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Rumors of a Political Capture
Accusations of influence peddling in the heart of its presidency raise the ugly scepter of state capture in Nigeria. Read More
Mugabe Holds On
Zimbabwe’s ruling party, the ZANU-PF, has expelled Robert Mugabe and it is demanding that he resign by today or face impeachment. On Sunday in an address to the nation, Mugabe made no mention of stepping down, and referred to chairing the next ZANU-PF convention in a few weeks. Negotiations between the military and Mugabe, supposedly facilitated by South Africa and a Roman Catholic priest, appear to be going nowhere. Meanwhile, Mugabe’s likely successor and former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, has returned from South Africa. On the day of his address over the weekend, there was a huge (by Zimbabwean standards) anti-Mugabe demonstration in Harare.
More details about the coup are emerging, though they do not change the fundamental narrative. The issue was a conflict within the ZANU-PF over the succession of Mugabe, who at 93 is visibly failing. One faction is close to the military and is headed by Mnangagwa. He is called “the Crocodile” and his faction is called “Lacoste,” after the clothing logo that uses the crocodile as its symbol. The other, called G-40, supported Robert Mugabe’s wife, Grace, to be his successor and includes politicians of a younger generation. Its name refers to its members’ age bracket, in contrast to Lacoste, which is dominated by politicians and generals in their 70s. When Mugabe came down on the side of his wife, the stage was set for the coup.
The definitive moment leading to the coup appears to have been the flight of Mnangagwa, first to Mozambique and then to South Africa, to avoid arrest after Mugabe removed him as vice president. This was apparently accompanied by Mugabe’s attempt to arrest the head of the army, General Constantino Chiwenga, at the Harare airport upon his return from China on November 12. The New York Times reports that Chiwenga had been tipped off about this when his plane landed, and his soldiers at the airport prevented the police from arresting him. The coup then followed on November 13 and 14. On his trip, Chiwenga may have briefed the Chinese of the impending military intervention.
It is becoming clear that the War Veterans Association, a political proxy for the military that enables it to maintain a “non-political” stance, played a major role. Its head, Christopher Mutsvangwa, went to Pretoria and briefed South African intelligence with the goal of persuading the Zuma government not to describe the foreseen military intervention as a coup, reports the New York Times. It looks like he was successful, as no South African official statements have used “coup” to describe the events in Zimbabwe.
What happens next? The ZANU-PF dominates parliament, which is voting to impeach Mugabe either today or very soon. If he is impeached, it is unclear if he would accept the parliament’s decision and go quietly. Would the African Union and Southern African Development Community, which reflect Africa’s strong opposition to military coups, accept the impeachment as legal? Or would they continue to recognize Mugabe as head of state? African opposition to coups has become Mugabe’s strongest card. Another may be the police, with which Mugabe has cultivated a close relationship. A violent confrontation between the army and police could be a disaster. The best solution continues to be a bargain between the army and police in which Mugabe steps down from power, if not necessarily from office.
There are no “white hats” in this drama. Mnangagwa was Mugabe’s enforcer. He directly participated in the 1980s slaughter of Ndebele rivals of Mugabe’s Shona ethnic group, and he is widely feared. Even if Mugabe goes, his regime does not, and there is little evidence that Mnangagwa would be any improvement from the perspective of human rights and the rule of law.
Responding to Coups That Aren’t Coups
Spokesmen are insisting that the military’s intervention earlier this week in which it placed President Robert Mugabe and his wife Grace under house arrest and took over the state television station is not a coup. Instead, the military maintains that its intervention targeted “criminals,” and it has good reason to say so. The African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are strongly and explicitly against coups. In some developed countries, such as the United States, a coup can automatically trigger sanctions. Hence, most American administrations are often reluctant to identify military intervention as a coup in a country of strategic importance to the United States. For example, General el-Sisi led a coup in 2013 that toppled the recently democratically elected government of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, and the U.S. declined to acknowledge that the intervention was, in fact, a coup. Egypt is a key U.S. partner in a volatile region, and sanctions would have undermined its relationship, rightly or wrongly.
Whether or not we decide to call it a coup, when soldiers in fatigues takes over the state owned television station at 4:00 a.m. and announce that the president and his wife are under house arrest, and armored vehicles block roads to government offices, parliament, and the courts, it probably is a coup: ‘if it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck.’ Furthermore, the current head of the African Union, Alpha Conde, who is also president of Guinea, has commented that what happened in Zimbabwe is “soldiers trying to take power by force.” By any reasonable, objective standard, a military coup took place in Zimbabwe.
The U.S. lawmakers who have commented publicly have taken the general line that the ouster of Mugabe is welcome, but the methods are not. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented, “We obviously don’t like coups, but it’s time for the country of Zimbabwe to move on. I hope that they will find a democratic process.” Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ), who has lived in Zimbabwe, commented that Mugabe would be remembered “as a long-serving thug.” Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said, “[Mugabe] got more attached to power, more repressive in how he treated his people,” and was party to “rampant corruption.”
The U.S. State Department’s November 16 comment reflects the difficulty of dealing with a coup, even when the outcome is desirable: “The U.S. government is concerned by recent actions undertaken by Zimbabwe’s military forces. We call on all Zimbabwean leaders to exercise restraint, respect he rule of law, uphold the constitutionally protected rights of all citizens and to quickly resolve differences to allow for a rapid return to normalcy.” It assiduously avoided any characterization of the military intervention.
For now, it is likely that the international community, like Zimbabweans, will accept the November 16 coup, especially if violence by the army and the police is avoided and steps are taken toward future restoration of civilian, democratic rule.
How the Situation in Zimbabwe Could Proceed
In the aftermath of the November 15 military intervention, there are credible rumors that negotiations are underway at State House in Harare for a deal that confirms the transfer of power from Robert Mugabe while retaining him as a ceremonial head of state. Unconfirmed rumors suggest that the negotiations are including such major opposition leaders as Morgan Tsvangirai and ZANU-PF politicians that had been previously removed by Mugabe, including Joice Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa. Under one scenario, the goal would be the establishment of a transitional government that would include representatives of the formal opposition; it would function like a government of national unity and prepare for genuine, democratic elections in the future, perhaps in two or three years. It would be headed by Mnangagwa, restored as vice president. To sweeten the deal, there would be guarantees for the well-being of Robert Mugabe and his family, but corruption investigations would still likely target supporters of his wife, Grace. The minister of finance has already been arrested, and other cabinet officers associated with Grace are in hiding.
Such a deal requires Mugabe’s acquiescence and there is nothing in his past that would indicate that he would accept what would, in effect, be the loss of power. Further, Grace and her supporters in the ZANU-PF would be deprived of political roles. On the other hand, the situation is entirely new for Mugabe, who has never before been in the custody of the military. He might also consider that there has been no outpouring of support for him in the streets. His wife and children, widely hated for their abusive behavior and conspicuous consumption, at least in Harare, would receive immunity from prosecution, so there is a good chance that Mugabe will deal for his and their sake.
The extent to which Grace can control or influence Mugabe in unknown. Certainly, as he has become feebler he has become ever more dependent on her. Would she accept political marginalization? What are her alternatives? (There are rumors, denied by the military, that she has somehow escaped house arrest and has fled to Namibia.)
If Mugabe refuses to deal with the military, the latter will face a dilemma. It could keep him and his wife under permanent house arrest and cut them off from contact with the media, though it is still unlikely it would depose him as head of state. This move would be risky, however. Mugabe’s base of popular support in the countryside has thus far remained quiet, no doubt awaiting the outcome of the negotiations. If the perception grows that their “icon” of the struggle against white supremacy, who transferred white-owned land to Africans and thus to whom they have to thank in part for the land they own, is being disrespected or abused by the military, rural grass roots opposition may develop.
The African Union and the Southern African Development Community, the relevant regional organizations, oppose coups as a matter of principle. Thus far they have been muted about the change. If the military government drags on, it will likely be subject to increased African and Western criticism. The longer there is no clear way forward, the greater the possibility that the impressive unity on display by the military could begin to break down and that the coup and its eventual opponents could move in a radical and violent direction. There is also the risk of igniting ethnic conflict, always smoldering below the surface in Zimbabwe. Mugabe is a Shona, and that ethnic group has typically been a part of his power base.
Hence, the best outcome would be a deal between Mugabe and the military that strips him of power but retains him as a chief of state with all of the due honors in a transitional government that moves toward the establishment of democratic and legal norms. Once again, however, such a favorable outcome is highly dependent on Mugabe, and even if he does cooperate, there is no guarantee that Zimbabwean governance improves after the transition.
Military Coup in Zimbabwe Remains Bloodless
As of today, the military seems to be firmly in control of Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare, after what appears to have been a military coup. Tanks and armored vehicles have been deployed and the streets are relatively empty, though banks and shops remain open. Thus far, no elements within the military have rallied to Mugabe and his wife, Grace, who are under house arrest at their private residence, though there are growing reports of gunfire around the city. Were some army units to rally to Mugabe, the likelihood of violence would greatly increase. The ZANU-PF youth league has already pledged it is “prepared to die” for him. South Africa’s president Jacob Zuma has been in contact with Mugabe, who said that he and his wife are fine.
Within the military, it is unclear who is in charge. It has made no announcement that Mugabe has been deposed from the presidency, it has publicly guaranteed the independence of the judiciary, and Harare newspapers continue to publish. Despite professions by military spokesmen to the contrary, this is, indeed, a coup. The military has seized the state television station, and while it is treating the Mugabes well, the president and his wife are its prisoners. The finance minister, Ignatius Chombo and the head of the ZANU-PF youth league have also been arrested, according to South African media. There is speculation, which is credible, that deposed vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa is behind the coup, and it would come as no surprise to many were he to assume control of the government. Mugabe’s removal of Mnangagwa to make way for Grace to succeed him likely precipitated the military’s move. Mnangagwa’s present whereabouts are unknown, but it is widely assumed that he is in South Africa. If Mnangagwa does take charge, he is likely to retain Mugabe as a figure-head. The fate of his wife and her supporters, called the G-40, however, is more problematic, as she clearly wants the presidency for herself. Neither Grace nor Mnangagwa are popular, but the latter at least has the military on his side.
Further to that point, the coup is not a popular uprising. Rather, it is a “palace coup” within the governing ZANU-PF political party motivated by a struggle between two factions. The issue between the two is not one of policy but of who gets to cut the “national cake” (i.e. distribute state largesse) following Mugabe’s incapacity or death. Vice President Mnangagwa’s removal was a clear sign that the president had opted for his wife to succeed him. The perpetrators, apparently close to the ex-vice president within the ZANU-PF, include those who led the overthrow of white minority rule in 1980 during the liberation “struggle.” The G-40, the rival faction within the ZANU-PF, is led by Grace. It is of a younger generation that did not participate in the “struggle.” Further, Grace’s G-40 coalition is primarily civilian, while the older generation has strong ties to, and is made up of, the military. For now, Grace and her supporters seem to have been defeated.
The coup-makers justify their action as a move to displace the “criminals around Mugabe,” but not to remake the current political and economic system, which has resulted in widespread poverty and economic chaos. There are no “white hats” within ZANU-PF; there is no evidence that Grace Mugabe and the G-40 would be any less rapacious and self-serving than the generation of “freedom fighters” they sought to displace.
It is too early to say what the popular reaction to the military move will be, if there is one at all. Mugabe and the ZANU-PF have successfully emasculated the official opposition associated with Morgan Tsvangirai and it is prone to division. Most viable to affect change is a street protest movement associated with Christian religious leaders that has used national symbols such as the flag to try to rally the nation against the regime’s human rights abuses and bad governance. While it looks to radical change, its goals and methods are not yet clearly defined. Aspects of it recall the early days of the “Arab Spring.” Mugabe’s response has been to arrest and jail the movement’s leaders and it is unlikely that the military will respond any differently. Nevertheless, the fact that there has been a coup, and that Mugabe has, in effect, been deposed, may open the range of possibilities for popular opposition.
Many Africans like to say that the era of coups is past, but Zimbabwe is currently facing one. Mugabe is an icon of African liberation across the continent. For many, he drove the whites out and distributed the land to Africans. (The reality is much more self-serving for Mugabe and his cronies, who personally benefitted from the land seizures.) Thus far, the African Union has made no public comment, though it is on record strongly opposing military coups. There have been statements from Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari, South Africa’s Jacob Zuma, and UK Foreign Minister Boris Johnson. They in one form or another call for restraint and avoidance of violence. China, Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, has merely indicated that it is monitoring the situation. The strongest response has been from President Zuma of South Africa, who has said he will send a delegation to Harare and involve the Southern Africa Development Community, the regional security and economic organization. What these interventions can actually accomplish remains unclear.
A Coup Could be in the Works Against Zimbabwe's Mugabe
The era of coups in Africa is supposed to be over. Nevertheless, one may be underway in Zimbabwe against the regime of nonagenarian Robert Mugabe and his wife, Grace. Army Chief General Constantino Chiwenga, along with ninety senior military officers, gave a news conference on Monday in which he said that the army will step in unless the “purging” of the country’s ruling ZANU-PF stops. Though the general did not mention Mugabe by name, the intervention was clearly a response to the president’s firing of his deputy, Emerson Mnangagwa. The move is widely seen as an effort to ensure that Mugabe’s successor will be his wife Grace. On Tuesday, armored vehicles were seen moving toward Harare, the capital, from the military barracks at Inkomo. At the same time, a statement from the ZANU-PF accused General Chiwenga of “treasonable conduct.”
The army will not tolerate the political leadership of those who did not participate in the “liberation struggle” that led to Zimbabwe ending white minority rule in 1980. Grace Mugabe, born in 1965, was a school girl at the time and did not participate in this “struggle.” Once in the State House typing pool, she became Mugabe’s mistress and then his second wife four years after the death of his first wife, Sallie, a Ghanian who was widely popular. (Mugabe claims that on her death bed, Sallie gave her blessing to the union with Grace; Zimbabweans love the ongoing soap opera.) They have three children together. Apparently, she is rapacious for personal wealth and is often called ‘Gucci Grace.’
The power balance between Mugabe and those around him and the military is opaque and always in flux. Many senior military officers have done very well out of the wholesale looting of Zimbabwe. Emmerson Mnangagwa was a leader in the independence movement and spent time in exile during the liberation struggle. Since liberation, he served in numerous high positions in Mugabe’s government, becoming vice president in 2014. Called the “Crocodile” for his cunning, he is widely regarded as Zimbabwe’s richest man.
Are there issues beyond a Mafiosi-like fight over the swag from a looted state? There are. The army leaders, veterans of the “struggle,” represent an older generation. Grace, improbable though it may seem, represents a younger generation associated with reform. All over the country, the ZANU-PF dominates patronage/clientage networks. In general, Mugabe (and presumably Grace) remains very popular in rural areas, where he is credited with expelling the white farmers and redistributing their land to those that work it, but he is deeply unpopular in urban areas.
Mugabe is one of the last remaining African liberation icons and is therefore above criticism by other African leaders. For their part, these other leaders tend to appreciate his outspokenness. For example, in his speech at the UN General Assembly, he characterized President Donald Trump as a “gold Goliath” because of his “attacks” on North Korea, presumably the “David” in this tableau. Many Africans share Mugabe’s view about American arrogance overseas, but are reluctant to express it. Hence, if the military does make a move, it would likely strip Mugabe of power but could still keep him as its figurehead.
