Rohingya

  • Rohingya
    The Rohingya Refugee Crisis, With Meenakshi Ganguly
    Podcast
    Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss the abuses against Muslim Rohingya from Myanmar.
  • Bangladesh
    One Year After a Contentious Election, Bangladeshis are Satisfied With the Country’s Direction
    Geoffrey Macdonald is resident program director for Bangladesh and Vivek Shivaram is program officer for South Asia at the International Republican Institute. !function(){"use strict";window.addEventListener("message",function(a){if(void 0!==a.data["datawrapper-height"])for(var e in a.data["datawrapper-height"]){var t=document.getElementById("datawrapper-chart-"+e)||document.querySelector("iframe[src*='"+e+"']");t&&(t.style.height=a.data["datawrapper-height"][e]+"px")}})}(); Around Dhaka, fresh candidate posters line city streets and commandeered rickshaws cruise neighborhoods with loudspeakers blaring political slogans. Dhaka’s municipal elections will be held on February 1—marking the largest scale election in Bangladesh since the Awami League (AL) and its leader Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina won a third five-year term in an election marred by claims of fraud in December 2018. In the aftermath of the 2018 general election, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) boycotted local elections, alleging they would be rigged against them. But the BNP is back on the campaign trail. Despite fears of electoral manipulation, the Dhaka municipal election presents yet another showdown between the AL and BNP in Bangladesh’s political and population center. The AL enters 2020 buoyed by strong economic and development achievements, but dogged by corruption, student wing violence, rising inequality, and persistent critiques of its democratic record. According to the new public opinion survey of Bangladeshis conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in August and September 2019, positivity about the government and country has rebounded since IRI’s May 2018 survey, but an undercurrent of frustration remains. If key domestic issues continue to go unaddressed, the government may find it difficult to maintain its current levels of support. Development and Growth Drive Optimism, Government Support Improvements in development and the economy have driven public optimism in Bangladesh. From 2018 to 2019, the belief that Bangladesh is heading in the right direction rose 14 percentage points to 76 percent, its highest level in the last seven years of IRI’s polling. Large majorities of the public positively rate the economy, security, and political stability and 54 percent believe the economy will improve over the next year. Bangladeshis praised the government’s performance on a wide range of issues, such as providing education and electricity and fighting extremism. In the last year, approval for the Awami League-led national government rose 19 percentage points to 83 percent. Political and Governance Concerns Continue In the wake of the controversial December 2018 election, significant portions of the public remain disillusioned with the state of politics and political competition. Three-quarters say the gap between political elites and citizens is growing and roughly half say they are fearful to express political opinions in public. Seventy percent say the Awami League, whose governing coalition holds over 95 percent of the elected seats in Parliament, should include other political parties in its decision-making process. The top-rated concerns among Bangladeshis are corruption, drug abuse, and unemployment, issues on which the government gets its lowest performance marks. Three-quarters of the public say income inequality is rising. Corruption has “a lot” or “some” impact on 31 percent of Bangladeshis’ lives, and a plurality (19 percent) say corruption is the single most important problem facing the country. The Awami League has recently tried to allay public concerns with a high-profile crackdown on corruption. Amid violent campus politics, Bangladeshi youth appear disillusioned with formal politics. Over 70 percent of youth respondents say they are unlikely to run for office and over 80 percent have never contacted an elected official, signed a petition, or engaged in other forms of democratic activism. In a country governed almost exclusively by female leaders since 1991, 56 percent prefer male candidates to female candidates, all other things being equal. But there is a stark gender divide in the results: a plurality of women would prefer a female candidate, whereas 72 percent of men would prefer a male candidate. International and Transnational Issues Bangladeshis are deeply concerned about the Rohingya refugee crisis. In 2017, approximately 750,000 Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh from Myanmar amid a military crackdown. The refugees settled in over thirty camps along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border and have benefited from an enormous Bangladeshi and international relief effort. Initially supportive of their co-religionists from Myanmar, Bangladeshis are clearly frustrated by the strain and instability created by the camps. Only 37 percent rate the government’s handling of the refugee crisis positively. Recent studies show the refugee population has disrupted medical care, reduced wages and job opportunities, and increased social tension in the areas around the camps. In an era of rising great power competition in South Asia, Bangladeshis are split between the major players in the region. Asked about the impact of India, China, and the United States on Bangladesh, a small majority say India has a positive effect (52 percent), with China (47 percent) and the United States (42 percent) trailing slightly behind. However, this survey was fielded mostly before recent controversies in Bangladesh around India’s Citizenship Amendment Act (which accuses Bangladesh of persecuting religious minorities, a charge that rankles Dhaka, and provides fast-track naturalization for six religions but excludes Muslims), and the National Register of Citizens in Assam (in which people unable to prove Indian citizenship could potentially be rendered stateless and deported to Bangladesh, which could further inflame anti-migrant sentiment there). The Awami League-led government, which is closely aligned with India, initially said these issues were India’s “internal matters” but Prime Minister Hasina recently called the citizenship act “unnecessary.” Anti-Indian protest movements have sprouted in Bangladesh and unprovoked violence against Bangladeshi citizens along the India-Bangladesh border has risen recently. There is good reason to believe public sentiment toward India could be shifting. Renewed Confidence, Persistent Challenges IRI’s survey shows Bangladeshis have renewed confidence in the country’s economic and development outlook and the government’s performance on some kitchen table issues. Yet problems of corruption, inequality, and dysfunctional political competition persist, and the Rohingya refugee crisis shows no signs of abatement. The BNP is pressing these issues on the campaign trail in Dhaka, with the hopes of winning back power in the nation’s capital. If the country’s challenges go unsolved, it could wear on the Awami League’s favorable standing nationally over the course of its third term.
  • Myanmar
    Why the ICJ Is Trying to Protect Myanmar’s Rohingya
    The International Court of Justice issued an important decision aimed at protecting Myanmar’s persecuted Rohingya minority, but its impact is unclear.
  • Myanmar
    The Rohingya Crisis
    Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a Muslim ethnic minority group, have fled persecution in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, fueling a historic migration crisis.
  • Women and Women's Rights
    Fleeing Home: Refugees and Human Trafficking
    Global refugee flows are currently at the highest levels in history. Many refugees are at risk of a human rights violation too often insufficiently addressed in security and conflict prevention efforts: human trafficking. 
  • Southeast Asia
    While Bangladesh and Myanmar Plan Rohingya Repatriation, Rohingya in Myanmar Remain at Grave Risk
    In recent months, the Myanmar government has begun pushing for some of the over one million Rohingya living in Bangladesh to return to Myanmar’s Rakhine State. As I noted in a blog post for CFR.org earlier this month, Naypyidaw recently launched a plan to facilitate Rohingya repatriation that was actually the second proposed plan, after an earlier one last November failed. The Bangladesh government has supported Naypyidaw’s proposed repatriation of Rohingya, although so far no Rohingya have taken up the offer to return to Rakhine State. Yet lost in much of the coverage of the Rohingya’s grim fate as refugees in Bangladesh, and the growing tensions between the Rohingya and citizens of Bangladesh, is that the situation in Rakhine State itself remains dire. So dire, in fact that another genocide of Rohingya is certainly possible, two years after earlier crimes against humanity decimated Rohingya in western Myanmar. For more on the situation in Rakhine State, see my new World Politics Review article.
  • Bangladesh
    A Conversation With Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh
    Play
    BESCHLOSS: Hello, and welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations, ladies and gentlemen. Very pleased to be here today. It is with much excitement that I welcome Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh today. Prime Minister Hasina has been the leader of Bangladesh for over ten years, following in the legacy of her late father, Sheikh Rahman, Bangladesh’s first president. She has steered the country through an incredible period of growth. The growth in Bangladesh has been so much higher not just compared to the G-7 countries, but to the rest of emerging markets. And in the last two years it has been in the region of 7 to 8 to 9 percent, which is one of the highest rates, really, across most economies. She has received international praise for her management of the Rohingya crisis, accepting over one million forcibly-displaced persons into Bangladesh and providing them with safe haven. She has long been a proponent of women’s and children’s rights. And as Bangladesh’s longest-serving prime minister, she serves as an inspiration to millions in her country and around the world. Please join me in welcoming Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. (Applause.) HASINA: Bismillah, rahman, rahim. President of CFR Mr. Richard Haass, distinguished members of CFR, members of my—(inaudible)—my former finance minister, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon and as-salaam aleikum. It is a pleasure for me to be at CFR and to meet its distinguished members once again. It has been almost nineteen years when I was at CFR last. Since then, remarkable changes have taken place in many spells in my country, Bangladesh. It is now recognized worldwide as a role models of socioeconomic development and a responsible state in global affairs. These achievements are due to our people’s drive to realize the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s, dream of Sonar Bangla or Golden Bangla, a nation of prosperity and social justice for all with a modern inclusive society, yet preserving its old traditions and culture. Thus, Bangladesh today embodies secularism and religious freedom, democracy and fundamental human rights, principles enshrined in our constitution and shaping our way of life. Bangladesh takes particular pride in religious freedom and communal harmony in the region. This year Bangladesh’s GDP growth rate has hit a record high at 8.13 percent after registering 7.6 percent last year. It is not very far from achieving double-digit growth. Our per-capita income has raised US$1,909, which is close to the middle-income threshold. Bangladesh has attained food and energy security. According to The Spectator Index, Bangladesh achieved the highest GDP growth in the world during the last ten years, 188 percent. Bangladesh is today in the world the third-largest producer of vegetables, fourth-largest producer of rice, fifth-largest producer of inland fisheries, and second-largest orange exporter in the world. Sound macroeconomic fundamentals, political stability, pragmatic fiscal policy, and export-led vibrant private sector, and more importantly the determination and perseverance of our common people, have been the main contributing factors of this economic miracle. In 2008, when I campaigned for a vote, I promised a digital Bangladesh. Therefore, since assuming office in 2009, I immediately set forth expanding the ICT network across the country. The aim was to reduce the digital divide, enhance access to information, accelerate development, and create new empowerment opportunities. The ICT coverage in Bangladesh is close to a hundred percent. Bangladesh is now the fifth-largest internet user in Asia. And out of its 160 million population, more than 150 million are mobile subscriber and ninety million internet users. An important cornerstone of my domestic policy has been women empowerment. It is because I have always believed that equal participation of women and men was vital for optimum national development and progress. Now I am happy to say that women in Bangladesh hold high position in politics, government, parliament, local bodies, business, labor, military, police, border guard, security, and security agencies, as well as in U.N. peacekeeping. According to the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2018, Bangladesh is ranked first in South Asia and second in Asia on overall women empowerment. Bangladesh is ranked fifth in the world on political empowerment of women. Bangladesh, being a Muslim-majority country, has shown how the potentials of women mobilized and unleashed could make them equal partner and speed up a country’s development. In global efforts, Bangladesh has consistently contributed all ways possible to international peace and security. This emanated from Bangladesh’s policy of friendship to all, malice to none, as laid out by the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This policy of goodwill has helped Bangladesh maintain good relationship with all countries of the world. It has also helped Bangladesh in resolving its land and maritime boundary issues with its two neighbors. This policy has also inspired Bangladesh to support United Nations peacekeeping missions. For decades, Bangladesh has remained one of U.N.’s three top troop contributors. So far Bangladesh has served in fifty-four U.N. peacekeeping missions, contributing 122,000 troops, of which 119 gave their lives for the cause of peace. Among the challenges Bangladesh faces in its developmental journey is climate change. The frequency and intensify of cyclones and floods and river erosion have increased through the years. Science estimates that if global temperature increases by one degree centigrade by 2050, sea level would rise by one meter, submerging 70 percent of Bangladesh. My government has therefore adopted the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan in 2009. And also, we are—under this plan two funds were set up: the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund, with own resources; and Bangladesh Climate Resilience Fund, with resources from development partners. But from partners we receive very little help. Since then, almost a billion U.S. dollars have been spent on several hundred projects, mostly on adaptation and a few on mitigation. The other significant challenge to our economic progress and humanity is terrorism and violent extremism, against which we have taken a zero-tolerance policy. We believe that terrorists do not belong to any religion or boundaries. To root out this menace of terrorism and violent extremism, I would like to propose the following stakes: First, must stop the source of supply of arms to the terrorists. Second, must stop the flow of financing to the terrorists and their outfits. Third, must remove the divisions within societies. Fourth, must pursue the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes through dialogue for a win-win situation. I believe only by taking those actions sincerely and with determination would we be able to free our world from scourge of terrorism and violent extremism and have peace. In Bangladesh we have already started taking necessary measures to isolate these menaces socially and the aim of ridding them for good. Our efforts are made effective by the excellent cooperation that we have been receiving from our regional and global partners. We have also taken digital measures to stem the spread of lies and hate narratives that ignite violence. As a result, since the Holey Artisan attack on 1st of July 2016, there has been no major incident. We have remained increasingly vigilant as we are committed to ensuring the safety of our people and supporting security situation beyond our borders. An immediate challenge facing us is the Rohingya crisis. Through a planned genocide, the government of Myanmar cleansed its northern Rakhine state of Rohingya minority. They fled violence and atrocities, and we opened our border to shelter them on humanitarian ground. This humane decision came from our own experience in 1971 during the war of independence, when ten million of our people took refuge in neighboring India. I myself became a refugee. When my father and the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and eighteen members of our family were brutally killed in August 15, 1975, my younger sister, Rehana, were abroad at that time, and therefore survived. We are banned to return to Bangladesh for nearly six years by the then-military dictator, Ziaur Rahman, and had to live as refugees in foreign land. Therefore, I could feel and understand the pain/agony felt by the persecuted Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar to safety in Bangladesh. Now, while we are providing humanitarian support to the best of our ability to Rohingyas, we want a peaceful and immediate resolution to the crisis. Myanmar has created this crisis, and the solution lies there in Myanmar. The international community—particularly the USA, the European Union, China—have been extremely helpful and supportive to Bangladesh in dealing with the crisis. I want to include there are many other countries also helping and cooperating with us. The world must take all measures to compel Myanmar to create conditions enabling the Rohingyas’ safe, dignified, and voluntary repatriation to their ancestral homes. I also urge you all to visit the Rohingya camps at Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. I believe while in those camps you will be shocked by their horrifying stories of atrocities at the hands of the Myanmar security forces and local resilience. I believe seeing their plight would worry your heart so much so that you would want to see the end of their painful predicament the soonest. Ladies and gentlemen, I wish to conclude here and a meaningful conversation with you all. Thank you all for listening. (Applause.) BESCHLOSS: Thank you very much, Sheikh Hasina. That was really very interesting. And I was just thinking, I’ve been to Bangladesh many times, and read about your economy and what you’ve been achieving. Particularly in the last ten years, the development of education sector, the health sector, and maternal and child health. And I was just curious if you could tell us a little bit more about how you’ve been working on the Millennium goals, then more recently in the SDGs. And of course, you were at the U.N. in the last few days and you’ll be speaking tomorrow. But I’m just curious to what—if you can give us a preview of that. HASINA: You see, when Millennium Goal was adopted I was president, and also SDG, in 2000 and 2015. So what we did in our program, like, five years in development program, we always take long-term program. So we included—which is essential for our government, for our people—those agenda we included our five-years plan, and we implemented it, and MDG very successfully we implemented. Now SDG we have also included in our seventh five-years plan so that we can implement all those, I mean, areas. And we are doing well. And we have, like, five-years plan. Side-by-side we have also long-term plan, that, what do we want to achieve? How do we want to help our people? And where we want to reach? That is absolutely clear. First thing is that the basic needs of our people—food, education, healthcare, shelter, job opportunity—those are very, very important. So we know that what is our priority. And the priority message, we prepare our plan. And as you know, that Bangladesh geographically are positioned in such a way that time and again we have to face natural calamities. It is not only natural calamities, as because in Bangladesh what happened in 1975, the killing of my father. Then Bangladesh development was hard. 1996, after twenty-one years, when we formed government, actually, we have to make many pragmatic decision(s), and also we have taken—how our plan, program, how to help people. First thing, food security. We’ll start research on it to produce more food; and not only producing food, also the distribution that the poorest of the poor, all disabled people, all older people, we started distributing free food for them. Also, our social safety net program. Oldest pension we introduced. Disabled pension we introduced. Then destitute women, we started assisting them. Then education, we survey all over the country where we need more school, like primary school. Primary education is free. My father, he has done it, the primary education. And for girls education, also free. Then we started distributing free books so that people can, you know, go—I mean, the children can go to school and with the parents. Not only that, well, in 1981, when I returned home, I travel a lot. I talked to people. I found that they don’t send their children to their schools. Sometimes I asked them, well, why you are not sending your, I mean, children to school? They said what they would do. If they want, they could answer money. Then I asked some—say about one lady, that how much your son earns? If I give you this money, will you send your child to the school? Then said, why not? Then we have started it. It’s a very humble way, very small amount, but still we give this money to the mother—in the mother’s name. Nowadays we have digital system and we have, you know, mobile phone. That tender is not much, but we started it. We open up in the private sector, the mobile phone use. So now we started sending money to the mother, then they started sending their children to school. And that’s because they are getting free books. Nowadays we have also started a school feeding program that also help us the drop out—there is no drop out in the primary section and also in the middle school. That way, the social safety net program, that also help, because when people get some money—at least the oldest people or the destitute—old and destitute—I mean, sometimes, you know, that women, they become widowed, or sometimes their husband abandon and get married other. So then where she would go? She has nowhere, neither husband’s house nor the parents’ house. And people are poor. They cannot afford to keep house. When she’s receiving some money, then that also reduce many social, you know, disputes. At least then she has some money, so always everybody look after her. Even the oldest people, also. That we have started. And sometimes when they get the money they also invest it. And then the healthcare, we started building community clinic(s) all over Bangladesh. We had a plan to—plan that every plus-minus takes six thousand people, there will be a community clinic from there. We will then get—I mean, just primary medication. Especially women or children are the beneficiary. After that, we thought that we will encourage not only the food but also the nutrition. That is also important. So we should, you know, allow people to access to the nutrition. Otherwise, you know—we want a healthy child. So that, we have to give many steps. Even the pregnant poor women, we send them some money so that she can eat properly. And then the lactating mother, working lactating mother, we also give them allowances. So that way in many way our social safety net program, it is really continuing. Side-by-side you see—I open up all our economy. As a political party, Bangladesh Awami, we have our own economic policy. And time and again, we updated it. So give more importance to the private sector. So when we form government, immediately we open up all the sectors to the private like America. You see, when I form government in 1996, I found that American investment was only twenty (U.S. million dollars) or US$25 million. When I open up our different sectors, like energy sectors, then electricity policy, the American companies started investment. Within our tenure it increased from twenty million (U.S. dollars) to US$1 billion. That way, it increased. So many area, like private bank, private—I mean, every sector I open up, because I thought that private people if they invest that will create job opportunity. Even if we had only one television, government owned, one radio, government owned, no private television, no private, you know, radio. Usually military dictator never allow that, you know that. So I opened it up. Now we have given license to forty-four television and private television, and also many radio. That creates job opportunity for people. So one hand our aim is to create job opportunity, and other hand that economy must be vibrant. And digital Bangladesh, now you see in Bangladesh the broadband connection we have started. It almost reaching everywhere. And then we launch our satellite, Bangabandhu 1, first. And side-by-side we started teaching our children that computer—because in 1996 I found people are very much shy about using the computer, so—and my digital advisor is here. So actually I also learned computer from my son. (Laughter.) So he—actually he used to give me all the idea, that we have to do this and that. We dropped all the taxes, opened it up for the children. Now even in the school we have started teaching our children. So that we open up. And our policy, mainly it is not only in the urban society. We give more importance to the rural society because I believe that we should give more attention to the rural area. Our development should come from the grass to—(inaudible). Then it can be sustainable. And that, we have taken our policy and we have started implementing it. And that we are getting good result. Like our—you know, yes, our GDP, we achieved 8 percent—8.13. Side-by-side we control our inflation, which is only 5.4 to 6. This is why it’s only 5.4 or 6, within this. So you can understand that while GDP is growing, inflation is controlled, actually the fruit of economy reach to the poor people, grassroot people. They are the beneficiary. And that way—because the food security. Now, we—and show food security—our life expectancy also increased. It was only fifty-six years; now it is seventy-two-plus. For women seventy-three, for men seventy-one, together seventy-two. I don’t know why it happened—(laughs)—why women life for long time. That I don’t know. (Laughter.) The experts or researcher can tell me. But it’s really—it is a fact. It has happened. Then our literacy rate, 1996 I found it was only 44 percent. Then we took a project, total literacy, because we want to remove the illiteracy. We started working on it and get good result: We increased literacy rate up to 65.5 percent. Unfortunately, when we—well, in 2001 I come back to power, then I found after seven, eight years, 2009, when I found government, then I found that it’s reduced to, again, the same—almost same, I mean 45 or 50 (percent), something like that. Then we took some steps, like, I mean, education for all and compulsory. That we’re now—it’ll go up—gone up to 73 percent. But we have to do more. And another thing, that for women empowerment, 1996, when I found government, I found that in higher post(s) there is no women. Not a single secretary. Nobody. But in parliament, in government, you know that from 1991 in our country, either me or opposition, prime ministership always captured by a woman, either me or my opponent. No male member could get any chance. It is true. (Laughter.) But in other side, there is—there was, you know, lapses. So what I did, I introduced that my army, navy, border guard, every sphere of life, even the higher court, there is no women judges in the higher court. No women judges. So I said, no, it cannot be. It should be there. During Pakistan rule there was a law that women cannot get any job in the judiciary service. But after liberation, my father changed that law that women can go. And then I found that no woman can get any promotion or get into—then I said, no, it should be there. I talked to our president because usually they are just, you know, appointed by the president. I said—I requested, and also the chief justice, that if he will not mention any name of any woman judge, then I will not sign the file and send it to the president. (Laughter.) So that way—you know, sometimes you have to apply, you know, force also that they should. And that now we have many judges, and they are doing very well. I much appreciate it. So this way every sphere of life. And another thing I did, usually in our society—we’re a conservative society. Our parents, they said, oh, why we should spend money for the girls? Girls will be married to another family. They’re not earning money for us, and this and that. Then what I did that—I thought that job opportunity will give them good. So I introduced that in the primary school, the teacher, 60 percent should be women. That where I started. When you create job opportunity, then the parents, voluntarily they allow their girls for education. That way, even in the schools, at the beginning it was very difficult for us. Even some—even some stays that were about to happen, that women cannot participate in the football or kick it. Oh, women, what should they do, how they will play this and that? But then I thought there what to do. The second time we started that from the school. Now we have, you know, competition is school versus school, college versus college, that way. Now from their childhood, when they started, no one can say no. Now they are doing very well. We have women cricket team, woman football team, women sports. So they are now in the—it means that create confidence and also job opportunity. That really gives. Our digital center, at first we open 5,275 digital center all over the country. But they are one girl, one boys should be the initiator, that way. He give me this policy, my son. (Laughter.) So what happened, the girls are getting some job opportunity. Our community clinic, now eighteen thousand community clinic we planned to start build, but by this time we had—already we had, you know, clinic—health clinic. And now we have around fourteen thousand community clinic, plus four thousand, I mean, healthcare, altogether around eighteen thousand. From there, we distribute thirty types of free medicine and also health service. Especially women and children are beneficiary. And we—that way, because they are getting all health service, so our mother mortality reduced, our child mortality reduced, and the women can just walk down there and get healthcare. BESCHLOSS: That’s really impressive. HASINA: So that way in the past what happened, the women have to wait for a male member to take her to the hospital also, and now they don’t need any help. They can go by themselves. Side-by-side we have created job opportunity. We have thirteen thousand health provider, and it is increasing. Then, beside that they can—different type of job like digital center, community clinic. And also women for their, you know—this is also another kind of social safety net. Like my house, my home, my—you know, when I was on farm, like, we give training to the women sitting in the house what they should do. Then I said, they can involve in some kind of production, whatever they want. We provide some money, a lump sum, training, and they can produce whatever type they want. They can do it through cooperative. We give them market facilities. That way they can earn some money that also give them from—come out from the poverty level. That will reduce our poverty. It was more than 40 percent. Within one decade we reduced our poverty level to 21 percent. Now it is 21.3 (percent), but we’re very much hopeful that within a few years, two or three years, we can reduce more. I have given target to program that within two to three years—that means—well, our tenure is up to ’24, 2024. So within this period it should come down to 16 or 17 percent, the poverty level. BESCHLOSS: That’s wonderful. HASINA: And that we’ll achieve. I can tell you we will achieve. Even earlier we will achieve. So every program we are taking we have our—when we were in opposition, that time we prepare our plan. The moment we then took power, we started implementing it. And time and again differently we just updated it. And that way we made this achievement. Thank you very much. BESCHLOSS: Thank you very much. Really, really impressive. If I may, I wanted to turn it to the audience. Our members here would like to join the conversation. And I wanted to see if any of the members have any questions. Just reminding all members that we are on the record, and that when you stand up if you could wait for the microphone and introduce yourselves, mention your name and your affiliation before you ask your question. Q: Madam Prime Minister, thank you so much for being here with us. My name is Ella Gudwin and I’m the CEO of VisionSpring. I have a colleague in Cox’s Bazar right now, so thank you for having the international community be so welcome there. I want to thank your ministry of labor and employment for increasing the minimum wage for the garment workers. It was such an important step. Additionally, your ministry of health has been very effective in rolling out vision centers in order to increase access to eyeglasses and to vision correction. We have screened the vision of thirty-five thousand garment workers, and we have found that 25, 35 percent of the workers, mostly women, do not have the glasses they need to thread their needle. And they are falling out of the workforce as their near vision gets blurry. And so my question, as the garment sector is so critical to your exports and to the growth of the economy, and these women have fought so hard for the jobs that they have earned, how might the nonprofit sector, and especially the corporations who are purchasing from your country, contribute and collaborate with your government so that we can make sure that this strategic workforce has the wonder of clear vision? HASINA: (Speaks in a foreign language.) MR.     : (Speaks in a foreign language.) HASINA: Garment sector. (Speaks in a foreign language.) Actually, what you mention actually I have a good connection with the labor force because during my time, you know, we increased their wages. In ’96, I found it was only eight hundred taka. Then we increased to sixteen hundred in our country currency. But second time when we came back to power we increased it about five thousand. Now it is eight thousand. Actually, we give more facilities. But about this problem, well, we have our—all facilities, if anybody has any problem they can go to doctor. And all our garments owner, they are facilitating all the facilities for them. So this is the first time I heard that they had eye problem and they’re not getting proper—or they’re leaving job. Sometimes what happened for a few years when they earn some money they get married. Then they start their own life in their village. They don’t want to work. That also happened. But what you mentioned I must inquire about it. (Speaks in a foreign language.) Garments owner? Is there any— BESCHLOSS: Maybe if we just move on to other—maybe if you move on to other questions, if we may? HASINA: OK. Sure. (Speaks in a foreign language)—garments— BESCHLOSS: Any other questions? Sorry. Sorry, there’s—Alyssa, do you have a question? Q: Hi. Alyssa Ayres from the Council on Foreign Relations. Madam Prime Minister, you spoke about the challenge of the Rohingya refugees as a problem that was created in Burma—in Myanmar—and a place where we need to find the solution in Myanmar. But I think what we are now seeing, realistically, is that there’s no solution emerging from Myanmar. So what would it take? What would be the solution for the next kind of near term for this humanitarian crisis? I mean, we all recognize the generosity of Bangladesh in being host to the refugee community. But they are challenged now what to do about higher education, about employment. Should there be a third country resettlement program put in place? Should the international community—I recognize the fundraising is always below the actual appeal. What should be the solution to help in the case that we see now where that real solution in Myanmar is not forthcoming? Q: Can I answer that question, please, because my question leads to it? BESCHLOSS: Yeah. Q: My name is Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, Cordoba House, New York. The prophet Mohammed, peace and blessings, said that my ummah—the ummah of Muslims is one body. Whenever part of it suffers pain the whole ummah suffers. You mentioned the Rohingya. On Monday morning, Prime Minster Imran Khan talked about the attacks against the Kashmiris in Kashmir recently. We are reading in the news daily about the Chinese minority Muslims. When will a critical mass of Muslim world leaders like yourself, like the members of OIC countries, get together to address this problem? Because, collectively, this can be done. And it’s not only a matter of Muslims, of Muslim minorities. It is also a human rights issue. And this should be something which the whole Muslim ummah as a whole, and the governments of Muslim-majority countries, collectively can wield the kind of leverage to turn the needle on this issue. BESCHLOSS: I think we’re trying to keep the questions short so that we can move on. Thank you. HASINA: You see, about the Rohingya, I can tell you, well, we—actually, we engaged dialogue with Myanmar, and we are discussing with them, and also international community are also supporting. But the problem is that these people don’t want to go back unless they feel in a secure. Myanmar, what happened in 1982, they changed their constitution and there they didn’t mention about the Rohingya, that they are—they are citizen. Sometimes they deny, that they are not their citizen; they are outsider, this and that. But, well, when Bangladesh and Myanmar started dialogue and UNHCR—(inaudible)—and other U.N. organizations—they are also active—at once they said they agreed to take them back. But somehow, in one hand when they agree then in the camp some people just instigated them that they don’t want to go back; they want to stay. They want—there they have some demands. That way, every time when we take some initiative and the time comes, then this problem arise. Now, well, I feel that all these U.N. organizations and other organizations working, what they’re doing here in Bangladesh they can help these people even in Myanmar also. They should take some initiative that way. And Myanmar should also agree and also create an atmosphere so that these people can go back and stay their own land. Now, international pressure is important about the education and, as you know, that is 1.1 million. Because for a long time—some of the Rohingya for a long time they are staying there. It has started—since 1977-78 they started, you know, inflows in our country. So we developed one area. We thought that we already built up the houses. There is a cyclone shelter. We built up the embankment. If we can ship them there, then in these cyclone shelters usually we have in our coastal belt is a multipurpose. We have the schools. We have offices. We have a healthcare center there. We just run that way. So if we can ship them in the this Bhasan Char, one island we develop, and already the houses we have building, a hundred thousand Rohingya we can accommodate. Then some people can get some job opportunity and children can get education. We can arrange the school and healthcare. And also the—we build up the warehouse where all of the materials can be preserved. That way we prepared ourselves. But somehow, it seems to me that all the organizations that are working there, they don’t want that these people should go there. They are trying to prevent. And about the Muslim ummah, I can tell you that when I attended the OIC summit in Makkah, I also raised these points—that if there is any problem, through dialogue, through discussion, all the Muslim countries then can solve their problem. But somehow it is not happening. It is—well, you know—you know where the problem lies; that many resource-full country, they cannot use their resources by their own. So those who are helping, they have some game to play, and they always divide and rule. Then so Muslim people should understand it and realize it. So it’s very—I mean, really, it is a very unfortunate situation. Every time in OIC I raise the issue that OIC should take some steps, but somehow it is not happening. And conflicts, it is not only Muslim to Muslim. What happened in New Zealand? In the mosque was under attack. So many people killed there. Well, who killed them? He was not a Muslim. He was a Christian. But he killed innocent people. Our—(inaudible)—team was there. I was so worried about them. Even some of our Bengali community people also died. When the conflict arise and when it happen, it can happen everywhere. So what I feel that, yes, you are very correct; the Muslim ummah should be united, and if they have any problem themselves they can solve it. They can sit together. Through dialogue, through discussion, through cooperation, they can solve it. Q: (Off mic.) BESCHLOSS: Thank you, Sheikh Hasina. This has been incredible. I can’t thank you enough on behalf of our members here, and we hope that you will come back before another nineteen years—much sooner. (Laughter, applause.) HASINA: Another nineteen? I don’t want to leave that—(inaudible). (END)
  • Southeast Asia
    What Happens if Rohingya Stay in Bangladesh Forever?
    Earlier this month, the Myanmar government embarked upon a new plan to begin repatriating Rohingya who had fled Rakhine State after waves of brutal violence there. It was the second time Naypyidaw tried to begin the repatriation process—the first attempt was in November—and this time the Myanmar government reportedly had approved some three thousand Rohingya to return, with the backing of Bangladesh for this action. None apparently voluntarily took up the offer, instead fleeing back to the camps in Bangladesh or hiding out. That Rohingya would not want to return to Myanmar is hardly surprising. It has been only two years since the deadliest wave of violence against them in Rakhine State. Rakhine State, where most Rohingya in Myanmar live, remains a violent and unstable place. In recent months, violence in Rakhine State has been rising again, as the army battles the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army. The military has resorted to its usual scorched earth tactics in response, and the UN’s human rights office has accused the Tatmadaw of launching attacks against civilians in this fighting. Amnesty International has further issued a report claiming that the Myanmar military is committing new atrocities in Rakhine State, against both ethnic Rakhine and Rohingya—including extrajudicial executions. Meanwhile, the Myanmar government, while telling Rohingya that they can come back safely, has not exactly created a safe, trustworthy environment for their return. The ongoing violence in Rakhine State certainly does not indicate a strong prospect for safe return. Senior Myanmar government leaders continue to demonize the Rohingya and also refer to those still in Myanmar as illegals. A report released this week by Fortify Rights, a human rights and investigative group closely monitoring the situation for Rohingya, found that Myanmar authorities have continued to force Rohingya still living in Myanmar to accept National Verification Cards, which basically mark them as foreigners and preclude their getting citizenship rights. And the Myanmar and Bangladesh authorities did not appear to consult with Rohingya who were put on a list for repatriation, or prepare anywhere for them to restore their lives in Myanmar. The UN fact-finding mission found that the Myanmar government has simply leveled portions of northern Rakhine State where Rohingya had lived. Naypyidaw has done little to rebuild to prepare for a return, or offer infrastructure or social services of any kind in northern Rakhine State. Instead, Myanmar companies are developing tracts of land formerly occupied by Rohingya. A UN fact-finding report released in early August found that the Tatmadaw’s “crony companies” are funding projects in Rakhine State now designed to reengineer the province’s ethnic makeup and “erase evidence of Rohingya belonging to Myanmar.” Instead, the more than one million Rohingya in Bangladesh may try to stay in Bangladesh indefinitely, a scenario that is becoming increasingly plausible—though as Bertil Lintner notes, the Bangladesh government desperately does not want them to remain. Already, the camp on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border is the largest refugee camp in the world, overflowing with people, crowded, and highly vulnerable to disease and human trafficking. As Lintner notes, Bangladeshi citizens are growing increasingly resentful of the refugees and worried that they might take locals’ jobs, the camp’s massive size is causing environmental damage, and there are real fears that, the longer so many Rohingya stay as refugees in desperate conditions in Bangladesh, they could become targets for radicalization by extremist groups. Yet given the abysmal prospects for Rohingya if they returned to Myanmar, he is probably correct to note that the Rohingya are “there to stay” in Bangladesh, at least for a long time. If this is the reality, what can Bangladesh, and other governments and aid agencies do about it? For one, while continuing to prepare for the (remote) possibility that Rohingya would be safely repatriated to Myanmar, the UN and other third party actors could push harder for a third country settlement solution for at least some Rohingya. There is at least some precedent for this option—Bhutanese refugees in Nepal have almost all been resettled in third countries—although it will obviously be difficult in the current global environment of large refugee flows and leaders increasingly opposed to taking in refugees. Still, there are third countries, in the region and globally, where more Rohingya resettlement might be possible in at least modest numbers, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Canada. Yet the likelihood is that the Rohingya are going to remain in Bangladesh, and both the Bangladesh government and outside actors need to prepare for that possibility.
  • Southeast Asia
    The United Nations’ Failures in Myanmar: Lessons Learned?
    Last month, the United Nations released a scathing report about the organization’s own actions in Myanmar over the past ten years. The report, written by an independent investigator, but commissioned by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, lambasted the UN for a “systemic failure” by UN agencies to find any common strategy toward the Myanmar government. This strategic failure, it noted, continued even as abuses escalated in the past five years against the Rohingya, and ultimately resulted in such atrocities that the UN’s own fact finding mission has called for Myanmar’s top military leaders to be investigated on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. The fact the UN was willing to investigate and criticize its own actions might offer some hope for change. For more on the UN’s approach to Myanmar, and whether it might shift, see my new World Politics Review article.
  • Mexico
    Global Conflict This Week: Mexico's New Security Plan
    Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.
  • Southeast Asia
    Next Steps in Addressing the Rohingya Crisis?
    Last month, the State Department released a report investigating violence against Rohingya in Rakhine State in western Myanmar. Although the report concluded that the violence was “extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving out the Rohingya residents,” as CNN noted, the report did not contain a finding that the violence rose to the level of genocide. The report also notably was released with little fanfare, despite the fact that administration officials had widely publicized that the State Department was conducting this investigation, and that a United Nations report had already found that senior Myanmar military leaders should face justice for genocide. In addition, administration officials, especially UN Ambassador Nikki Haley and her office, had been vocal about Myanmar’s brutal treatment and the need for justice for Myanmar leaders involved in the Rakhine State massacres. The report, as Politico noted, had been anticipated by the rights community and many on Capitol Hill as possibly a pivotal moment in how Washington approaches the Rakhine crisis. If the report had contained a finding of genocide or crimes against humanity, it would have provided the intellectual framework for tougher action, both in Congress and in the executive branch, against senior Myanmar military leaders, including possibly armed forces commander Min Aung Hlaing. Without that finding, the next steps for addressing the Rohingya crisis, from a U.S. policy perspective, remain unclear. The State Department has noted that “the U.S. government has previously characterized the events described in the report as ‘ethnic cleansing,’” according to Politico, and vowed to address the sources and results of the conflict in Rakhine State. Still, the finding seemed a departure from the actual evidence presented in the report. Perhaps the White House does not want to issue a finding of genocide or crimes against humanity because it does not want to empower the International Criminal Court on any issues, including those related to Myanmar. Perhaps the report’s ultimate message, despite the evidence that pointed to genocide and/or crimes against humanity, reflected a realist view of what could actually be accomplished in pressuring Myanmar. Or it might have reflected concerns about triggering a process in which targeted sanctions would be applied to Min Aung Hlaing, and he eventually ran for president in the next Myanmar election and he wound up being the elected leader of a country. The United States then would have sanctions on Myanmar’s leader. Still, advocacy from Congress—and from Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Sam Brownback, who has focused on the Rohingya issue—could possibly prod the White House to take tougher steps. In a hearing last week, Congressman Ed Royce and other leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Committee pressed the White House to reverse course and label the killing in Rakhine State a genocide. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, a longtime advocate for human rights in Myanmar, and ally of Aung San Suu Kyi, has so far deferred to the Myanmar civilian leader, claiming that she has no power to stop the military’s abuses. Yet he and other old allies of Myanmar’s civilian leader face mountains of evidence—mountains that are still growing—that Suu Kyi now has little interest in rights advocacy at all, and has not taken even most steps to constrain the armed forces—rather, she increasingly seems like their advocate. Besides ignoring or essentially defending the military’s actions in Myanmar, Suu Kyi has overseen a clampdown on press freedom, and appears publicly nonplussed at how her government treats reporters. At a certain point, it becomes impossible to deny that Suu Kyi has not used even the (somewhat) limited powers of her office to advocate for progress on rights and freedoms, and to no longer let old deference to her constrain policy toward Myanmar. On Myanmar, there is more the White House could do. In addition to a formal genocide finding, which would be a bright line echoing the UN finding, the White House could impose targeted sanctions against a wider array of senior military leaders, including the Myanmar commander in chief, who has not been named in the targeted U.S. sanctions that have been imposed so far.
  • Myanmar
    Global Conflict This Week: UN to Investigate Abuses in Myanmar
    Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.
  • Rohingya
    Global Conflict This Week: UN Fact-Finding Mission Releases Myanmar Report
    Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.
  • Southeast Asia
    Extensive Report Suggests Myanmar Military Thoroughly Planned Crimes Against Humanity in Rakhine State
    Last week, the research and advocacy group Fortify Rights, which has amassed considerable expertise on the situation in Rakhine State and the abuses perpetrated by the Myanmar armed forces, released probably its most comprehensive report yet. The report [PDF], based on interviews with more than two hundred survivors of the killings in Rakhine State and some two years of research, strongly suggests that the Myanmar military carefully laid the plans for massive crimes against Rohingya in Rakhine State in late 2017. In fact, some of the evidence collected in the report makes the situation in Myanmar seem reminiscent of the type of planning that occurred in Rwanda, prior to the genocide against Tutsis there in 1994. The Myanmar military has denied any and all allegations that it planned atrocities in Rakhine State. As the Guardian notes, “A military inquiry into the conduct of soldiers released its findings in November 2017, exonerating the army.” As the Fortify Rights report shows, however, the killings of Rohingya in late 2017 were not just an outpouring of violence or some kind of inter-ethnic bloodletting that happened in the heat of Rakhine State political tensions. Its evidence shows that, well before an attack by a shadowy Rohingya insurgent group on police posts in western Myanmar in August 2017 which the Myanmar government claims supposedly triggered the violence, the Myanmar military had apparently launched a concerted effort to prepare for the killings of Rohingya that came after August. Fortify Rights reveals that, nearly a year before, the military had begun stripping Rohingya areas of possible defenses against violence, including confiscating makeshift weapons and removing Rohingya’s fences. The report also shows that the army trained Rakhine Buddhist vigilante groups, and armed them as well, and that in 2016 and 2017 the military moved new detachments of troops into northern Rakhine State, which would be the epicenter of the violence. All this , it shows, was in preparation for 2017, and these preparations allowed Rakhine Buddhists, and security forces, to go on a rampage in late 2017 against Rohingya, with the Rohingya fully unable to defend themselves. Perhaps more than any other piece of evidence yet unveiled about the situation in Rakhine State, the report demonstrates the need for international actors to take action against senior leaders of the Myanmar military responsible for the atrocities. There is no hope that the most senior army leaders will face any reckoning within Myanmar, given the army’s continuing dominance of many facets of Myanmar politics, and Aung San Suu Kyi’s weakness, as well as the weaknesses of the civilian government. The Myanmar government has not even allowed the top UN human rights official focused on Myanmar into the country to investigate the situation in Rakhine State. But the international community should take stronger action against the top levels of the Myanmar military—even if doing so, as some analysts predict, would alienate the majority of Myanmar citizens (at least Buddhist Burmans), who have rallied around the armed forces in the past two years. Top Myanmar leaders could, for instance, be referred to the International Criminal Court, or the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) could create a framework for investigating alleged crimes in Myanmar; the Security Council will not do so, since any proposal would be blocked by China and Russia, so a UNGA framework would be a possibility. Without some kind of accountability for the Myanmar armed forces’ top leadership, the prospect of the army committing similar abuses in the future is high. And future crimes, in Rakhine, or in other ethnic minority areas, could not only bring more suffering but also further set back Myanmar’s peace process, and further undermine the country’s already-shaky political stability.
  • Women and Women's Rights
    Eradicating Wartime Rape Once and for All
    Podcast
    Today, sexual violence is used as a tactic of war, terrorism, torture, and repression, and has driven massive displacement of the civilian population in Myanmar, Syria, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere, according to the UN secretary-general’s latest report. Special Representative Patten has met with survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, and those working on the frontlines to support them, in settings such as Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria and the Bangladeshi camps where persecuted Rohingya civilians have sought refuge. Special Representative Patten shares what survivors have told her about the burden of physical and psychological trauma, social stigma, and impunity. She reflects on what is needed—from governments, justice and security sector institutions, civil society organizations, and the UN system itself —to end wartime rape once and for all. This meeting is generously supported by the Compton Foundation.   Transcript BIGIO: OK, good afternoon everybody. Thank you so much for joining us today. And welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I’m Jamille Bigio, senior fellow with the Council’s Women and Foreign Policy program. Our program has been working for fifteen years now to analyze how elevating the status of women and girls advances U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. And I want to take a moment before we begin to thank our advisory council members who are with us today, as well as the Compton Foundation for its generous support of today’s discussion. I also want to remind everyone that the presentation, discussion, and the question-and-answer period will be on the record. Yesterday marked the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violation in Conflict. This year’s theme is “The Plight and Rights of Children Born of War,” focused on the women and children released from armed and violent extremist groups who struggle to reintegrate into their families and communities. These children may be left stateless, they may be left in legal limbo, and they’re often more susceptible to radicalization, to trafficking, and to exploitation. And yet, they’ve been ignored by the broader peace and security discourse. We’ll have the opportunity today to hear more from our guest, SRSG Patten, on strategies to rectify this. It’s been a decade since the U.N. Security Council first took up the issue of conflict-related sexual violence, releasing Resolution 1820, the first that made explicit how sexual violence is a security threat for us all. Yet, as SRSG Patten recently briefed the U.N. Security Council, despite international recognition of this devastating abuse as a crime against humanity, sexual violence continues to plague conflicts from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Syria. It’s proliferated amongst extremist groups, including Boko Haram Nigeria and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. It’s also been used as a tactic of torture and repression and has driven massive displacement of the civilian populations in Myanmar, Syria, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere. I’m thrilled that we are joined today by Pramila Patten, the U.N. special representative of conflict-related sexual violence, who will share with us what she has learned meeting with survivors and those working on the front lines to support them and what more can be done to better respond to wartime rape. Since taking up your mandate as SRSG on sexual violence in conflict last June, you’ve made a concerted effort to go to the field and to engage in direct dialogue with survivors, with affected communities. Can you share some of your impressions, some of your findings from these trips? What have survivors shared with you? PATTEN: Thank you. Thank you, Jamille. I would really like to begin by sincerely thanking the Council on Foreign Relations for hosting this event to highlight the issue of conflict-related sexual violence. As you know, I took up office last year in June, I’m just a year in office. I’m the third special representative of the secretary-general since the office was established in 2010 following the adoption of the resolution in 2009. And since taking office, I have actually emphasized the importance of maintaining a survivor-centered approach to the implementation of this mandate. I see the mandate as having the face of a survivor. And for that reason, I felt it very crucial to maintain a deep conviction, connection with survivors. I felt it extremely important to directly engage and to consult with survivors. And that also is as a result of the experience that I had when I was on the CEDAW Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, on which I sat as an expert for fifteen years and took the initiative in 2010, for example, to draft a general recommendation on the situation of women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict. And for the first time, I engaged the committee in elaborating a GR, engaging regional consultation. And what I gained through these regional consultations was a real eyeopener. So when I took office, I made it a priority to actually meet with survivors in the field. I think that the insight that I gain through this direct engagement would not have been possible. The direct engagement really enabled me understand the needs, the experiences, the vulnerabilities in a way that would have been impossible. Hearing also firsthand accounts of the experience of women and men whose lives and livelihoods have been shattered by armed conflict has also enabled my office to take more strategic and targeted action to prevent and address the scourge of conflict-related sexual violence. You mentioned yesterday’s celebration of the third International Day on the Elimination of Sexual Violence. I’ll just give you one concrete example. One of my first missions when I took up office was to go to Bosnia. And during a meeting with survivors, I met a young man, an activist, who was himself a child born of rape. I thought I understood the plight of children born of rape until I met this young man. And it was a real eyeopener. And yesterday, the focus of the third international day was precisely on the plight and the rights of these children born of rape. And I brought this young man to New York and he had the opportunity to share his story at the event yesterday. To date, I have visited Iraq, Bangladesh, the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar where I went twice actually. I went to Myanmar, Guinea, Nigeria, DRC, and Sudan. And I’m now preparing to go, my next field mission will be in South Sudan in the very first week of July. Together it will be a joint U.N.-AU mission, together with the DSG and the AU special envoy for Africa. And as you know, the situation is really rapidly deteriorating in South Sudan and it becomes a priority. Each visit has been unique, but I must say that the findings across these various contexts confirm that sexual violence continues unfortunately to be used as a tactic of war and terrorism and is even being employed as a tool of political repression to target women and girls. For example, during my visit to Sudan, I met with women in Abushok and Alhujajj camps who had been displaced since 2003, 2004. And despite all the—well, the Sudanese government is in a completely distinct posture in terms of their denial. They are very proud of some of the initiatives that they have taken, such as collection of arms. But meeting with those women in a context where freedom of expression is not quite—is very much an issue, they were still very willing to share with me the security risks that they were facing as soon as they step outside of the camp, the real risk of sexual violence as we are speaking, and they took chances in talking to me in front of the national intelligence service. They shared their experiences. In West Darfur, I met with women who told me how they were unable to return to their prewar homes due to security concerns, mainly due to the fear of being raped. And some of the women shared very, very recent incidents of rapes outside of the camp. My two visits in the Rohingya refugee camp—I first went to Cox’s Bazar in November. And I engaged directly with survivors, with witnesses, with caseworkers, and service providers. And the women were very, very willing to share their stories. And what I learned firsthand from these women were these horrific accounts of sexual violence of an extremely violent nature, of girls and women being tied to rocks and trees and being gangraped by multiple soldiers. And their accounts were very much corroborated by the injuries that they were very willing to actually show me on their bodies, different parts of their bodies. But what was also clear—I was at four different camps. And we’re talking about mega camps of five hundred thousand people living in one camp. What was clear was sexual violence being used as a push factor for forced displacement in a context of an overall campaign of ethnic cleansing. At the same time, when I was there in November, there was a sense of relief on the part of these women who had successfully crossed the border. And they were relieved, they were safe now in Bangladesh, although they asked for justice and they asked that the perpetrators be brought to justice. But when I went back last month in May, there was a sense of despair because now they know that repatriation is not going to happen in the—in the near future. Their ordeal is not over. They shared security concerns now inside the camp; again, concerns about sexual violence being perpetrated by Rohingya people in the camps, but also people coming from outside. The prevalence and the extent of trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation of prostitution, they shared this with me. And all the—I met with different focus groups of women and groups of adolescent girls and that was their major, major concern, of girls being snatched after five p.m. at night from their shelters made of tarpaulin and bamboo. And they all shared stories of tarpaulin, especially the female-headed hospital and also children-headed households, of tarpaulin being slit in the middle of the night and children being snatched from the shelter. They are not able to access the toilets because men are waiting for them in the toilets. But the trafficking issue is a real major concern and they were saying it’s happening in every block. Girls are disappearing, children are disappearing. And, of course, what I also found was that these women were in need of both physical and psychosocial support, which was not, in terms of—there were gaps at both quantitative and qualitative levels. And service coverage, despite all the efforts of the different U.N. agencies in the camp, remains limited with GBV response quite underfunded. And when I went back again in May, I must say that I went back immediately after the visit with the Security Council, because in December I briefed the security council on my first visit and recommended that they also go to Cox’s Bazar in Myanmar, which they did in April. And I also prepared a package for members of the council to flag, for example, the high rate of pregnancies as a result of these rapes and the fact that many of these pregnancies were being hidden for obvious reasons and the likelihood of the maternal rate being very high and that urgent measures be taken to address the sexual and reproductive health of these—of these women. And when I went back last May, that was obviously very apparent, that what they went through in August following the crackdown was not only affecting the survivors, but also the children born of rape. It’s a real dilemma for young, unmarried women to have these babies and they’re not accessing medical care, even when it’s available. Yesterday, the government of Bangladesh gave us some figures during the event, that they estimate—and that’s, of course, very much underreported—sixty thousand pregnant women as of now and that no less than sixty babies are being born per day in the camp. And when you add this to UNFPA reports that only 22 percent of deliveries are occurring in health facilities, that gives you an idea of the scale of the—of the problem. In Iraq, I must say that, prior to my actual visit in Iraq in March, I was very much focused on the work that the office had done. And to show you the importance of field visits—again, so I was only focused on the plight of the Yazidi women, whom I had met in Berlin in the context of the special rapporteur project. But when I went to Iraq and visited a camp in Mosul and in Erbil, I met with women from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds and I understood that the Yazidi women were not the only victims. And you had a large number, for example, of majority Sunni women who were also very much victims. And in fact, their plight was—it was—it can be said that even more difficult because they are perceived as being pro ISIS. There is this misconception of every Sunni being pro Daesh. And they shared their concerns with me. In addition to—they were—they were in the IDP camps, some of them tried to return to their—to their home after Mosul was liberated, but due to security concerns, they had to return. Many of them are not accessing available support, medical and psychosocial support, out of fear of being arrested, of being questioned as intelligence assets, and of being—of being detained. Of course, the situation of the Yazidi survivors remains extremely difficult. And those that I actually met who had been released in December—I met them in March, they had been released in December—none of them had access to medical or psychosocial support. They were like living corpses sitting in front of me. And I had to spend a long time with them to be able to engage. And then I understood that there was, in addition to the stigma of sexual violence, having been in captivity for three, three-and-a-half years, there was that additional layer of stigma in terms of the association with Daesh, having lived in a Daesh environment for so long. And they, too, were very much confined to their camp, often by their parents, out also of the fear of being interrogated as intelligence assets. And the—and information that I received from NGOs also confirmed that there were many women actually in detention, but I was not able to get the actual data from the government authorities. The situation of the—of the children born of rape is even more concerning in Iraq, because I met with the religious leaders from all religious faiths and none of them are prepared to accept the children. So the Yazidi religious leaders, for example, the baba sheikh, has actually embraced the women and has actually gone a long way in encouraging families and communities to accept the women back. But the babies are simply not accepted. So when you meet the women who shared with you the choice that they had to make in terms of returning to—choosing between returning to their—to their families or choosing to stay behind and to care for—for their—for their children, it was very, very difficult. The Christian religious leaders, they are very much in denial and they say that nothing happened to the Christian women. They were given the choice between forced conversion to Islam or to leave and they left and they lost everything and they moved out of Mosul. But the NGOs tell you that there are many Christian women who also have been taken into captivity. And today, the situation is also very difficult because huge ransoms are being claimed. And I met with families who told me that they had to sell their organs to get the money to have their daughters released. And we’re talking about no less than between $25,000 to $35,000 because these are women who have been sold several times and this is the amount that is being actually claimed for their—for their—for their return. And the—for the Turkman-Shia community, the religious leaders were very straightforward. They said we simply cannot accept those children back. And what we know is that the women have not returned, they have integrated to different communities and they are not back, but they are not accounted for. We know that they have integrated and they have separate data for those who actually are still in captivity, so they have two sets of data. But they know that these women will not come back because they will be killed. This is what they said. And we are negotiating for them not to be killed, but should they return with their children, they would—both mother and child would be—would be killed. So it’s extremely, extremely complex. But what transpires in Nigeria, Maiduguri where I went, or Iraq in Mosul or Sudan is that they need physical security, but, in addition to access to medical and psychosocial services, legal support to access justice, but also economic livelihood opportunities. And this is one of my area of focus now as a result of these field missions. That economic livelihood opportunities is not only about economic survival, but it’s also part of the recovery. In Cox’s Bazar, women were asking me for knitting kits and sewing machines, which I was not able to provide because the government of Bangladesh in November was not keen on anything that could be seen as a pull factor, so nothing has been provided to these women. But in Mosul, I met with women who were actually at their sewing machine or with their knitting kits. And it made me understand that it’s really part of the—of the healing part of the—of the recovery. I can talk for ages, but that’s the area where I’m placing a lot of focus through U.N. Action Network, comprising fourteen U.N. entities, that I actually chair. That economic livelihood supports should also be part of the—of the holistic assistance that is provided to these—to these victims before they become survivors. BIGIO: So powerful to hear the messages and the priorities that survivors are sharing with you, whether it’s the continued trafficking in camps to the stigma that they’re facing and the lack of services that they’re receiving, whether psychosocial, economic support. I know that in April the U.N. Security Council held its annual debate on sexual violence and conflict, where the secretary-general presented a report and where you presented to the council some of the issues that you’ve laid out today. You had the opportunity to hear from councilmembers, where they’re seeing gaps in priorities as well. What do you see as some of the key themes and key trends coming out of that conversation at the policy level? PATTEN: Well, the report of the SG, I think, serves, above all, to measure progress or regression on this agenda. And the 2017 report, which was the first report that I presented, actually highlighted how, in spite of having reached some important legal, policy, and operational milestones, they situation in most of the—of the nineteen conflict-affected countries covered in the report remains dire and demands urgent attention. I flagged a few rising trends in the 2017 report, which is very much based also on the field mission, recalls to negative and harmful coping mechanisms in situations where survivors are deprived of the material support of their families, such as early marriage. You see that in Iraq, you see that everywhere, you see that in Cox’s Bazar, the withdrawal of girls from schools, and women from employment. So it’s very disturbing because what we are seeing in terms of trends is that the response to sexual violence is often more repression in the name of protection rather than greater gender equality and empowerment. When you see the government of Iraq trying to introduce a law that would allow nine-year-old girls to be married in the name of protection, and when you talk to the religious leaders, they all—they all support this legislation. You talk to parliamentarians, including women parliamentarians, they all support this legislation. Or you have a member of parliament, a woman, who has actually introduced a bill in parliament to say that the thirty-year-old survivors of sexual violence who are above thirty years or the female heads of house, the widows, et cetera, survivors of sexual violence, they should be married off and the government should actually give an economic package of incentive to the men who would marry them. And the religious—in the bill, they mention five million dinars. I don’t know what is the equivalent in U.S. dollars, but to the—to the religious leaders that I spoke to, they were saying, yes, maybe a flat, maybe a plot of land should be given to these men for them to marry these women. And it was an interesting discussion, but very frustrating at the same time because they simply would not accept that, you know, the same apartment or plot of land or economic package could be given to the women and help them rebuild their lives. They were all in favor of these women marrying their rapists, for example. So it’s really repression and repression in the name of protection. And I saw this in Cox’s Bazar as well, where we see how already Bangladesh is a country with one of the highest rates of early marriages. Now in Cox’s Bazar with the vulnerability of this large population, early marriage—in the name of early marriage, these girls are being given away. But they are eventually being trafficked. And that’s the trend in other countries, Central African Republic, Somalia, Yemen, we see the rates of early—of child marriage being amongst the highest in the world. And it has also spiked in the Syrian—amongst the Syrian refugees. So we—it’s clear that economic desperation continues to be also a major driver of sexual violence, that enables terrorists, transnational criminal groups in places such as Iraq or Syria or Colombia, to profit from trafficking of women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Victims are either abducted or deceived by false promises of lucrative job offers only to be forced into sexual slavery and prostitution. The sexual slavery practice by Daesh, I think it’s quite unique. Because I talk to the girls in Nigeria, I talk to the Chibok girls, I talk to—it was not—it was not quite the same. Boko Haram was actually abducting the girls and then married, they would marry the girls, and they would impregnate the girls. I was in one room with two hundred young girls—I can’t call them women, they weren’t that high, fourteen, fifteen—there were 162 babies in that room, tiny babies. And what was also—it still gives me the chill when I think of it. They came to me and said you know we were better off with our Boko Haram husband. Although in the first place we were forcefully abducted, forcefully married, but then they treated us well once we were married. No other men would abuse us. We heard they were very bad people, that they were killing, et cetera, but they did not kill in front of us. We were fed, we were clothed, our babies had food and everything. Now we are in the camp and we are being abused by men in the camp. We are stigmatized by even the women inside the camp. We are called Boko Haram wives; our babies are called Boko Haram babies. And they would not—we get abused when we go and fetch water, when we go and collect firewood. We are abused by the Civilian Justice Task Force responsible for the management of the camp. So you have that kind of situation. And then on the other hand, you have the organized sexual slavery of Daesh, where these girls—I went to Heilbronn in Germany to a shelter where many years, over fifty years, the women are living because it’s an environment where they feel more at ease. And they were sharing the details of how they were sold from one to the—one to the other and how organized it was in terms of the price list and the younger ones were more expensive, if they had blue eyes. It’s really frightening. So in the report, we depict how, for example, ISIL and other terrorist groups are trading in women and girls for profit and that women are being reduced to sexual commodities in the political economy of war and terrorism. And what we are scared of is that this model will be replicated now in other—in other conflicts. What we also flag in the report as emerging is the distressed stigma of survivors layered with the presumption of guilt by association after being forcibly gifted or married to members of armed or terrorist groups, inhibiting their return to their areas of origin. In Iraq up to now, not a single ISIS perpetrator has been prosecuted for sexual violence. Since Mosul has been liberated, there are thousands, hundreds of trials going on every day, but only through the lens of counterterrorism. So I met with the high judicial council and discussed it. Why aren’t you prosecuting sexual violence cases? And for them, the answer is clear. We simply have to prove affiliation and our antiterrorism law is back to 2006 and provides for the death penalty, whereas our criminal code dates back to the early nineteenth century and is quite archaic. But I told them, the women that I met want justice and up to now they don’t feel that they are having justice. So Boko Haram, the same thing. Not a single Boko Haram person has been prosecuted. So we see that mass rape is really met with mass impunity. And, of course, this deters survivors from coming forward. And it’s really perpetrating the culture of silence that surrounds sexual violence. It’s really not helpful. But at the same time, I’d like to be on a more positive note, the report refers to landmark cases in DRC, which were prosecuted resulting in the conviction of a colonel of the—of the force army, the FARDC, for the war crime of rape and pillage. There’s also a former member of the South Kivu parliament, a provincial parliament, who was convicted of a crime against humanity for his role in the abduction and rape of thirty-nine young children in Kavumu. And with the support of MONUSCO and the team of experts from my office, the experts, on the rule of law we have also supported these prosecutions, but hundreds of prosecutions that have been undertaken by the Congolese authorities. And I must say it’s also the roadmap towards delisting because FARDC has been listed for a few years now. And the roadmap towards delisting is really prosecution in addition to a series of measures. And I think the progress that we highlight in addressing pervasive cultures of impunity includes, for example, success we’ve had in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan with regard to legislative reform, having national penal code in line with international norms and standards where, for example, penal codes have been brought into alignment with international standards by delinking rape from adultery and morality crimes. In Sudan, there has been a huge—a huge problem. If you go—a woman goes—and in fact when I was there, many women did not even know about this change in the law, so they were still scared of reporting cases of rape. Because once they report a case of rape, it can be interpreted as adultery because they’ve had sex outside marriage. So it’s a—it’s a catch-22 situation and it’s a double-edged sword for them. So we’ve had these positive developments in terms of legislative framework. A number of countries have also signed a joint communique with my office to implement action plans to curb conflict-related sexual violence. And examples include Central African Republic, DRC, Guinea, Iraq, Somalia, and South Sudan. And when I was in Myanmar in December, I told them that I would be recommending that Tatmadaw be listed; and in fact, we have—we have. But I told them already that I will recommend to the secretary-general. It’s up to the secretary-general to endorse or not my recommendation, but that I feel dutybound and compelled to make that recommendation. And I explained to them that the way forward would be to sign a joint communique with my office, which would entail training of the armed forces, supporting national authorities to prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence amongst other measures. So I left—I left them with a draft joint communique which is still under consideration. And there’s also—similarly, I’ve expressed to the government of Bangladesh the support, I’ve extended the support of my office through a framework of cooperation to address, for example, the issue of trafficking and sexual exploitation of prostitution, and building capacity of their border guards, of their law enforcement authorities. That also is under consideration. So these are some of these milestones. At the same time, I think they need to be—to be told because they serve as an important reminder that, while we have a long way to go, it is still possible to deliver justice and to prevent and to mitigate the risk when there is political will. Côte d'Ivoire, for example, was listed, and since last year we have delisted them. And for two—for two consecutive years, there has been no new case of sexual violence being reported. So all these are clear signals that when there is political will, it is—sexual violence is preventable and we can mitigate—we can mitigate the risk. BIGIO: You’ve shared a few ideas already, but can you reflect more on what you think can and should be done? When there is political will, what are the priorities that you see that the international community, that the United Nations, that governments, the U.S. government should be pursuing to better prevent and address sexual violence? PATTEN: Well, I’ll take this opportunity to thank the U.S. government for being such a strong—such a strong supporter of this mandate, for being the penholder of this mandate, but for continuing to support. And I can assure you the support that I had with regard to the situation in Bangladesh and Myanmar, for example, if it was not for the U.S. putting the pressure, I would not have even been able to brief the Security Council on my visit to Cox’s Bazar. China was blocking, Russia was blocking, and it was through really intense lobbying of the U.S. government, the U.S. permanent mission that I was able to. So the support is critical. The support is critical, but also the financial support for the mandate. The situation in Cox’s Bazar and Myanmar is huge. And it’s absolving a lot of the—of the resources of the office in terms of the labor intensity, but also financial. Financially, it has huge implications. And we do have situations like this with Nigeria and Boko Haram. We also see, for example, in a country like DRC where resources are dwindling, but the needs are increasing with the situation in the Kasai, in Tanganyika, in Ituri where the situation is quite traumatic. And in spite of all the efforts of the—of the government and their wish to be—to be delisted, their interest to be delisted, but the figures have spiked on account of the situation in the Kasai. And yet, the resources of the office with U.N. Action Network or the team of experts, which has been doing very important work in DRC, now we are in the—in the red zone. So there’s also—there’s also that. From the perspective of my office, where I want to place the focus, is I—and these are my strategic priorities for the office. I think it’s critical to reverse this culture of impunity into a culture of prevention and deterrence through justice and accountability. And that’s where I want to place the focus, justice and accountability. And I will give you one concrete example by what I mean, justice and accountability. I take the example of Iraq. I go to Iraq, I meet with the high judicial council. I see no interest in prosecuting these cases. For them, it’s easy to go under their antiterrorism law. I meet with their religious leaders and they turn around and they say no woman is going to stand up in a court of law and will give evidence of sexual violence. And yet, when you meet with the women, they tell you they want justice. And having met those Yazidi survivors in Mosul and seeing how devastated they are and how shattered they are and how difficult it may be to start with them in a court of law in Iraq, I went to—I went to Germany and I went to Heilbronn where—I went to a shelter where there are over fifty women. And I sat down and talked to them. I had met them last year in Berlin, but I went to Heilbronn, I sat with them and said, what does justice mean to you? Are you—are you willing? This is what the religious leaders are saying, this is what the law says. We can support these, we can bring these cases. My office with my team of experts can support you to have justice. And you are the privileged ones to have been relocated in Germany, so we will take you to Iraq to go through the proper legal channel to give your—to make your complaint, we’ll take you back to Germany, and then we’ll bring you back to Iraq for the trial. And they are extremely keen. And so now my team of experts is really focused on—and we will partner with the German government, the federal prosecutor, we will partner with—there’s a psychologist with whom we’re working very closely who will be supporting these women. So we will—these test cases are crucial. And yesterday, I got an email that the Canadians now want to meet with me because they want me to also maybe take the cases of the Yazidi who have been relocated in Canada. And I was going to reach out to them and to the others where Yazidi women have relocated because I know that this is going to have an impact once the ball starts rolling. So my focus is on justice and accountability. Because I think so long as impunity prevails, sexual violence will be normalized and will be trivialized. I’m also reviewing all the joint communiques that this office has signed with a number of governments over the years. And I want also to place the focus on the legislative framework. I’m a lawyer by—I have been practicing law for thirty-five years. I think there’s no point in supporting government, in training them, et cetera, in supporting training judiciary and law enforcement on very retrograde laws that allow a victim to marry their perpetrator, et cetera. So I want to place the focus on the legislative framework so that when a government signs a joint communique, like Iraq, for example—and I was there for the adoption of the implementation plan—that they commit to review their legislative framework and we provide the support. Most of these countries are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women that are legally binding treaties, so I really want to use all these mechanisms. So for me, it’s also the partnership. I don’t work in silos. My office cannot afford to work in silos. I have to work as a system, the U.N. system. And I work very closely with the U.N. treaty bodies. And, of course, the survivors and the approach that I take is, of course, at the heart of the mandate. But also, addressing our work—by my first field mission, I was quite surprised. I was only meeting with ministry of defense, of interior, but not gender equality. And for me, addressing the invisible—addressing the root cause of this sexual violence, which is gender inequality and discrimination, is critical. So I think it’s also very, very important to address gender inequality and discrimination, which, to me, is really the invisible driver of this—of this sexual violence. When I see who are the women, who are the girls who are most vulnerable to sexual violence, we’re talking about rural women, we’re talking about uneducated, we’re talking about economically deprived women. So it’s really important. But, of course, where member states, where the U.S. government could really support is—I was on the high-level advisory group on the fifteen-year review of Security Council Resolution 1325. And we came up with this global study with great recommendations which, unfortunately, I don’t think it’s being put to good use. So really reviving 1325, ensuring that women are part, at the peace table, ensuring that women are part of the reconstruction. In Iraq right now, when I see these women in the camps—and some of them were telling me they’ve gone back and they’ve returned—and I was telling the prime minister that it’s reconstruction. A lot of money is going into Iraq for reconstruction, but reconstruction is not only about building bricks and mortar, it’s about these women and these—and these children. And women need to be part of the reconstruction, so I think that’s where the U.S. government could be very instrumental. BIGIO: Thank you. PATTEN: It’s on the right track, but could lead on this. BIGIO: There’s certainly space for much more to be done to address the kinds of issues that you’ve put on the table today. I want to open the floor for questions. Please, if you could raise your name placard, if you have one, and introduce yourself and the organization that you’re with. Q: OK. Gloria Nyrock, American ORT. I feel kind of sorry for you. You have so many places to go and so much to do. And I don’t know how big your office is, but I just—I think you’re terrific that you can—that you can stay on track and whatever. But my question is this. In some of the countries that you visit, do you feel that the U.N.—that they’re willing to work with you or they resent the fact that the U.N. comes in to talk about policies of the countries? And how do you feel about being able to accomplish your goals unless you get the government to work—to work with you? PATTEN: Well, with the U.N., of course, I have a great relationship. My visit is always facilitated by the U.N. resident coordinator. And the first meeting I always have when I go in a country will be with the U.N. family, the larger U.N. family. But, of course, that’s not the difficult part. Besides, as I mentioned, I also chair U.N. Action Network which is a network of fourteen U.N. entities delivering as one. So the U.N. facilitates my mission, the U.N.—I’ll give you one concrete example, Myanmar. The U.N. in Bangladesh or the U.N. family in Myanmar, they are waiting for this joint communique and the framework of cooperation to be signed between my office and Myanmar and Bangladesh, respectively, because that gives them also the space to work in the country. But where it becomes very difficult is precisely when the government is not always receptive. Myanmar is one concrete example. When I went to Bangladesh in November, I asked to go to Myanmar, but I did not receive any response from the government. Until the time that I briefed the Human Rights Council on the fifth of December, that’s when the invitation came. In fact, the invitation came a few days before simply because they did not want me to brief the Human Rights Council. But I told them not only I will go ahead with my briefing to the Human Rights Council, but I will also be briefing the Security Council on the twelfth of December. And immediately after briefing the Security Council, I went. I must say that I was amongst the lucky ones in the U.N. who actually had very good meetings in Myanmar, although with a state counselor the meeting turned out not to be a substantive one because she refused to engage. I met her for forty-five minutes, but she refused to engage. But all my other meetings were very positive and very, very substantive. And there was almost an acknowledgement that some elements of the Tatmadaw may have committed the sexual violence. They were receptive to the kind of collaboration that I was putting on the table based on the collaboration that we have with a large number of countries in terms of the training of the armed forces, in terms of support that we can—we can provide the judiciary law enforcement. But like I said, with Myanmar I’m still in the waiting mode. But the experience of my other colleagues in Myanmar has not been so good. But again, for me, nothing concrete has come out because I’m still waiting for them to agree to the joint communiqué. The last meeting I had with the permanent representative of Myanmar, he was indicating that I should come to Myanmar to sit with the technical team there and to work on the joint communiqué. But I proposed that they come to New York. I didn’t want to come to be in an environment where, you know, we would be compelled to compromise on issues. So, of course, it can be very difficult to work when there’s no political will and when the government—but, of course, you go with the permission of the government, you do not go on a field mission without the consent of the government. But how collaborative they are of course makes a big difference. In Iraq, for example, I must say that I was very pleasantly surprised by the openness of the authorities. But now with the elections, I don’t know what, I’m still waiting, because I will have to go back to Iraq now for the implementation of the implementation plan. But it makes a difference when you can really openly engage, when you have a prime minister who will sit with you for an hour and brainstorm on how we can support these children born of rape because it is so—it’s so unique, it’s such a tribal society, sectarian. They don’t have an easy solution. It’s not as easy as in Bosnia or in Colombia. They can’t even give a name to the child. Whose name? They can’t even—the mother cannot transmit nationality. It’s extremely—it’s extremely complex. So today, we have thousands and thousands of children born of rape in Iraq, in an orphanage, without a name, without any identity, completely in complete legal limbo. And we have commissioned research to come up with a possible solution to support the government of Iraq as to how they could—they could deal with this. For example, in Bangladesh in 1991 or ’71—1971, 1971 war with Pakistan, there were—there were also many, many cases of rape and children born of rape and the same issue. And I was discussing it, and how the then president said, OK, we don’t know what to call them, just give them my name. So you have many babies with the name of the—of the prime minister, the father of the current prime minister, Mujibur Rahman. So you have a generation of kids bearing the name. And the prime minister of Iraq was saying, you know, I don’t know how to, I simply need your help, I don’t know how to resolve—to resolve this issue of name because the mother cannot give—the mother cannot give her name and now, because the father is a Daesh perpetrator, even the grandparents are very unwilling to give their names. It’s extremely—there’s no religious, because if you are Yazidi and the father is unknown, the child automatically becomes Muslim. So it’s extremely, extremely complex. To cut a long story short, it’s a very difficult mandate with not a big staff. But I have very good people. Q: Nathaniel Davis, I teach strategy at West Point. You mentioned that the focus was on—or your focus was on justice, accountability, and law, which are—which are generally more backward-looking. And my question is, why the focus on justice rather than the present and the future of the women and other victims where greater long-term good may be achieved looking through the lens more of positive action, morality, and policy rather than the legal route? And as you just mentioned with the prime minister and what he was looking to reach out on, it looks like that’s where many want to engage. PATTEN: When you meet with survivors and the first thing they tell you they want is justice. It is a century-old problem, sexual violence. And I think what makes it a—it’s almost cost-free as we are talking, it’s almost cost-free to rape until and unless you bring perpetrators to justice. And I know that international prosecution becomes extremely—is quite rare, but there are some very good examples in places like Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala of local initiatives, of legal professionals, women’s NGOs, women’s human rights defenders having brought a number of cases. And we have a range of good practices that we can—that we can use. We see difficulties in bringing cases to the ICC, for example, and we see a recent setback that we’ve had now with the acquittal in the case of the Bemba case. I really believe that you need the—you need to have the proper legislative framework in place. And that’s also part of the prevention work. I think so. Because I have signed a framework of cooperation with the CEDAW Committee, for example. I’m totally in line with the vision of the SG who says prevention is not a priority, it’s the priority. And ensuring that you have 189 states parties that have ratified this convention, ensuring that they honor their legal commitments, ensuring that the legislative framework is in place. As a CEDAW Committee member, I have, myself, supported states parties in drafting their criminal code, ensuring that you do not have a, for example, provision where a rapist would be let off if he marries the victim. I have drafted victim and witness protection laws. So ensuring that women have access to justice and empowering women. And that’s why I say it’s a three pillar—it’s a three pillar. It’s reversing that culture of impunity, it’s addressing the root cause, which is gender inequality and discrimination, and having that survivor-centered approach. I think it’s very holistic when you look at the three pillars. BIGIO: Well, I think this is incredible to hear what you’ve learned from survivors on the priorities and to see the opportunities that you’ve shared with the Security Council, the opportunities of the joint communiqués, and the work being done by governments to tackle this. I’m sorry we haven’t had the opportunity to get to all of the questions, but please join me in thanking SRSG Patten for joining us today. (Applause.) I know we all wish you good luck in your portfolio. PATTEN: Thank you. (END)