Blogs

Africa in Transition

Michelle Gavin, Ebenezer Obadare, and other experts track political and security developments across sub-Saharan Africa.

Latest Post

Nigerian President Bola Tinubu speaks at the National Collation Centre in Abuja, Nigeria on March 1, 2023.
Nigerian President Bola Tinubu speaks at the National Collation Centre in Abuja, Nigeria on March 1, 2023. REUTERS/Esa Alexander

Rumors of a Political Capture

Accusations of influence peddling in the heart of its presidency raise the ugly scepter of state capture in Nigeria. Read More

Sub-Saharan Africa
New Report on Africa's Internally Displaced Persons
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are those forced to leave their homes but who do not cross international borders. As a practical matter, they are largely devoid of the protections accorded by international law and UN agencies to refugees—persons with a well-founded fear of persecution based on ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, and other criteria that is defined by international protocols. IDPs by contrast, are the responsibility of the country in which they reside and hold citizenship. In poor countries, the material conditions of IDP’s may be worse than refugees, who are eligible for international assistance. In 2012, member states of the African Union signed the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (IDMC). This is the world’s only protocol that binds governments legally to protect the rights and well-being of IDPs. However, because of a lack of state capacity, persistent internal conflict, and poverty, too often this protocol remains only aspirational.  Due to the fact that IDPs do not cross international borders and are often found in remote areas, their numbers are difficult to determine. Perhaps the best, readily available source are the reports of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The organizations concluded that at the end of 2016, there were 12.6 million African IDPs. They have just released a new report on the plight of IDPs in Africa. The new report concludes that in the first six months of 2017, an additional 2.7 million people have been internally displaced. Of those, almost half are in two countries: just under one million people became internally displaced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and just over two hundred thousand in the Central African Republic. These figures represent significant increases from recent years. Most of the time, internal displacement is not the result of natural disasters. The IDMC and the NRC conclude that conflicts caused 75 percent of new displacements so far in 2017, up from 70 percent in 2016. The primary driver of internal displacement is politics in the context of poor governance. The Norwegian Refugee Council established the IDMC in 1998. Its headquarters is in Geneva. It is funded mostly by the Scandinavian states, the United Kingdom, the United States (through USAID), Australia, and various international agencies and non-governmental organizations. Its data is the gold standard when it comes to studying IDPs.  
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Cabinet Appointments Disappoint
Friends of Zimbabwe hoped that President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s cabinet appointments would signal a shift away from the tyranny of deposed president Robert Mugabe. Instead, Mnangagwa’s appointments have signaled continuity, not change. No members of the opposition were included, and the most important positions went to military personalities. The foreign minister will be General Sibusiso Moyo, who announced the coup against Mugabe while insisting that no coup had taken place. Air Marshal Perence Shiri, the head of the air force, is to be minister of agriculture and land affairs. Like Mnangagwa, Shiri was deeply involved in the massacre of Ndebele in the 1980s. However, Mnangagwa is showing some flexibility. In the face of public outcry from the teachers’ unions, he cancelled the appointment of Lazarus Dokora and replaced him with Paul Mavina, and he also annulled his appointment of Clever Nyathi as labor minister in favor of Petronella Kgonye. It is not clear, however, whether Nyathi has been demoted. He has been appointed special advisor to the president for peace and reconciliation, an area in which he has professional expertise. While Kgonye has been involved in controversial land deals in the past, Zimbabwe’s constitution and political practice calls for consideration of gender, and Kagonye is a woman.  On the positive side of the ledger, a Zimbabwean court acquitted Evan Mawarire of charges of “subverting” the government. His #ThisFlag movement had organized large-scale protests against the Mugabe regime. Observers were watching his trial as an indicator of whether the Mnangagwa regime would respect the independence of the judiciary. It is too early to draw any conclusions regarding the Mawarire acquittal, but it is still a good sign.  Thus far, the Mnangagwa regime appears to be a continuation of Mugabe’s, albeit with slightly more flexibility. Mugabe and his ZANU-PF retains popularity in the rural areas, if not in the cities. If Mnangagwa introduces even a few reforms that are immediately visible and impact positively on daily life, ZANU-PF may win credible election when they are next held. An example might be Mnangagwa’s making permanent the replacement of police by the army at checkpoints. The police generally demand bribes, the army does not—at least up to now.   
Nigeria
Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: November 25 - December 1
Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from November 25 to December 1, 2017. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1512395817095'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   November 25: Boko Haram killed three soldiers and one civilian in Magumeri, Borno. November 25: Nigerian troops killed fourteen Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. November 28: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants in Kala/Balge, Borno. November 29: Four children were killed by a petrol bomb in Aniocha South, Delta. November 29: Boko Haram killed five in Madagali, Adamawa. November 29: Robbers killed two policemen and four civilians in Lapai, Niger. November 29: Youth killed five civilians suspected of witchcraft in Udung-Uko, Akwa Ibom. November 30: Unknown attackers killed three children at a school in Kwaya Kusar, Borno. November 30: Herdsmen killed six mobile police officers in Numan, Adamawa. November 30: Kidnappers abducted six students in Moro, Wara; one was subsequently released.  November 30: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants and lost one soldier in Dikwa, Borno.
  • South Africa
    Mugabe Falls as Zuma Struggles to Hold on
    Zimbabwe and South Africa are adjacent geographically and share a parallel history, but they are radically different polities. Not least, Zimbabwe is a tyranny, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. South Africa is a democracy conducted according to the rule of law. Nevertheless, there are similarities, particularly between the two heads of state. In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe attempted to designate his wife, Grace, as his successor, while Jacob Zuma is sponsoring his ex-wife, Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, to succeed him as leader of the governing African National Congress (ANC) at the party’s national convention this month. In both cases, the choices appear to have been self-serving. Mugabe likely concluded that his wife could best protect his interests, and that of their children; in Zuma’s case, his critics plausibly view his motivation as avoiding criminal prosecution once out of office and protecting his considerable assets for his children. Both Mugabe and Zuma tried to insert their family members into the more or less mutually understood succession of a vice president to the presidency. In Mugabe’s case, his choice of Grace precipitated his removal from power by a military cabal within the governing movement, ZANU-PF. Will Mugabe’s downfall significantly influence the ANC party leadership race? It might. Mugabe had appeared invincible up until the moment of his resignation. Jacob Zuma, whose patronage/clientage networks and mastery of the internal politics of the ANC has enabled him to survive despite his deep unpopularity, has also seemed untouchable. But Mugabe’s fate shows that the fall can come quickly. Unlike ZANU-PF, the ANC has a significant, democratic dimension. Zuma’s successor will not be determined by a military cabal as Mugabe’s was, but rather by a party convention that will operate according to understood procedures. Zuma’s vice president and Dlamini-Zuma’s chief rival for the party leadership is Cyril Ramaphosa, who has significant party support. (It should be noted that Dlamini-Zuma is a significant political force in her own right.) Mugabe left office in the face of the threat of impeachment, which would have stripped him of his pension and all the other emoluments of a former chief of state. There are numerous grounds for impeachment of Jacob Zuma, which becomes a potential political reality if he loses control of the party. Like Mugabe, Zuma would probably resign in the face of likely impeachment, after which he would have to face the hundreds of charges against him. Will Zuma be able to continue his control of the ANC party machinery at the December party convention? If he can, then Dlamini-Zuma will probably win the party leadership, buying Zuma the ability to fill-out his presidential term, which ends in 2019. It is also likely that if the ANC wins the majority of seats in parliament in 2019, that Dlamini-Zuma will become the president. If however, deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa is elected party leader, Zuma will probably be required by the ANC to resign the presidency, though it might take some months for that drama to play out.  
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    New Study on Trump Administration's Impact on U.S.-Africa Relations
    The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has released a serious study by John Stremlau of the African response thus far to the presidency of Donald Trump. Stremlau, an American, is a SAIIA fellow and a visiting professor at the prestigious University of the Witswatersrand (“Wits”) in Johannesburg. He served for years as the vice president for peace programs at the Carter Center in Atlanta (a non-governmental organization established by former President Jimmy Carter). Though he now lives in Johannesburg, Stremlau is looking at the Trump presidency from the perspective of a ‘Democrat’ in the United States and of a ‘democrat’ in Africa, working for democracy and the rule of law. He is well placed to understand the political dynamics both in the United States and in Africa. That he has a clear perspective does not invalidate what he is saying. The study, more than forty pages in length, is as much about the U.S. president and his administration as it is about Africa. It is a thoughtful and devastating critique. The report contains in one place a great deal of information, ranging from the impact of proposed budget cuts at the State Department on Africa to cataloguing public statements about Africa made by the president (almost none), the secretary of state (also almost none), and Nikki Haley, U.S. ambassador to the UN (a significant number). He also shows how remarkably little interaction there has been between the president and the secretary of state and African leaders. Drawing on polling data from the Pew Research Center, Stremlau charts the dramatic decline in African confidence in the U.S. president “doing the right thing,” country by country. For Africans, the president’s economic nationalism, hostility to multilateralism, rejection of the Paris accords on climate change, and what many Africans see as discomfort with democratic values, make him an unattractive, even hostile, figure. Stremlau also identifies characteristics of the Trump administration as seen by its critics that will give aid and comfort to the dwindling number of African “big men,” including “the political art of lying,” “opinion over fact,” and “crony capitalism.” Stremlau also talks about the elephant in the living room: the racism of many of the president’s supporters, and the views of many Africans that the president himself is racist. The latter point is longstanding: it dates from the negative African reaction to the president’s view that former President Obama was born in Africa and therefore not qualified to be president of the United States. (Stremlau notes the enduring popularity of President George W. Bush and Barack Obama in Africa.) The study sees the Trump administration as having silver linings for African countries, including incentive to greater self-reliance and to building stronger relationships with non-African countries. He also considers that assaults can often strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law. For those Americans concerned with advancing the U.S. relationship with Africa, Stremlau’s study shows where we are now and provides a benchmark for going forward. SAIIR has done a service by making the study available to a wide audience.