruling against Zuma and Abrahams unfolded is illustrative of the rule of law in South Africa. Three civil society organizations sued in the courts, arguing that Zuma’s removal of the previous prosecutor so that he could appoint Abrahams was invalid. That suit brought the issue into the court system. As has happened many times in the past, South Africa’s strong and vigilant civil society groups sued against the government, and an independent judiciary found in their favor. The rule of law is more advanced in South Africa than elsewhere because of the independence of the judiciary combined with the strength of civil society and a free press which regularly highlights issues (such as the ties between Zuma and Abrahams) that the administration would prefer to remain in the dark.   

The governing African National Congress (ANC) will hold its elective conference from December 16 to December 20 in Johannesburg. The conference meets every five years to choose a party leader and other senior officials. So long as the ANC has a majority, parliament is all but certain to elect the party leader to the South African presidency in 2019. (Voters vote for a party, not individual candidates, and then newly elected members of parliament elect the president.) Hence party leader Jacob Zuma is also the president of South Africa. Under the ambiguous ANC rules, he is probably ineligible to run for the party leadership at this elective conference; even if he could, he is so discredited by personal scandal that it is unlikely he could get enough votes. However, should his preferred candidate for party leader, his former wife Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, win the race, he might finish out his term as state president. Conversely, if current vice president Cyril Ramaphosa were to win the leadership race, the ANC might recall Zuma from the presidency before his term is up, as it did when Thabo Mbeki lost the party leadership in 2008 before his term as state president ended. Much media commentary represents the leadership contest as a two-horse race between Dlamini-Zuma and Ramaphosa, who each head slates of candidates for other offices. Many in the ANC, however, are uncomfortable with slates that correspond to a certain party faction, and there are calls for "party unity." This would involve the election of candidates from the two slates as well as others not necessarily on a slate, creating a party leadership that is not binary by allowing many combinations and permutations. The draft program of the conference (which is not necessarily final) provides for nominations of candidates for the party's president, secretary general, chairperson, and treasurer on December 16. Voting will follow, and results are scheduled to be announced on the evening of December 17. Nominations for deputy president and deputy secretary general would open on December 17, followed by voting, and the results would be announced on December 18. Nominations and voting would thus take place after results are known from the first four contests. Under this scenario, the losers of the first round of voting could be accommodated in the second. Nevertheless, it seems increasingly unlikely that Dlamini-Zuma and Ramaphosa, and their respective slates, would benefit from the winner-take-all practice of previous conferences. Ramaphosa has more pledged delegates than Dlamini-Zuma, but voting is secret so there is ample room for horse trading. Further, President Zuma has a formidable patronage/clientage network and in a political climate rife with corruption charges, “he knows where the bodies are buried.” A deal between Ramaphosa and Dlamini-Zuma would be attractive to many in the party. The most likely outcome, in my opinion, is that Ramaphosa will emerge as party leader and Dlamini-Zuma will become his deputy. The ANC is bitterly divided, though more over personality and style than policies. It has been sloppy in its procedures for delegate selection. Should a faction wish to derail the conference, it could do so by challenging the credentials of delegates. Similarly, if the party remains divided over the leadership question, the loser—either Ramaphosa, Dlamini-Zuma, or some other figure—could challenge the convention’s choice in the courts. Should the convention become derailed or its choice for party leader be challenged successfully in the courts, the ANC’s partners, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), might well withdraw from the Tripartite Alliance and set off on their own. The ANC itself might split. Many within the ANC are working to prevent such a scenario, and they are more likely to succeed than not. But, these are perilous time for the cause of ANC party unity.