Africa in Transition

Ayobami Egunyomi is a Franklin Williams intern for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She received her BA in International Relations from Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis. She is a native of Nigeria. In light of the renewed clamor for the secession of Biafra, it is evident that the country is far from settling its national question, and attainment of true nationhood is not on the horizon of Nigeria. Although Nigeria is striving to promote national unity, the country seems to still be battling with the ethnic tension it faced after its independence that ultimately led to the outbreak of its three-year civil war. After the Nigerian Civil War ended in 1970, as part of the “3R” program—reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation—the government created the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to bridge ethnic and religious divisions in Nigeria and to foster the spirit of Nigerian nationalism. General Yakubu Gowon, the military head of state at the time, created the NYSC as one of many ways to achieve national unity in Nigeria. The program is a mandatory one-year service to the country after the completion of a first degree for youths below the age of thirty. Participation is a prerequisite for admission into graduate schools and employment in Nigeria. Although it was established with great intent, many Nigerians think it is high time that the forty-four year old scheme was scrapped, arguing that it has its lost its relevance in present-day Nigeria. This view stems from the fact that since its inception, the scheme has neither been reviewed nor updated to fit the realities of modern Nigeria, despite its glaring problems. Even though the federal government allocates about 70 billion naira ($194 million) to the program yearly, the NYSC, like many other Nigerian institutions, is riddled with mismanagement and corruption. This results in unreliable officials administering the scheme, a general lack of faith in the NYSC, and complacency among the participants. According to its original design, the scheme deploys youths to unfamiliar locations and places of primary assignment to fields relevant to their academic pursuits and job interests. In reality, however, it mostly deploys youths to teach in local schools as a way to make up for the educational shortcomings of the state, rather than finding them suitable job assignments geared toward their interests. Consequently, “corpers” feel undervalued and view themselves as a source of cheap labor for the government. Furthermore, youths who have the financial resources can “work it”—use connections to serve in choice locations—or “ghost”—secretly not participate in the service. For those that do participate, their safety is not assured, as there have been numerous cases of “corpers” dying in service due to post-election violence, sectarian wars, and medical negligence. The question that thus arises is, has the NYSC been successful in achieving its main objective of “developing common ties among the Nigerian youths and promoting national unity and integration?” For all its faults, the answer is still yes, to some extent. By posting “corpers” to unfamiliar places in order to interact with people from different backgrounds, the NYSC brings together Nigerian youths from different socio-economic and ethno-religious backgrounds. This helps bridge the ethnic and religious divisions in the nation by providing exposure to other ethnic groups, which is a positive step towards building a stronger nation. Moreover, the scheme aids social integration by providing opportunities for cross cultural interaction that has led to inter-tribal marriages, helping to reduce inter-ethnic stereotypes and suspicions that were prevalent during the period after the war. The scheme further serves as an employment buffer by offering employment to recently graduated youths, as some places of deployments retain the “corpers,” thereby, aiding economic integration in the country. Likewise, NYSC fosters a sense of patriotism among Nigerian youths; participation is regarded as obeying the clarion call to serve the fatherland, since there is no military conscription in Nigeria    With the renewed agitation for the secession of Biafra, the need for the NYSC remains high and illuminates the fact that the scheme is far from achieving its mission of fostering national integration. Based on the design of the NYSC, it is a good scheme and a great avenue to promote nationalism in Nigeria. The program has a lofty objective and has achieved some positive goals. Even with all its mistakes, there is still hope for the Nigerian Youth Service Corps, but it is crucial that it be reviewed, updated, and better managed in order to preserve and strengthen the cause of national unity.

Jacob Zenn is a Fellow on African and Eurasian Affairs at The Jamestown Foundation.  The latest news from northeastern Nigeria is that the Nigerian army will erect fortresses around the region’s larger towns to prevent Boko Haram raids and allow farmers to tend their fields in safety. This strategy should also in theory allow displaced people to return to the towns that they abandoned after Boko Haram incursions. Whether or not this strategy can keep Boko Haram out for good is one question. But the other question is, “what does this say about the state of the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria?”  In August 2014, Abubakr Shekau, leader of Boko Haram, announced the creation of an Islamic state after amassing significant territory in northeastern Nigeria and the surrounding region. Months later in March 2015, he pledged loyalty to Abubakr al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State and renamed Boko Haram the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). While at least some of this conquered territory has since been recaptured by the government, the “fortress strategy” put forward by the Nigerian military shows that only the major towns in Borno State remain in government control, which itself is tenuous. Several kilometers outside of those towns Boko Haram still operates freely.   A UN report from September 30, 2017 shows that eastern Yobe State, northeastern Adamawa State, and virtually all of Borno State, aside from its capital of Maiduguri and other large towns, remain “not accessible” or “partially accessible” to the UN because of the threat of insurgent attacks. Even parts of Borno that are “accessible,” such as Magumeri, are still highly insecure. Magumeri is where ISWAP militants, loyal to Abu Musab al-Barnawi and travelling in a convoy of forty-five vehicles, were able to kill dozens of Nigerian soldiers and kidnap University of Maiduguri professors on an oil exploring mission in July 2017.  In August 2016, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was appointed as leader of ISWAP and Shekau was demoted from the position by Islamic State for reasons that Islamic State has not made clear. However, the decision was likely related to Shekau’s loss of support among ISWAP fighters. Al-Barnawi’s ally, Mamman Nur, for instance, claimed that Shekau killed anyone that he considered to be a threat his authority, including a weapons expert who simply had a dream that Shekau should not take women as slaves.  Despite Shekau’s demotion from ISWAP, he still has militants loyal to him around Sambisa Forest. A recent video from November 2017 shows Shekau’s fighters ambushing Nigerian troops and stealing a tank near Sambisa. Shekau’s fighters have also been able to send suicide bombers to attack the University of Maiduguri three times in 2017, and his faction recently carried out a suicide bombing at a mosque in Adamawa State that killed at least fifty worshippers. This shows Shekau’s faction has reach beyond Sambisa. Moreover, Shekau also has enough control over his faction to have authorized the exchange of more than eighty kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls in May 2017; ISWAP under Abu Musab al-Barnawi, however, reportedly still holds more than one-hundred other Chibok schoolgirls in its territory. What this means is that much like the challenge for the U.S. and Afghan army in Afghanistan, the Nigerian army now has enough strength to control population centers but not rural areas. The population, caught in the middle, may not be in favor of the insurgents but the retribution that ISWAP and Shekau’s faction can inflict on anyone who collaborates with the government is enough to keep the population passive. In such a situation the insurgents can take advantage of their superior knowledge of the socio-cultural and physical terrain in northeastern Nigeria to harass the Nigerian army, at least outside of these new “fortresses”.  Nigeria now faces a classic counterinsurgency scenario, and it may be an uphill battle to shift the current status quo in its favor instead of playing defense.